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R&D intensive firms make significant contributions to the economic growth of a country. 
Majority of the R&D intensive firms are from High-Tech industries (such as 
telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and computer hardware) and are characterized by 
high growth potential (Kohers and Kohers, 2000) and operate in a relative risky business 
environment. These firms have a high pressure to innovate and grow its knowledge base 
to stay competitive in the market place. R&D intensive firms can stay innovative or grow 
its knowledge base either by undertaking a series of in-house projects over time or by 
acquiring external knowledge bases (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). However, due to 
competitive pressure and time-lag in developing in-house innovative capabilities, R&D 
intensive firms often resort to mergers and acquisitions (M&A hereafter) activities to 
realize growth potential. This study focuses on the M&A activities of R&D intensive 
firms with a Canadian M&A sample. 
 
 Prior studies in this area find that, in general, investors react favorably to the 
M&A announcements by high-tech acquiring firms (Kohers and Kohers, 2000). 
However, there are some important issues that are not adequately addressed in the extant 
literature. First, most of the prior studies with high-tech acquisitions are based on U.S. 
data. As Doukas and Petmezas (2007) point out, results of earlier M&A studies could be 
limited to a particular market. For example, most of the earlier studies with U.S. data 
have reported negative or insignificant reactions to M&A deals for the acquiring firms 
(Bruner, 2002); whereas, most of the Canadian studies have reported significantly 
positive reactions to M&A deals for the acquiring firms’ (Dutta and Jog, 2009). 
Therefore, results of earlier U.S. studies my not be extended to other M&A markets. 
Second, earlier studies primarily focus on acquisitions in high-tech sectors and assume 
that all firms in the high-tech sectors engage in extensive R&D activities and foster 
innovations. However, it is likely that all firms in the high-tech firm do not have similar 
focus on R&D activities and innovations. Similarly, some firms in the so-called low-tech 
sectors (such as food industry, mining industry) may pursue high level R&D activities. 
Therefore, it is more reasonable to focus on a firm’s R&D intensity (R&D expenditure by 
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sales) across all industry sectors instead of just focusing on high-tech sectors. Third, 
although prior studies examine the market reactions to M&A deals in high-tech sectors, 
not much attention has been paid to find explanation as to why market reacts in that 
particular way. In order to have a deeper insight into this issue, according to our view, we 
need to examine the differentiating characteristics of R&D intensive firms. Lastly, one of 
the main challenges in high-tech acquisitions is to integrate the target firm and its key 
people (Chaudhuri and Tarbizi 1999). Poor integration may cause failure of the 
acquisitions. In order to examine this integration issue in the acquisitions by R&D 
intensive firms, we need to examine the long-term operating performance of the 
acquiring firm subsequent to an acquisition. To the best of our knowledge, prior studies 
have not examined this issue. This study aims at filling these gaps. 
 
 In this study, we focus on 925 completed deals by Canadian acquirers between 
1993 and 2002 that have information on R&D expenditures. While examining the returns 
to acquiring firm shareholders in the R&D intensive firms we evaluate two competing 
hypotheses: ‘growth potential hypothesis’ and ‘integration failure hypothesis’. According 
to the ‘growth potential hypothesis’, considering the growth potential of the targets 
acquired by R&D intensive firms, investors are likely to react positively. ‘Integration 
failure hypothesis’ focuses on integration difficulties of a target firm by an R&D 
intensive acquiring firm and suggests that investor might be skeptical of such acquisitions 
and react negatively. Our results show that R&D intensity (i.e. R&D expenditure by 
sales) has a positive and significant effect on cumulative abnormal returns of the 
acquiring firms around the announcement dates. This implies that market generally favors 
the M&A deals by the R&D intensive firms. An analysis of the differentiating 
characteristics reveal that R&D firms have a significantly higher growth potential and 
undertake more stock financed deals compared to the non R&D firms. Further, our results 
show that there is no significant change in long-term operating performance subsequent 
to the acquisitions for both R&D firms and non R&D firms. In general, our results show 
support for ‘growth potential hypothesis’.  
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 Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we examine 
Canadian acquiring firms and thus present out-of-sample evidence with a different 
developed country capital market. We take the view that differences in the size of the 
economy and in the capital market and regulatory environment may lead to different 
results. Most of the prior studies focus on U.S. acquisition markets, where most of the 
M&A deals take place. However, Canadian M&A market is also considerably large and 
vibrant. As reported by Crosbie & Co., a Toronto-based merchant bank, total transaction 
values of the announced deals during 2007 was $370 billion with 1,941 deals in Canadian 
M&A market. This was a record in Canadian M&A history with 60 transactions in excess 
of $1 billion. Dutta and Jog (2009) identify a number of important differences between 
the Canadian and the U.S. M&A markets and show that market reactions to M&A 
announcements differ between these two markets.1 Second, we present some plausible 
explanations for the observed market reactions to the M&A deals undertaken by R&D 
intensive firms. We find that R&D firms are growth firms and they use stock deals more 
frequently compared to the non R&D firms. Third, we examine the long-term operating 
performance of the acquiring firms to evaluate the integration challenges in the 
acquisitions by R&D intensive firms. Finally, in the spirit of Kohers and Kohers (2001) 
we have also examined the long-term stock return performance of acquiring firms to 
understand the extent of overvaluation of the M&A deals. However, unlike Kohers and 
Kohers (2001) we do not find any significant long-term stock return underperformance 
for the R&D intensive firms. This finding reiterates the views of Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) that outcome of M&A studies could be dependent on a particular market data. 
 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the 
background and relevant literature review. Section 3 discusses the sample and 
methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 presents 
the results of robustness checks. Section 6 presents summary and conclusions. 
 
1 M&A studies using U.S. data generally report either negative or insignificant abnormal returns for the 
acquiring firms around the announcement date (Bruner, 2002). This is contrary to the notion of the synergy 
motive that leads to acquisition activities. In contrast, previous Canadian studies consistently report 
significantly positive abnormal returns around the announcement date (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Yuce 
and Ng, 2005).  
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Acquisitions by R&D intensive firms 
 
R&D intensive firms face unique challenges as they operate in an uncertain and high-risk 
business environment. These firms need to deal with both new product development 
challenges and shorter product life cycles. As Chaudhuri and Tarbizi (1999) suggest, for 
the R&D intensive or High-Tech firms “a successful new product may boost market 
share and profits, but the relentless pace of innovation means that any one gain is likely 
to be brief” (p. 124). In order to satisfy the changing market needs, these firms need to 
develop long-term and sustainable capabilities and often need to make acquisitions to 
expand and sustain their technological and new product development capabilities.  
 
 Chaudhuri and Tarbizi (1999) examine the practices of 24 high-tech companies in 
their execution of 53 acquisitions in order to understand the key success factors in high-
tech acquisitions. They identify three critical steps in making a successful high tech 
acquisition: (i) assessing the needs prior to make an high-tech acquisition, (ii) identify 
potential targets and conduct extensive due diligence, and (iii) retain and integrate the 
new people. Most of the successful acquisitions that Chaudhuri and Tarbizi (1999) have 
studied have undertaken all these steps carefully. For example, prior to Cisco’s decision 
to acquire Crescendo - a privately held switch developer, the networking staff at Cisco 
had acknowledged the need to move into new switching technology due to the 
monitoring of rival competition and reacting to the resultant competitive pressures. The 
acquisition cost $95 million, and the integration went smoothly as the engineering staff 
were allowed to remain in the same team environment that they were originally in before 
the acquisition and the former founder (Mario Mazzola) of Crescendo was appointed 
head of all enterprise products at Cisco—the dominant business unit of the firm. Another 
example of a successful merger includes Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), who carefully 
considered NextGen before acquiring it in 1996. (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999). 
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 However, not all high-tech acquisitions are well-planned and well-coordinated. 
Many of the high-tech acquisitions are done hastily to achieve some short-term goals. In 
the high-tech industry that is characterized by fast-changing technology and markets, 
acquisitions aimed at a specific product or market share do not contribute to long-term 
success (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999). Further, the managers of R&D intensive firms are 
likely to be infected with ‘hubris’ (Roll, 1986) and may make judgmental errors in 
making acquisitions. As a result, many high-tech acquisitions have failed in the past. In 
Canada, Nortel was a tech giant in 1990s and its shareholders had experienced some 
unprecedented increase in their wealth. However, in 1990s managers of “Nortel went on 
frequent buying sprees, often using its own stock to take over tiny companies with 
promising technologies. In 2000 alone, it bought 11 companies for a total of $19.7 billion 
US” (CBC News, September 16, 2009). Such unwise acquisitions led to the downfall of 
Nortel and wiped out shareholders’ wealth.  
 
 A number of prior studies have examined the high-tech acquisitions and 
corresponding market reactions. Kohers and Kohers (2000) examine a U.S. sample of 
1,634 mergers in the various high-tech areas that occurred between January 1987 and 
April 1996. The study results show that acquirers of high-tech targets experience 
significantly positive abnormal returns, regardless of whether the method of payment is 
cash or stock. Further, Kohers and Kohers (2000) find that high-tech targets are paid 
higher premiums than non-high-tech targets. 
 
 Kohers and Kohers (2001) examine a sample of 304 mergers involving both U.S. 
acquirers and foreign acquirers with ADRs, occurring over the period from January 1984 
through December 1995. This study primarily focuses on the long-term stock return 
performance of high-tech acquirers. Their findings show that although acquiring firm 
shareholders react positively to high-tech takeover announcements, these acquirers 
generally underperform industry-matched benchmarks and size- and book-to-market 
matched control portfolios in the long-run. This implies that market shows excess 
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enthusiasm about high-tech acquisitions around the announcement dates and these 
overreactions are corrected in the long-run. However, it should be noted that, Kohers and 
Kohers (2001) do not make corrections for cross-sectional correlations in the holding 
period return (HPR) test statistics. This is likely to induce bias in the test statistics and 
overstate the results (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000).  
 
 Benou and Madura (2005) examine the investment bank’s role in high-tech M&A 
activities. The study results show that high-tech acquisitions using an investment bank of 
any tier are viewed more favorably than similar acquisitions with no investment bank. In 
case of high-tech public targets, however, deals advised by top tier banks perform better 
than those advised by mid- or third-tier banks. These findings are in line with the 
complexity involved in high-tech acquisitions. It appears that investors have more faith in 
a deal once it is endorsed by an investment bank. 
 
2.2 Implication of Payment Method in the M&As by R&D Intensive Firms 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) contend that if the bidder believes the firm’s shares are properly 
valued, it may offer cash to send a positive signal to the market. As a result, the market is 
likely to view a cash offer as more favorable than a stock offer. Also, if the bidder is 
uncertain about the target’s value, the bidder may not want to offer cash because the 
target will only accept a cash offer greater than its true value and the bidder will have 
overpaid (Fishman, 1989; Fuller et al., 2002). An alternative tax-based hypothesis exists 
that favors stock offers. If a bidder acquires a target with cash, target shareholders must 
pay taxes immediately; while in the case of stock offers, tax implications are deferred 
(Fuller et al., 2002). Empirical studies generally support the hypothesis that shareholders 
of acquiring firms view cash offers more positively than stock offers (Fuller et al., 2002; 
Moeller et al., 2003). In a Canadian context, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) do not find any 
significant difference for cash payments.  
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In the case of a high-tech acquisitions or acquisitions by R&D intensive firms, 
stock financed deals may have some distinctive advantages. First, it might be more 
prudent to use stock as a method of payment considering the high risk associated with 
and uncertainty involved in high-tech acquisitions. Stock payment is likely to mitigate the 
information asymmetry about the target (Hansen, 1987) and share the risk of a target’s 
overvaluation with the target’s owners (Officer et al., 2009). Second, as Denis and Denis 
(1995) report, target firm’s existing management is often changed in the cash financed 
deals. Such dramatic changes in target firm management may disrupt the post-acquisition 
integration process severely, specially in the high-tech acquisitions. Finally, in the stock 
financed deals existing shareholders of a target firm are more likely to retain a significant 
level of ownership. It is more important to have existing shareholders monitoring the 
activities of the newly acquired firm in high-tech acquisitions due to the complex nature 
of high-tech business. Therefore, in the context of acquisitions by high-tech or R&D 
intensive firms, market may react differently with respect to different payment methods 
and view stock financed deals more favorably. Officer et al. (2009) have empirically 
examined this issue and found that acquirers’ returns are significantly higher in stock-
swap acquisitions of difficult-to-value targets, as measured by R&D intensity and 
idiosyncratic return volatility. However, Kohers and Kohers (2000) do not find any 
significant relationship between method of payment (stock or cash) and acquirers of high-
tech targets.  
 
2.3 Integration of Targets and Impact on Long-term Operating Performance  
 
Conjectures for long-term operating performance of acquiring firms generally evolves 
around ‘synergy motives’. Synergy motive of M&A envisages that there will be an 
improvement in the operating performance of the acquiring or the merged firm in the 
post-acquisition period. Realization of synergistic gains depends on how well a new 
target is integrated with the existing operations of an acquiring firm. Chaudhuri and 
Tarbizi (1999) have identified the post-mergers integration of a target firm as a key factor 
for the successful acquisitions in high-tech sectors. In case of high-tech acquisitions it is 
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quite challenging to integrate the key people of target firms and often acquiring firms do 
not pay adequate attention to this important issue. Goold and Campbell (1998) find that 
synergy initiatives often fall short of management expectations due to poor integration 
efforts. 
 
 A smaller but growing body of literature has investigated the long-term operating 
performance of acquiring firms. However, previous empirical studies in this area have 
reported inconsistent results (Martynova et al., 2006). Most of the recent US based 
studies either report an improvement in operating performance (Heron and Lie, 2002; 
Linn and Switzer, 2001), or an unchanged performance (Moeller and Schlingemann, 
2005) 2. Results from the studies on other markets are also inconsistent. For example, 
using UK data, Powel and Stark (2005) report modest improvements in operating 
performance for acquiring firms. For continental Europe, Gugler et al. (2003) report an 
insignificant increase in post-acquisition profit and Martynova et al. (2006) report an 
insignificant decrease in operating performance. In the similar fashion, Asian studies also 
present inconsistent results (Rahman and Limmack, 2004; Sharma and Ho, 2002). 
Rahman and Limmak (2004) show that operating performance improves significantly for 
Malaysian acquirers; whereas, Sharma and Ho (2002) find insignificant changes in 
acquirers’ post-acquisition operating performance for Australian firms. We are unaware 
of any study that has examined the long-term operating performance of R&D intensive 
acquiring firms. 
 
2.4 Puzzle for Market Participants: Competing Viewpoints 
 
Preceding discussions present various issues and factors that may influence the acquiring 
firm shareholders’ perception about the M&A activities undertaken by R&D intensive 
firms.   
 
2 Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) report no significant change in the long-term operating performance for 
the overall sample. However, they find that cross-border acquisitions have a negative impact on the long-
term operating performance.  
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 In one hand, investors might be quite enthusiastic about the acquisitions by R&D 
intensive firms due to the high-growth potential of the combined firm. In order to sustain 
long-term growth potential and market share, at times it is imperative for the R&D 
intensive firms to make acquisitions. In-house capability development may take time and 
could be more expensive. Therefore, investors might view the acquisitions by R&D 
intensive firms more favorably. We term this view as the ‘growth potential hypothesis’. 
Further, investors of R&D intensive firms are likely to favor ‘stock’ as a method of 
payment that shares the risk of overvaluation of a target firm with the target shareholders.  
 
 On the other hand, due to inherent technological complexity level and uncertainty 
in the high-tech sector, there is a risk of integration failure of target firms in the high-tech 
sector (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999). In the R&D intensive sector, integration of a target 
firm is more challenging due to the involvement of intangible assets and critical human 
capital. If the target firm is not integrated properly, the long-term operating performance 
of the acquiring firm would suffer - leading to shareholders’ wealth destruction. Due to 
this integration risk, investors might view the acquisitions by R&D intensive firms less 
favorably. We term this view as the ‘integration failure hypothesis’. In this study we 
examine both hypotheses with a Canadian M&A sample.  
 




This study considers all Canadian M&A deals that occurred between 1993 and 2002 and 
involved a TSX-listed bidding company. We obtain our dataset from the SDC Thomson 
Financial Database. Our data meet the following criteria: (i) the deals were completed, 
(ii) the acquiring firm was not from the financial industry, (iii) acquiring firms with 
multiple acquisitions during 1993-02 period were considered, and (iv) deals with all sizes 
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of transaction value were considered3. Stock return data was collected from the Canadian 
Financial Market Research Center (CFMRC) database. Accounting information was 
collected from the StockGuide database. Using the System for Electronic Document 
Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) database, we collect data related to governance 
variables from annual reports and management information circulars.4 The sample set-up 
and the descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, 2 and 3. 
Insert Table 1, 2 and 3 about Here 
Descriptive statistics of the sample show that: (i) in line with the overall Canadian 
merger and acquisitions (M&A) activities, there is an increase in M&A deals between 
1996 and 2000 but a decline in the post 2000 period but with much larger individual deal 
sizes. (ii) Most of the acquirers (757 out of 968 acquiring firms) are single acquirers (that 
is, made only one completed deal in a calendar year); the rest of the firms made more 
than one acquisition in a given year. (iii) Most of the deals are in minerals, 
manufacturing, and service industries consistent with the industrial landscape in Canada.  
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of deal-specific factors for a sample with 
no multiple acquisitions. The sample consists of 925 annual observations for acquiring 
firms between 1993 and 2002 that have R&D expenditure data. For acquiring firms, only 
one event is considered in case of multiple acquisitions by the firm in any year. Panel A, 
B and C present descriptive statistics for full sample, firms with R&D expenditures and 
firms with no R&D expenditures, respectively. In terms of the characteristics of the 
offers, we find that (Table 2) there are significantly higher number of (a) merger offers 
than tender offers, (b) pure cash transactions than share swaps, (c) growth acquiring 
firms5 than value acquiring firms, and (d) unrelated acquisitions.  
 
 
3 Out of 1300 events considered in the study, only 88 cases have transaction values less than $1 million 
CDN.  
4 Management proxy circulars are unavailable on the SEDAR database before 1997, which complicated our 
ability to collect information on all governance variables before that date. 
5 We define a growth-acquiring firm as the acquiring firm with price-to-book value of more than 1 in the 
preceding year of an acquisition. 
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Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of firm-specific factors. Panel A, B and 
C present descriptive statistics for full sample, firms with R&D expenditures and firms 
with no R&D expenditures, respectively. Table 3 shows that R&D firms are generally 
larger firms (characterized by market and book value of equity, revenue and total assets), 
have more growth potential (characterized by price to book value ratio), and acquire 




3.2.1 Abnormal returns around the announcement dates 
 
We follow Brown and Warner’s (1985) standard-event study methodology to calculate 
bidder-announcement effects – abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) – around initial acquisition announcements. We use the market model, which 
expresses daily abnormal returns as: 
     )Rβα(RAR mtjjjtjt +−=                        (1)                                 
Where  and  are the observed returns for security “j” and the market portfolio, 
respectively, in time period “t” relative to the event date of interest. We compute the 
security-specific parameters 
jtR mtR
jα  and jβ  over the estimation period t-31 to t–120 trading 
days.6 We exclude the 30-day time interval t-30 to t-1 days to avoid including information 
about the event that may affect security returns. We use multivariate (regression) analysis 




                                                 
6 Some studies use a longer estimation window (e.g., t-41 to t–240 days). As the estimation window increases, 
the chance of encountering other external events during this estimation period also increases. Since many 
acquirers make multiple acquisitions, we chose to use a shorter estimation window in our analysis. 
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3.2.2 Long-term operating performance 
 
We use a firm’s cash-flow to total assets as a measure of operating performance. We 
present the results for pre- and post-acquisition operating performance using cash flow to 
total assets that is somewhat standard in this literature. To ensure that the results do not 
depend on the methodological choices we use both industry (mean) adjusted (Healy et al., 
1992) and matching firm adjusted (Ghosh, 2001) cash flow to total assets in the pre- and 
post-event period7. The reason for using the latter is two fold: First, Ghosh argues that 
larger firms generally make acquisitions within an industry segment and they are likely to 
be more profitable compared to the industry average benchmark just because of the size 
effect (Fama and French, 1995). Second, acquiring firms generally make acquisitions 
following a period of above industry average performance. Therefore, industry mean 
adjusted operating performance results might be biased. In order to select a matching 
firm, we follow a two-stage procedure. First, we identify all the TSX firms that have not 
made any acquisition in the period of 1992 to 2003. Second, we perform an OLS 
regression considering all acquiring firms and matching firms. We regress the firms’ 
return on equity on firm size and market-to-book value variables and select matching 
firms based on the nearest propensity score obtained by using the coefficients of firm size 
and price-to-book value factors.  
 
 Once we obtain the benchmark cash flows, we compute the industry (mean) 
adjusted and matching firm adjusted cash flows as follows: 
 
 Industry adjusted cash flow return = acquiring firm’s cash flow to total  asset 
      – Industry  mean cash-flow to total asset                       (2a) 
 
 Matching firm adjusted cash flow return = acquiring firm’s cash flow to total asset  
               – matching firms cash-flow to total asset               (2b) 
 
7 Matching firm benchmarks are selected in the spirit of Barber and Lyon’s (1997) arguments. 
 13




 Subsequently, we first calculate the industry (or matching firm) adjusted 
profitability for each acquiring firm for three years prior and three years subsequent to the 
takeover event. The mean pre-acquisition profitability is compared to the mean 
profitability over the three years subsequent to the merger. We use the t-test to examine 
the difference between pre- and post-acquisition mean performance.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1 Short-term Performance of the Acquiring Firms in the Cross-border Acquisitions 
 
In this section, we use multivariate analysis (OLS regression) to examine the effects of 
R&D intensity (i.e. R&D expenditure divided by sales) on acquiring firms’ Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs). We employ the following regression model: 
 
CAR =  α + β1 × R&D intensity + β2 × Stock Pay + β3 × R&D intensity × Stock Pay   
 + β4 × Public target + β5 × ln(Market value) + β6 × Price to book value  
 + β7 × R&D intensity × Price to book value + β8 × Related target + β9 × ln(Relative size)   
 + β10 × Tender Offer + β11 × Year dummy + β12 × industry dummy + ε         (3) 
 
Insert Table 4 about Here 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression models. All regression models use CAR (-5, 
+5) as the dependent variable. Regression models include a number of independent and 
control variables. “R&D intensity” is calculated as the R&D expenditure of the acquiring 
firm divided by annual sales. “Market vale” is the total market value of the acquiring 
firm’s equity in the preceding year of M&A event “Stock pay” is a dummy variable. If 
the medium of transaction is pure stock, the value of this dummy variable is ‘1’ and ‘0’ 
otherwise. “Public Target” is a dummy variable. If the target is a public firm, its value is 
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‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Price to book value” is a ratio of the market price to book value of 
acquiring firm’s share. “Related target” is a dummy variable. For a related acquisition 
(based on 4-digit SIC code), the value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Relative size” is the ratio 
of transaction value and market value of the acquiring firm’s equity. “Tender Offer” is a 
dummy variable. If a firm completes an acquisition through a tender offer, the value is 1 
and 0 otherwise. Two interaction terms (“R&D intensity × Stock Pay” and “R&D 
intensity × Price to book value”) are included to examine the moderating effect of “Stock 
Pay” and “Price to book value” on the relationship between R&D intensity and CAR. 
Model 1 does not include and interaction effect, Model 2 includes only one interaction 
effect (“R&D intensity × Stock Pay”), whereas Model 3 represents the full model. All 
three models show that coefficient of “R&D intensity” is positive and significant at 5% 
level. This implies that shareholders of R&D intensive firms view M&A activities 
favorably. Probably, they view these M&A activities as the right vehicle to realize the 
growth potential of acquiring firms and maintain the technological capabilities. Among 
other variables, “Relative Size” shows positive and marginal significance (at 10% level). 
The acquisition of a relatively large target is likely to be a more important economic 
event for the acquirer than is the acquisition of a relatively small target (Eckbo et al., 
1990). Higher relative size could bring in more synergy (positive effect). 
 
 Like Kohers and Kohers (2000), results presented in Table 4 shows no 
significance for “Stock Pay”. Similarly, none of the interaction terms are significant in all 
three models. We also examine the moderating effect of “Related target” by including an 
interaction term (“R&D intensity × Related Target”) in the model (results are not 
reported here). Through this interaction term, we examined whether or not R&D 
intensive firms make additional gains by making an acquisitions in the same industry or 
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4.2 Differentiating Characteristics of R&D Firms 
 
In order to find some plausible explanations for the positive relationship between R&D 
intensity and acquiring firms cumulative abnormal returns, in this section we examine the 
differentiating characteristics of R&D based firms. We employ the following logistic 
regression model to examine the differentiating characteristics of cross-border cash 
financed and stock financed deals.       
Logit (π(R&D Firms)) =  α + β1 × Stock Pay + β2 × Public target  
  + β3 × ln(Market value) + β4 × Price to book value  
  + β5 × Related target + β6 × ln(Relative size) + β7 × Tender Offer  
  + β8 × Year dummy + β9 × industry dummy + ε          (4) 
 
where, π(R&D Firms) is the probability of an acquiring firm to have R&D activities. All 
independent variables are described in the preceding section and in Table 4 and 5. Table 
5 (Model 4, 5 and 6) shows the logistic regression results that examine the differentiating 
characteristics of R&D firm. Model 4 includes the effect of “Stock Pay” but exclude the 
effect of “Price to book ratio”. Model 5 includes the effect of “Price to book ratio” but 
exclude the effect of “Stock Pay”. Model 6 includes both “Stock Pay” and “Price to book 
ratio” variables. 
Insert Table 5 about Here 
 Table 5 presents some interesting results. In all three models, we find that the 
coefficient of “long of Market Value” is positive and highly significant (at 1% level). It 
implies that larger firms have more resources to engage in research activities. Model 4 
and 6 show positive and significant coefficient for “Stock Pay” variables. This implies 
that R&D firms are more likely to use stock payments compared to the non R&D firms. 
Finally, Model 5 and 6 show that “Price to book value” have a significant and positive 
coefficient. This suggests that, in general, R&D firms have higher growth potential.  
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 These findings reinforce the view that, investors might be quite enthusiastic about 
the acquisitions by R&D intensive firms (as reported in Table 4) due to the high-growth 
potential of the combined firm. Further, investors of R&D intensive firms are likely to 
favor ‘stock’ as a method of payment that shares the risk of overvaluation of a target firm 
with the target shareholders. Overall, the results presented in Table 4 and 5 lend support 
for the ‘growth potential hypothesis’. 
 
4.3 Long-term Operating Performance of R&D Intensive Firms 
 
In the preceding section we have found evidence that R&D based acquiring firms’ 
investors are enthusiastic about new acquisitions. Possibly, investors react positively to 
such deals for potential growth prospects. However, due to the complexity involved in 
the high-tech acquisitions and reliance on intangible human capital, there is a high level 
of integration risk involved in such acquisitions. Do R&D intensive firms integrate these 
acquisitions reasonably well? To gain a deeper insight into this issue, we examine the 
long-term operating performance of R&D firms (who have R&D expenditures) and non 
R&D firms (who do not have any R&D expenditures).  
Insert Table 6 about Here 
 Table 6 presents the univariate results for both (i) industry-adjusted and (ii) 
matching firm adjusted operating performance. Panel A presents the results for ‘R&D 
firms’ group. We find significant improvements in “acquiring firms” operating 
performance while considering industry adjusted pre- and post-acquisition operating 
performance (mean difference is 2.1% per year and significance level is 0.008) 8 . 
However, we do not see any significant difference in pre- and post-acquisition 
performance once we consider matching firm adjusted operating performance (mean 
difference is -1.5% per year and the significance level is 0.261)9, albeit there is a negative 
trend. As argued by Ghosh (2001), there are methodological challenges with ‘industry 
 
8 We obtain similar results with median comparison.  
9 We obtain qualitatively similar results by using the ‘intercept approach’ as suggested by Healy et al. 
(1992).  
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adjusted approach’ and hence we rely primarily on ‘matching firm adjusted approach’ 
results. In general, the results presented in Panel A show that acquisitions made by R&D 
firms do not show any significant deterioration in acquirer’s long-term operating 
performance. These results are consistent with short-term stock performance presented in 
Table 4; whereby we found that market reacts favorably to the M&A deals announced by 
R&D intensive firms.  Panel B presents the results for ‘Non R&D firms’ group. Similar 
to the ‘R&D firms’ group, this group also does not show any significant changes in 
operating performance in the long-run, once we consider the results from matching firm 
approach. 
 
 These results do not support the ‘integration failure hypothesis’. It appears that 
although R&D intensive acquirers somewhat struggle to integrate a new target firm after 
acquisitions (as evident in a negative trend in long-term performance shown in Panel A - 
matching firm approach), their long-term operating performance do not suffer 
significantly. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
 
5.1 Examining the Role of Governance Factors 
 
In the recent past, there has been an increased level of attention to corporate governance 
issues and how a firm’s governance structure influences its decision making process. 
Two of the most important corporate governance mechanisms – that are extensively 
examined in the extant literature - are the ownership structure and the board structure. In 
this study, we subsequently examine the impact of CEO ownership structure and board 
structure on the market reactions to M&A announcements.  
 
 Earlier studies such as Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
point out that the level of managerial ownership is a potential source of agency problem. 
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If the managerial ownership is too low, their interest will not be aligned with that of other 
shareholders. As a result, management may make decisions that are not in the best 
interests of shareholders. On the other hand, if management has considerable ownership 
in a firm, they may be more careful in making a decision that is more favorable for the 
existing shareholders as the increased level of managerial ownership would align 
management’s interest with that of shareholders’ (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Subrahmanyam et al., 1997). This would lead to better managerial decisions. However, 
some studies have argued and showed that such relationship might not be monotonic 
(Morck et al., 1988). Kohers and Kohers (2000) examine the impact of insider ownership 
on acquirer’s abnormal return and find that the acquirer’s insider ownership has a 
positive effect on acquirer up to a certain point. 
 
 A common perception is that the board of directors plays an active role in 
formulating corporate strategy (Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001) which could often be 
quite complex and challenging (McDonald et al., 2008). Previous studies examine the 
role of board independence (i.e., presence of insider/ outsider directors) on a firm’s 
strategic decision making processes. However, the extant literature provides competing 
theories and evidence. For example, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) hypothesize that 
insider board members’ representation would facilitate a board’s involvement in their 
firm’s strategic change process as insiders have relatively greater access to corporate 
information and are in a better position to evaluate CEO actions. Furthermore, outside 
directors may evaluate CEO performance solely on the basis of short-term financial 
performance that would prompt CEOs to act conservatively. Several recent studies share 
similar views (e.g. Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2009; Harris and Raviv, 2009). On the 
other hand, as Johnson et al. (1993) point out, outside directors’ goals may be more 
aligned with shareholder interests and may seek strategic change when they encounter 
poor firm performance. 
Insert Table 7 about Here 
 Table 7 (Model 7, 8 and 9) shows the OLS robust regression results that test the 
impact of governance variables on the acquisition announcement returns. We use the 
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CARs of the acquiring firms in the window of (-5, +5) days around the acquisition 
announcement as the dependent variable. “CEO ownership” indicates the total stock 
ownership held by the CEO of the acquiring firm. “Ratio of Ind. Directors” indicates the 
independence of acquiring firm’s board structure. It is calculated as the ratio of 
independent or unrelated board members and total number of directors on the board. 
However, none of these governance variables show any significant results. In all three 
models (Model 7, 8 and 9), the coefficient of R&D intensity variable still remain positive 
and significant. This shows robustness of the results presented in Table 4.  
 
5.2 Examining the Long-term Stock Return Performance 
 
Kohers and Kohers (2001) find that although acquiring firms in high-tech sectors react 
favorably to the M&A deals around the announcement dates, the same acquirers show 
significant long-term stock return underperformance. Kohers and Kohers (2001) attribute 
such observations to the initial excess enthusiasm by the acquiring firms’ investors that 
lead to errors in judgment.  Given the high-growth potential of high-tech firms, initially 
market participants might overestimate the gain from these M&As, which are corrected 
over time leading to a long-term stock return underperformance. 
 
 Although, this explanation has some merit, there are fundamental challenges in 
drawing firm conclusions on the misevaluation of M&A deals based on long-term stock 
return performance results. Earlier studies that report long-term abnormal stock returns 
assume that the market gradually reassesses the quality of acquiring firms as the results of 
the acquisition become more clear (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). However, according to 
the market efficiency hypothesis, the market should correct any over-reaction or under-
reaction within a short period of time. Fama (1998) investigated a set of past studies that 
examined the long-term abnormal performance following a corporate event (such as IPO, 
mergers, stock-split). He dismissed any systematic claim of long-term abnormal returns 
and concluded that “consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis that the anomalies 
are chance results, apparent overreaction of stock prices to information is about as 
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common as under-reaction. And post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is 
about as frequent as post-event reversal” (p. 304). In a very comprehensive study, that 
uses a set of benchmarks and different methodologies (e.g. calendar time and event time 
approach), Mitchell and Stafford (2000) report inconclusive evidence or no abnormal 
long-term returns for U.S. acquirers. In a more recent study, Dutta and Jog (2009) report 
no systematic long-term abnormal returns for the Canadian acquiring firms. Further, 
investigation of long-term abnormal stock returns primarily shed light on the perception 
of market participants and extent of misevaluation. However, notwithstanding such 
arguments and findings, evidence of long-term underperformance as presented in some of 
the detail and careful studies (such as Rau and Vermaelen, 1998) remains a puzzle and 
keep the issue controversial.  
 
 In this section we examine the long-term stock return performance of Canadian 
acquiring firms for two groups, namely, R&D firms and non R&D firms. The relevant 
methodology and the results are presented below. 
 
Methodology: We followed standard buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
methodology10 (Barber and Lyon, 1997) in order to examine the long term performance 
of acquiring firms. We define the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) as the return on 
a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm less the return on a buy-and-hold 











iti RERBHAR       (5) 
Expected return, E(Rit ), in Equation 3, is calculated in two ways: by using (i) a reference 
portfolio return (such as market index return), and (ii) control firm return (such as a 
matching firm based on size and book to market value ratio). As reported by Barber and 
Lyon (1997), BHAR with reference portfolio is subject to a new listing bias, a skewness 
bias, and a rebalancing bias. We used Lyon et al.’s (1999) methodology to account for 
 
10 We use monthly return data for three years (i.e. 36 monthly return data) starting from the closing date of 
the deal in the BHAR analysis. 
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skewness bias while we calculated BHAR with reference portfolio. The control firm 
approach eliminates the new listing bias (since both the sample and control firm must be 
listed in the identified event month), the rebalancing bias (since both the sample and 
control firm returns are calculated without rebalancing), and the skewness problem (since 
the sample and the control firms are equally likely to experience large positive returns). 
In the control firm approach, we used the same matching firms as identified in the BHAR 
analysis. However, neither the reference portfolio approach nor the control firm approach 
accounts for cross-dependence among acquisition events which poses a serious problem 
to event-time based long-term performance methodologies such as BHAR. Consequently, 
we have adopted the correction procedure employed by Mitchell and Stafford (2000) for 












≈       (6) 
Where, N = number of sample events, )(BHARσ  is the cross-sectional sample standard 
deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of ‘N’ firms and ji,ρ  = average correlation 
of individual BHARs. In this study, we report our results based on control firm approach. 
Insert Table 8 about Here 
Results: Table 8 presents the BHAR analysis for R&D firms and non R&D firms. Results 
for both value weighted BHAR and equal weighted BHAR are presented in Panel A and 
Panel B, respectively.  Results from Panel A and Panel B show that both R&D firms and 
non R&D firms do not exhibit and significant long-term stock return underperformance. 
Our results differ significantly from Kohers and Kohers (2001) who report long-term 
underperformance for high-tech acquirers with a U.S. sample. Although most of the 
earlier studies with a U.S. sample show negative or insignificant results for acquiring 
firms around the announcement dates, Kohers and Kohers (2000 and 2001) report that for 
high-tech acquirers the market reactions are significantly positive. Kohers and Kohers 
view such results as an excess enthusiasm by investors around the high-tech M&A 
announcements. They posit that market overestimates the growth potential of high-tech 
M&As at the initial stage and gradually make downward corrections in the long-run. This 
leads to the long-term underperformance of the high-tech acquiring firms. Although, 
 22
S.Dutta, V.Kumar / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 1-37 
 
 
these results are interesting, it should be noted that there are methodological challenges 
that are not adequately addressed in Kohers and Kohers’ (2001) long-term performance 
analysis. Kohers and Kohers’ (2001) do not make adjustments for cross-sectional 
independence in BHAR test statistics. In an influential study, Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) argue that we need to make corrections for cross-sectional dependence in BHAR 
analysis in order to mitigate biases in BHAR test results. 
 
 In the Canadian context, the results presented in Table 8 are not surprising. The 
results of insignificant changes in long-term stock return performance (as reported in 
Table 8) are also in line with Fama’s (1998) argument. While most of U.S. studies report 
negative or insignificant results for acquiring firms, previous Canadian studies 
consistently report significantly positive abnormal returns around the announcement date 
(Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Yuce and Ng, 2005). Therefore, positive reactions by the 
investors of Canadian R&D intensive firms around the M&A announcement dates are not 
surprising. Further, our long-term operating performance analysis shows that R&D firms 
do not show any significant failure in integrating a target. In summary, we do not find 
any evidence of over enthusiasm by shareholders of Canadian R&D intensive firms 
around the M&A announcement dates. These observations show support to Doukas and 
Petmezas (2007) view that outcome of M&A studies could be dependent on a particular 
market data.   
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Due to the competitive pressure and time-lag in developing in-house innovative 
capabilities, R&D intensive firms often resort to mergers and acquisitions activities to 
realize growth potential. However, M&A activities pose significant challenges for the 
R&D intensive firms. High-tech acquisitions are complex in nature and require 
significant efforts in integrating the new targets and its intangible but critical human 
capitals. Accordingly, it is also difficult for the investors to evaluate the prospects of an 
acquisition undertaken by R&D intensive firms.  
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 In this study, we focus on 925 completed deals by Canadian acquirers between 
1993 and 2002 that have information on R&D expenditures, thus provide an out-of-
sample study. Our results show that R&D intensity (i.e. R&D expenditure by sales) has a 
positive and significant effect on cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiring firms 
around the announcement dates. This implies that market generally favors the M&A 
deals by R&D intensive firms. An analysis of the differentiating characteristics between 
R&D and non R&D firms reveals that R&D firms have a significantly higher growth 
potential and undertake more stock financed deals compared to the non R&D firms. It 
appears that investors of R&D intensive firms view these acquisitions as a mean to 
realize higher growth potential and react positively to these M&A announcements. 
 
 In order to understand the integration challenges posed by a new target to an R&D 
intensive firm, we further analyze the long-term operating performance of R&D firms. 
Our results show that although there are some signs of struggle by the R&D firms in 
integrating a new target firm after acquisitions (characterized by a negative trend in long-
term performance), it does not make any significant impact on long-term operating 
performance. Finally, in the spirit of Kohers and Kohers (2001), we also examine the 
long-term stock return performance of R&D firms. Unlike Kohers and Kohers (2001), 
our results do not show any significant long-term underperformance. This finding 
supports the view of Fama (1998), who terms long-term abnormal stock return results as 
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Table 1. Yearly and Sectoral Distribution of Canadian Acquirers Listed on Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
The sample size is 1300 acquisition events over 1993-2002 period by Canadian acquirers listed on the TSX. 
The sample includes multiple acquirers. ‘Multiple acquirers’ refers to the acquiring firms that acquire more 
than one target in a calendar year. ‘Single acquirers’ acquire only one target in any calendar year. 
 



















Value (in $ 
mil. CDN) 
1993 93 70 57 13 4919.0 52.9 
1994 105 82 67 15 9021.2 85.9 
1995 107 78 63 15 7757.6 72.5 
1996 139 100 73 27 7366.3 53.0 
1997 159 127 101 26 11293.7 71.0 
1998 160 109 81 28 40006.9 250.0 
1999 135 105 84 21 30467.8 225.7 
2000 150 107 85 22 54739.8 364.9 
2001 134 100 75 25 18440.2 137.6 
2002 118 90 71 19 18922.5 160.4 
       
Total 1300 968 757 211 202934.9 156.1 
 
 



















Value (in $ 
mil. CDN) 
       
10 Minerals 394 303 242 61 31723.3 80.5 
20-39 Manufacturing 325 239 184 55 89352.3 274.9 
40 Communications 154 101 71 30 53195.2 345.4 
50 Trade 42 35 30 5 1730.2 41.2 
70-89 Services 385 290 230 60 26933.9 70.0 
       














Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Deal-Specific Variables for Acquiring Firms 
The sample consists of 925 annual observations for acquiring firms between 1993 and 2002. For acquiring firms, only one event is considered in case of multiple 
acquisitions by the firm in any year.  “Deal size” is the total transaction value in million Canadian dollars. “Tender or merger” is a dummy variable. If the 
acquisition is completed through tender offer, the value is “1” and “0” otherwise. “Target type” is a categorical variable outlining the nature of target firm. Three 
categories are created: (i) public target, (ii) private target, and (iii) other (subsidiaries, joint ventures etc.). “Related/unrelated acquisition” is a dummy variable. 
For related acquisition, the value is “1” and “0” otherwise. It is determined based on the SIC code of acquiring firm and target firm. Two versions of this dummy 
variable are created based on: (i) 4-digit SIC code, and (ii) 2-digit SIC code (not reported here). “Methods of payment” is a categorical variable outlining the 
nature of transaction payment mode. Three categories are created: (i) pure cash payment, (ii) pure stock payment, and (iii) mixed or other. “Growth or value” is a 
dummy variable. The value is “1” if the acquiring firm’s price to book value ratio is greater than 1 and “0” otherwise.  
 
Full Sample R&D Firms Non R&D Firms 
     Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
Deal Size Less than 10m 391 42% 122 42% 269 42% 
(Transaction Value) 10 to 100m 369 40% 118 41% 251 39% 
 More than 100m 
 
165 18% 48 17% 117 18% 
       
        Tender or Merger Tender 107 12% 25 9% 82 13%
 Merger
 
       
       
        
818 88% 263 91% 555 87%
Target Type Public 272 29% 81 28% 191 30%
 Private       
       
348 38% 104 36% 244 38%
 Other (Sub., JV) 
 
305 33% 103 36% 202 32% 
Related/ Unrelated Target  Related 382 41% 106 37% 276 43% 
(based on 4 digit SIC) Unrelated 543 59% 182 63% 361 57% 
              
Methods of Payment        Cash 539 58% 156 54% 383 60%
 Stock       
        
       
110 12% 44 15% 66 10%
Other/Mixed
 
276 30% 88 31% 188 30%
Growth or Value Acquirers Growth 760 82% 245 85% 515 81% 
 Value       
        
128 14% 31 11% 97 15%
Info. not available 37 4% 12 4% 25 4%




Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Specific Variables for Acquiring Firms 
The sample consists of 925 annual observations for acquiring firms between 1993 and 2002. For acquiring 
firms, only one event is considered in case of multiple acquisitions by the firm in any year. “Market vale of 
equity” is the total market value of the acquiring firm’s equity in the preceding year of M&A event 
“Market value of equity” is calculated as the year end share price multiplied by number of outstanding 
shares. “Revenue” is the annual sales revenue of the acquiring firm. “Total assets” and “Total equity” are 
obtained from acquiring firm’s balance sheet. “Cash flow to total asset” is the ratio of operating cash flow 
to total asset of acquiring firm. “Price to book value” is the ratio of market price of share to the book value 
per share. “Relative size” is the ratio of transaction value and market value of the acquiring firm’s equity.  
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Table 4. Effects of R&D Intensity on Acquirer’s Return 
Table 4 shows the OLS robust regression results that test the impact of R&D intensity on the acquisition 
announcement returns. We use the CARs of the acquiring firms in the window of (-5, +5) days around the 
acquisition announcement as the dependent variable. For acquiring firms, only one event is considered in 
case of multiple acquisitions by the firm in any year. “R&D intensity” is calculated as the R&D 
expenditure of the acquiring firm divided by annual sales. “Market vale” is the total market value of the 
acquiring firm’s equity in the preceding year of M&A event “Stock pay” is a dummy variable. If the 
medium of transaction is pure stock, the value of this dummy variable is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Public 
Target” is a dummy variable. If the target is a public firm, its value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Price to book 
value” is a ratio of the market price to book value of acquiring firm’s share. “Related target” is a dummy 
variable. For a related acquisition (based on 4-digit SIC code), the value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Relative 
size” is the ratio of transaction value and market value of the acquiring firm’s equity. “Tender Offer” is a 
dummy variable. If a firm completes an acquisition through a tender offer, the value is 1 and 0 otherwise. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are presented 
in italics.  
 
Dependent Variable: CAR (-5, +5) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
R&D Intensity 0.0473** 0.0643** 0.0535** 
 0.0230 0.0210 0.0330 
Ln (Market Value) 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 
 0.7170 0.7030 0.7270 
Stock Pay -0.0135 -0.0099 -0.0097 
 0.3330 0.4910 0.5040 
Public Target -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0029 
 0.5690 0.5900 0.5870 
Related Target -0.0112 -0.0105 -0.0104 
 0.2150 0.2430 0.2470 
Tender Offer -0.0202 -0.0199 -0.0199 
 0.1500 0.1570 0.1580 
Price to Book Value 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 
 0.9770 0.9760 0.9410 
Ln (Relative Size) 0.0045* 0.0045* 0.0045* 
 0.0900 0.0900 0.0910 
R&D Intensity × Stock Pay  -0.0415 -0.0497 
  0.2170 0.2660 
R&D Intensity × Price to Book Ratio   0.0042 
   0.7000 
Constant 0.0190 0.0178 0.0195 
 0.6670 0.6870 0.6590 
    
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 627 627 627 










Table 5. Differentiating Characteristics of R&D Firms 
Table 5 shows the logistic regression results that examine the differentiating characteristics of R&D firm. 
π(R&D firm) is the dependent variable that denotes the probability of being an R&D firm. “R&D firm” is a 
dummy variable. If an acquiring firm has R&D expenditure, its value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Market 
vale” is the total market value of the acquiring firm’s equity in the preceding year of M&A event “Stock 
pay” is a dummy variable. If the medium of transaction is pure stock, the value of this dummy variable is 
‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Public Target” is a dummy variable. If the target is a public firm, its value is ‘1’ and 
‘0’ otherwise. “Price to book value” is a ratio of the market price to book value of acquiring firm’s share. 
“Related target” is a dummy variable. For a related acquisition (based on 4-digit SIC code), the value is ‘1’ 
and ‘0’ otherwise. “Relative size” is the ratio of transaction value and market value of the acquiring firm’s 
equity. “Tender Offer” is a dummy variable. If a firm completes an acquisition through a tender offer, the 
value is 1 and 0 otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. P-values are presented in italics.  
 
Dependent Variable: π(R&D firm) Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
    
Ln (Market Value) 0.241*** 0.237*** 0.248*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Public Target 0.0802 0.0277 0.0771 
 0.486 0.812 0.517 
Related Target -0.314* -0.338* -0.341* 
 0.068 0.057 0.056 
Tender Offer -0.438 -0.401 -0.369 
 0.156 0.199 0.239 
Stock Pay 0.605***  0.556** 
 0.01  0.024 
Ln (Relative Size) -0.0747 -0.0602 -0.0662 
 0.133 0.241 0.198 
Price to Book Value  0.141*** 0.139*** 
  0.001 0.001 
Constant -3.19*** -3.4*** -3.72*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 881 857 857 
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Table 6. Operating Performance (Cash Flow to Total Assets) for Pre- and Post-
Merger Period 
“Industry adjusted cash flow to total asset” is the average difference in the operating performance (cash 
flow to total asset) between the acquiring firm and industry average for a given year relative to the 
acquisition year. “Industry adjusted post average cash flow to total asset” is the average of “Industry 
adjusted cash flow to total asset” for post acquisition period (year +1, +2 and +3). “Industry adjusted pre 
average cash flow to total asset” is the average of “Industry adjusted cash flow to total asset” for pre 
acquisition period (year -1, -2 and -3).” Industry adjusted post and pre difference” is the average of the 
difference between “Industry adjusted post average cash flow to total asset” and “Industry adjusted pre 
average cash flow to total asset”. “Matching firm adjusted cash flow to total asset” is the average difference 
in the operating performance (cash flow to total asset) between the acquiring firm and matching firm for a 
given year relative to the acquisition year. The “Individual marching firm” was selected based on the 
nearest propensity score with respect to firm size and price to book value. “Matching adjusted post average 
cash flow to total asset” is the average of “matching firm adjusted cash flow to total asset” for post 
acquisition period (year +1, +2 and +3). “Matching adjusted pre average cash flow to total asset” is the 
average of “Matching firm adjusted cash flow to total asset” for the pre-acquisition period (year -1, -2 and -
3). “Matching firm adjusted post and pre difference” is the average of the difference between “Matching 
adjusted post average cash flow to total asset” and “Matching adjusted pre average cash flow to total asset”. 
t-statistics and significance level are reported for each mean difference. In case of multiple acquisitions by 
a firm in any year, only one event was considered in the analysis. All operating performance variables are 
expressed in decimals. Mean differences in operating performance are expressed in decimals (not in 
percentage). “R&D firm” is a dummy variable. If an acquiring firm has R&D expenditure, its value is ‘1’ 
and ‘0’ otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Panel A. Operating performance of acquiring firms with R&D Expenditures (i.e. R&D firms) 
Year Relative to 
M&A 
Industry adjusted cash flow  
to total asset 
(Acquiring firm – Industry Avg.) 
 Matching firm adjusted cash flow to 
total asset 
(Acquiring firm – Matching firm) 
 Mean t-stat p-value  Mean t-stat p-value 
3 0.084*** 7.185 0.000  -0.003 -0.192 0.848 
2 0.094*** 9.857 0.000  0.047*** 2.626 0.009 
1 0.100*** 10.214 0.000  0.054*** 3.059 0.003 
-1 0.080*** 8.127 0.000  0.057*** 4.095 0.000 
-2 0.064*** 6.107 0.000  0.039** 2.101 0.037 
-3 0.074*** 6.583 0.000  0.067*** 3.785 0.000 
        
Post Average: 
mean of years 3, 
2, and 1 0.095*** 11.922 0.000 
 
0.039*** 2.628 0.009 
Pre Average: 
mean of years –3, 
-2, and -1 0.073*** 8.805 0.000 
 
0.054*** 4.185 0.000 
(Post - Pre) 
Difference 
 0.021*** 2.688 0.008 
 












Panel B. Operating performance of acquiring firms with no R&D Expenditures (i.e. non R&D firms) 
Year Relative to 
M&A 
Industry adjusted cash flow  
to total asset 
(Acquiring firm – Industry Avg.) 
 Matching firm adjusted cash flow to 
total asset 
(Acquiring firm – Matching firm) 
 Mean t-stat p-value  Mean t-stat p-value 
3 0.029*** 3.754 0.000  0.047*** 3.723 0.000 
2 0.025*** 5.390 0.000  0.049*** 5.236 0.000 
1 0.021*** 4.336 0.000  0.051*** 4.622 0.000 
-1 0.023*** 5.387 0.000  0.052*** 6.963 0.000 
-2 0.016*** 3.520 0.000  0.053*** 6.636 0.000 
-3 0.014*** 3.052 0.002  0.050*** 5.171 0.000 
        
Post Average: 
mean of years 3, 
2, and 1 0.025*** 5.545 0.000 
 
0.049*** 5.424 0.000 
Pre Average: 
mean of years –3, 
-2, and -1 0.016*** 4.462 0.000 
 
0.050*** 7.053 0.000 
(Post - Pre) 
Difference 
 0.009** 2.127 0.034 
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Table 7. Effects of Governance Variables on Acquirer’s Return (1997 – 2002) 
Table 7 shows the OLS robust regression results that test the impact of governance variables on the 
acquisition announcement returns. We use the CARs of the acquiring firms in the window of (-5, +5) days 
around the acquisition announcement as the dependent variable. For acquiring firms, only one event is 
considered in case of multiple acquisitions by the firm in any year. “R&D intensity” is calculated as the 
R&D expenditure of the acquiring firm divided by annual sales. “Market vale” is the total market value of 
the acquiring firm’s equity in the preceding year of M&A event “Stock pay” is a dummy variable. If the 
medium of transaction is pure stock, the value of this dummy variable is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Public 
Target” is a dummy variable. If the target is a public firm, its value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Price to book 
value” is a ratio of the market price to book value of acquiring firm’s share. “Related target” is a dummy 
variable. For a related acquisition (based on 4-digit SIC code), the value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Relative 
size” is the ratio of transaction value and market value of the acquiring firm’s equity. “Tender Offer” is a 
dummy variable. If a firm completes an acquisition through a tender offer, the value is 1 and 0 otherwise. 
“CEO ownership” is the total stock ownership by a CEO in the acquiring firm. “Ratio of Ind. Director” is 
calculated as the ratio of independent board members and total board size (i.e. total number of directors). *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are presented 
in italics.  
 
Dependent Variable: CAR (-5, +5) Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
    
R&D Intensity 0.0395** 0.0539** 0.0562** 
 0.0330 0.0240 0.0450 
Ln (Market Value) 0.0034 0.0037 0.0037 
 0.4550 0.4220 0.4200 
Stock Pay -0.0148 -0.0109 -0.0110 
 0.4280 0.5800 0.5770 
Public Target -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0037 
 0.6220 0.6390 0.6390 
Related Target -0.0075 -0.0068 -0.0068 
 0.5370 0.5740 0.5740 
Tender Offer -0.0342 -0.0343 -0.0342 
 0.0760 0.0760 0.0760 
Price to Book Value -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 
 0.8220 0.8170 0.8550 
Ln (Relative Size) 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 
 0.3040 0.3000 0.3020 
CEO Ownership 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 0.3720 0.3630 0.3660 
Ratio of Ind. Directors 0.0237 0.0262 0.0262 
 0.4960 0.4570 0.4580 
R&D Intensity × Stock Pay  -0.0315 -0.0288 
  0.3220 0.4640 
R&D Intensity × Price to Book Ratio   -0.0011 
   0.9120 
Constant -0.0133 -0.0184 -0.0187 
 0.8190 0.7540 0.7500 
    
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 384 384 384 
R-square 0.0423 0.0435 0.0435 
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Table 8. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for acquiring firms (with 36 
monthly returns following the deal completion) 
“BHAR” is the buy and hold abnormal return based on the average difference in the aggregated 
(compounded) performance between the included stock and the benchmark over a 36-month period starting 
after the effective month of acquisition. Value weight BHAR is calculated based on the market value 
weight of the acquiring firm at the effective date of acquisition. Equal weight BHAR is calculated based on 
the equal weight of the acquiring firm at the effective date of acquisition (i.e. equal weight is assigned to 
each case irrespective of its market value). BHAR uses individual matching firm returns as the benchmark. 
Adjusted t-statistics accounts for skewness and cross-sectional dependence in stock returns. BHAR values 
are expressed in decimals (not in percentage). “R&D firm” is a dummy variable. If an acquiring firm has 
R&D expenditure, its value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. R&D and Non R&D firms (Value Weight results) 
 M&A deals by R&D firms  
(N = 244) 
M&A deals by non R&D firms 
(N = 475) 
Value weighted BHAR 






Adj. t-stat 0.107694 1.115692 
 
Panel B. R&D and Non R&D firms (Equal Weight results) 
 M&A deals by R&D firms  
(N = 244) 
M&A deals by non R&D firms 
(N = 475) 
Equal weighted BHAR 
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ABSTRACT  
    Current integration and co-movement among international stock markets has been 
boosted by increased globalization of the world economy, and profit-chasing capital 
surfing across borders. With a reputation as the fastest growing economy in the world, 
China’s stock market has continued gaining momentum during recent years and incurred 
growing attention from academicians, as well as practitioners. Taking into account 
economic and geographical considerations, the US and Hong Kong are considerably the 
most comparable stock markets to China. The usual vector error correction model 
(VECM) could overlook the long memory feature of cointegration residual series, which 
can in turn exert bias on the resulting inferences. To overcome its limitations, we employ 
a fractionally integrated VECM (FIVECM) in this paper to investigate the long-term 
cointegration relations binding China’s stock market to the aforementioned stock markets. 
In addition, by augmenting the FIVECM with multivariate GARCH model, the return 
transmission and volatility spillover between market return series were revealed 
simultaneously. Our empirical results show that China’s stock market is fractionally 
cointegrated with the two markets, and it appears that China’s stock market has stronger 
ties with its neighboring Hong Kong market than with the world superpower, the US 
market.     
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Globalization has been gaining momentum and has become irreversible regardless of 
sporadic oppositional influences. This phenomenon is a direct result of increased 
interaction between world economies, including both developing and developed countries. 
The stock market is one of the forefront players in this unprecedented spectacle in history, 
whilst the examination of integration within the world stock markets is one of the most 
important issues in finance. 
 
A large number of studies have been examining integration among the world’s stock 
markets. In an era of increasing globalization where there is a substantial capital flows 
across countries, integration among world stock markets has important practical 
relevance for both investors and financial policy makers. An important determinant of 
interdependence among stock markets across countries is economic integration in the 
form of trade and investment flows. The dividend discount model suggests that the 
current share price equals the present value of future cash flows, which depends on the 
earnings growth of a company. On the other hand, earnings growth also depends on the 
macroeconomic conditions of the domestic market as well as the macroeconomic 
conditions in countries with which a country trades and sources its investment flows 
(Shamsuddin and Kim, 2003). Thus, interdependence in stock markets may also reflect 
geographical proximity among markets with economically close ties. They are expected 
to exhibit high levels of market linkages because of the presence of similar investor 
groups and cross-listed companies. 
 
However, greater financial integration implies reduced opportunities for international 
portfolio diversification. Co-movements among markets can result in contagious effects 
where in an effort to form a complete information set, investors incorporate price changes 
in other markets into their trading decisions, inferring that shocks and errors in one 
market can be transmitted to other markets. Such contagious effects have been 
 39
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exacerbated by major events which have affected world stock indices in recent decades 
such as the 1987 stock market crash, Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the recent world 
financial crisis in 2008. Correspondingly, individual countries’ monetary and fiscal 
schemes are being designed to tackle possible external infections. 
 
   This paper focuses on examining relations between China’s stock market and world 
markets partially represented by the US and Hong Kong markets. We attempt to detect 
the relations between China and these two particular markets because these two markets 
are believed to have stronger relations with China than other markets in the world. The 
US market is the leading and most influential market in the world, it is also the largest 
trading partner of and the biggest foreign direct investment source for China. Hong Kong, 
on the other hand, is China’s closest market due to economic, political, and geographical 
factors. Interdependence in stock markets may also reflect geographical proximity 
between markets, like China and Hong Kong, whom have economically close ties which 
are expected to exhibit high levels of market linkages because of the presence of similar 
investor groups and cross-listed companies. Conclusions from the interactions of China’s 
stock market with the US and Hong Kong markets may depict the main topology of 
China’s market in the world, the former shows the hierarchical importance of the world’s 
superpower, and the latter exhibits a close neighbor in the evolution of China’s stock 
market. Inferences could be valuable to international portfolios coving these markets.  
 
  In addition, this paper makes a methodological contribution to extend the vector error 
correction model (VECM) to the fractionally integrated VECM (FIVECM) in examining 
the co-movements of the China’s market with the US and HK markets. Using FIVECM 
enables investors not only to reveal the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship 
and short-run dynamics among cointegrated variables, it also accounts for possible long 
memory in the cointegration residual series which may otherwise bias the estimation and 
draw misleading inference. Furthermore, conditional heteroskedasticity is often observed 
in market return series due to ever-changing underlying economic conditions over time. 
Accordingly, we augment the FIVECM with a GARCH-type model to capture the second 
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moment autocorrelations in the return series. In particular, we employ the BEKK(1,1) 
model proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995) to model the evolution of conditional 
variances. Since there are no restrictions1 imposed on the coefficient matrices of 
conditional mean and conditional variance equations, lead-lag relations in the return 
series and the possible volatility spillover effects are simultaneously revealed in this 
model.   
 
   Our empirical findings clearly demonstrate that China’s stock market is fractionally 
cointegrated with both US and Hong Kong markets. Though the volatility spillover 
between China and the US markets is not clear, in this paper we discovered information 
transmissions between China and Hong Kong markets. Overall, our empirical evidence 
demonstrates that China’s stock market has a closer relation with Hong Kong market than 
the US market. This finding reflects the fact that China’s stock market and financial 
market as a whole is still under-liberalized and regulated, which renders it operating 
relatively independent of world’s leading market. The close nexus between China’s and 
Hong Kong markets is also attributable to the strong dependency of the HK economy to 
mainland China. We further divided the sample into two sub-samples marked by the East 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 and the recent world financial crisis in 2008 to the 
financial integration, in order to study the possible structural breaks caused by the crises. 
However, the estimation results did not show much difference for the two sub-samples 
before and after the crisis. Therefore, we will skip the discussion of the results for the 
sub-periods and stick to one sample investigation.  
 
   The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the major 
literatures and states the motivations for this paper. Section 3 describes the data and 
methodology employed. Section 4 presents the empirical results and implications. 
                                                 
1 Except mild restrictions imposed on the elements of coefficients matrices in order to ensure identification 
of BEKK(1,1) model. Readers may refer to Propositions 2.1-2.3 of Engle and Kroner (1995) for more 
information.  
 41
Z. Yi, C. Heng, W.K. Wong / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 38-74 
 
Conclusions are made in Section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND MOTIVATIONS 
 
The basic tenant of portfolio theory is that international investors should diversify assets 
across countries, provided that returns to stocks across countries are not highly correlated. 
The seminal studies of market interdependence and portfolio diversification include 
Grubel (1968), Levy and Sarnat (1970), Ripley (1973), and Lessard (1974). These studies 
have investigated integration between developed markets, integration between emerging 
markets, and integration between one or more developed markets and several emerging 
markets. 
  
  Most of the early studies used correlation analysis to examine short-run linkages 
between markets. However since the beginning of the 1990s, several studies, of which 
Kasa (1992) is one of the earliest, have used cointegration methods to examine whether 
there are long-run benefits from international equity diversification. Whether stock 
markets are cointegrated carries important implications for portfolio diversification. 
Cointegration between markets imply that there is a common force, such as arbitrage 
activity, to bring the movements of stock markets together in the long run, inferring that 
testing for cointegration is a test of the level of arbitrage activity in the long-run. In 
theory, if stock markets are not cointegrated, arbitrage activity to bring the markets 
together in the long-run is zero, inferring that investors can potentially obtain long-run 
gains through international portfolio diversification (Masih and Masih, 1997, 1999). On 
the other hand, if the markets are cointegrated, the predictability of each stock market can 
be enhanced through using information contained in the other stock markets. In this 
situation, the potential for making supra-normal profits through international 
diversification in the cointegrated markets is limited in the long run. This is because 
supra-normal profits will be arbitraged away in the long-run and, in the absence of 
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barriers or potential barriers generating country risk and exchange rate premiums, one 
would expect similar yields for financial assets of similar risk and liquidity irrespective of 
nationality or location (von Furstenberg and Jeon, 1989). 
 
   Granger (1986) suggests that cointegration between two prices reflects an inefficient 
market on the basis that if two prices share a common trend in the long run, this implies 
predictability of each price’s movement, which in turn indicates that one market may be 
affected by another. The more accepted view, however, is that cointegration does not 
necessarily imply anything about efficiency (Dwyer and Wallace, 1992). For example, 
Masih and Masih (2002) suggest that a market is inefficient only if by using the 
predictability, investors can earn risk-adjusted excess returns, but predictability itself 
does not necessarily say anything about risk-adjusted excess rates of return. 
 
Most studies testing for long-run relationships between markets have typically used 
the method of cointegration pioneered by Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988). 
Fernandez and Sosvilla (2001, 2003) examined stock market integration between the 
Japanese market and Asia Pacific markets, and United States market and Latin American 
markets, respectively, using the Johansen (1988) and Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
approaches to cointegration and found more evidence of cointegration allowing for a 
structural shift in the cointegration vector. On the other hand, Siklos and Ng (2001) 
considered whether stock markets in the Asia-Pacific region were integrated with each 
other, and with the United States and Japan using the Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
approach to testing for cointegration, and found that the 1987 stock market crash and 
1991 Gulf War were turning points in the degree of integration.  
 
  Other common approaches to analyze co-movement include VAR analysis and 
Bayesian approach. For example, using VAR analysis, Eun and Shim (1989) found 
evidence of co-movements between the United States stock market and other world 
equity markets. Investigating the dynamics of stock market returns of the US, Japan and 
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Asia-Pacific stock markets, Cheung and Ng (1992) found that the United States market 
was a dominant global force from 1977 through 1988. However, not all research supports 
cointegration among international stock markets. Using Bayesian methods, Koop (1994) 
concluded that there are no common stochastic trends in stock prices across selected 
countries. Due to the significance of October 1987 crash of the US market, Lee and Kim 
(1994) examined and found that national stock markets became more integrated after the 
crash. Similarly, using a VAR and impulse response function analysis, Jeon and 
Von-Furstenberg (1990) showed a stronger co-movement among international stock 
indices after the 1987 crash. There is a large literature on integration among the 
Asia-Pacific markets or integration between major world equity markets and Asia-Pacific 
markets. For example, Ng (2002) and Daly (2003) examined market linkages between 
Southeast Asian stock markets. There are several studies which consider whether the 
Japanese and/or United States market is cointegrated with Asia-Pacific markets (Cheung 
and Mak, 1992; Chung and Liu, 1994; Pan et al. 1999; Johnson and Soenen, 2002). 
       
When a set of variables are cointegrated, the well-known Granger representation 
theorem yields vector error correction model (hereafter VECM) as the proper model to 
incorporate both cointegration relation and short-run dynamics among cointegrated 
variables. Most of cointegration studies listed above employs VECM to reveal the 
relations between underlying variables. The key aspect of VECM is that cointegration 
residual or error which is supposed to be I(0) process exerts correction effect to the 
long-run dynamics of underlying series. Specifically, when cointegrated variables deviate 
from the long-run relation, the immediately past period cointegration error acts as a force 
to pull the drifting variable back toward the equilibrium. This adjustment mechanism is 
based on the key assumption that the cointegration error follows a stationary I(0) process. 
However, the cointegration error between economic and financial series has been found 
to exhibit long memory feature which is consistent with neither stationary I(0) nor 
nonstationary I(1) processes. This special stochastic process is termed I(d) process with d 
being fractional real number, see, for example, Baillie (1996). When the cointegration 
error follows I(d) process which is found to be case for this study, long history of lagged 
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cointegration errors also have correction effect to the dynamics of cointegrated variables. 
FIVECM has been applied to optimizing dynamic hedging ratios in derivatives market, 
like Lien and Tse (1999), but rare in studies on cointegration of equity markets.  
 
   Since China’s market has a short history, the interactions and relations between 
China’s market and other world markets have not been extensively investigated. One 
exception is Huang et al (2000) who examined whether there is a long-run relationship 
between the stock markets of the United States, Japan and the South China Growth 
Triangle using the Gregory and Hansen (1996) method and found that the only markets 
among these which are cointegrated were Shanghai and Shenzhen. However, China’s 
stock market, initiated in early 1990s, has made a leaping progress during its only fifteen 
years’ presence, the total capitalization has reached US$464.29 billion, 1378 companies 
are listed and more than 72 million investors are registered across the country (as of date 
Feb. 2005). Today, China is widely considered the most promising developing market. 
China’s rising stock market echoes its fast-growing economy and its increasing 
interaction with the world in terms of trade. China’s GDP has more than tripled from 
1993 to 2003, the total amount of foreign trade (imports plus exports) of China jumped 
from US$115 billion in 1991 to US$1100 billion in 2004. China’s astonishing economic 
achievements during the last two decades are largely attributed to open and 
market-oriented economic policies implemented from early 1980s. As China’s economy 
is increasingly integrated with the world economy, China has also stepped up reforms and 
liberalizations of its financial market. Especially prior to and after joining the WTO, 
China accelerated the deregulation in financial market, meaning a great deal of the 
previous restrictions imposed on financial markets were lifted. Within 3-5 years, China’s 
financial market will be completely open to foreign investors. International investment 
funds are also preparing to the fully take advantage of the lucrative opportunities offered 
by China’s market. It is worthwhile at this critical point to assess the integration of 
China’s stock market with the world market proxied by the US and Hong Kong markets 
in this paper. The resulting inferences could yield some valuable insights to investors as 
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well as policy makers.   
   
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Data description 
 
We employed weekly data for the period from January 1998 through May 2009, giving 
595 observations, in our study. Downloaded from Datastream, the stock price indices are 
the Shanghai All Shares Index ( ) for ChinatSHH
2, Hangseng Index ( ) for Hong 
Kong, and S&P 500 ( ) for the United States. To avoid the ‘day-of-the-week effect’ 
which suggests that the stock market is more volatile on Mondays and Fridays, we use 
the Wednesday indices, readers may refer to Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Chen, et al. 
(2008) for the details. The sample covers the whole history of the Chinese stock market 




The normalized indices with starting value for each index is set to be 100 are 
displayed in Figure 1, revealing that the Shanghai All Shares index is more volatile than 
the other two indices. This is also confirmed by the summary statistics of the data shown 
in Table 1. From the table, we notice that the standard deviation for the Shanghai All 
Shares index is 0.389, higher than those of S&P 500 and Hangseng indices, revealing 
higher variability in the China’s stock market. The most striking feature of the S&P 500 
index from the figure is its continuous growth from early 2003 through mid 2007 when it 
reached a peak and then fell due to the subprime crisis which triggered the global 
financial crisis in 2008. Compared with S&P 500, Shanghai and Hangseng indices exhibit 
more large short-lived ups and downs in our studying period.  
                                                 
2 Shanghai All Shares index is the most commonly quoted index to represent China’s stock market, because 
most large (especially state-owned) companies are listed in Shanghai stock exchange (SHSE). The market 
capitalization of Shenzhen Stock Exchange is about half that of SHSE, and thus, it is less used to represent 
China’s stock market.     
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Notes : CHN SHH, HK HS, and US SP represent the normalized values of the Shanghai All Shares index, 
Hang Seng Index, and S&P 500, respectively. All indices are normalized so that they start at 100.  
 







Notes:  ,  ,  and  are the logs of the weekly Shanghai All Shares index, Hangseng index, 




SHH  tSP  tHS  
Min: 6．928 6．569 8．833 
Mean: 7.475 7．076 9．537 
Max: 8.705 10.353 7.354 
Std Dev.: 0.389 0.165 0.296 
Skewness: 1.303 -0.582 0．371 













To examine the existence of the cointegration relationship between stock price indices, 
we employ the Granger two-step procedure. In the first step, we fit the following dynamic 




jtjtt yyy ηωβα +∆′++= ∑
−=
−221  .                    (1) 
Here,  are the pair of stock indices chosen from , , and . 
Regression (1) is superior to the ordinary least squares, because the estimate  from (1) 
is found by Stock and Watson (1993) to be super-consistent
( 1 2,t ty y )
                                                
tSHH tHS tSP
β̂
3 and asymptotically efficient. 
The estimated cointegration residual ( ) can then be constructed by: tẑ
ttt yyz 21 ˆˆ β−=  .                          (2) 
 
   The definition of the cointegration approach suggests that some linear combinations 
of a set of I(1) variables could turn out to be stationary I(0) processes4. However, as first 
noted in early 1980’s, the characteristics of auto-dependence in cointegration residuals 
are found to comply with neither I(1) nor I(0) process. Baillie (1996) points out that the 
dichotomy between I(1) and I(0) could be too restrictive. Thereafter, researchers turn 
attention to investigate the process in the halfway between I(1) and I(0); that is, the 
fractionally integrated I(d) process with fractional real number d . In econometrics, the 
focus of study is on the I(d) process with -0.5<d<0.5, which is stationary and invertible 
and has the following representation: 
tt
d aYB =− )1(  ,    
 
3 This means that the estimate converges to true value β̂ β  at faster rate than usual OLS estimate. 
4 This is actually one particular cointegration called C(1,1) as termed in Granger (1986).  The general 
concept of cointegration is that if I (d) random vector  has a linear combination  which is I(b) 




















dB ,                       (3)               
where  is a Gamma function and  is a covariance stationary process with zero 
mean. When d<0.5, the process is weakly stationary and has long memory in the sense 
that its auto-dependence is more persistent than that of any stationary process. Whereas, 
when d>-0.5, the process is invertible and its autocorrelation is negative and decays 
slowly to zero. Specifically, for -0.5<d<0.5 with large lags, the autocorrelation function 
of the process is shown to follow: 
(.)Γ ta
12* −≈ dk kcρ  .                                           (4) 
Therefore, the autocorrelation of fractionally integrated process decays at hyperbolic rate 
which is lower than exponential rate as in the case of being stationary process. When the 
cointegration residual  from (2) is fractionally integrated, the underlying series  
and  are said to be fractionally cointegrated.  
tẑ 1ty
2ty
    
On the other hand, the long memory process was first investigated in the area of 
hydrology by Hurst (1951), who proposed a statistic of rescaled range (R/S) to test for 
long memory in time series. Thereafter, a few methods have been proposed to estimate 
the fractional difference parameter d based on either time domain or frequency domain, 
and the research in this line is still going on, see, for example, Shimotsu and Phillips 
(2005). This paper employs fractionally integrated ARMA (ARFIMA) model to estimate 
d with approximate MLE5 because ARFIMA model is more flexible to capture both long 
memory and short-run dynamic in time series.  
    
In the second step we apply R/S test to the  series obtained from (2) to test for 
possible long memory. If the cointegration residual follows a long memory I(d) process 
tẑ
                                                 
5 The Approximate MLE is based on the procedure of Haslett & Raftery (1989) which essentially 
approximates infinite autoregressive coefficients in ARFIMA model by asymptotic values. The 
log-likelihood function for estimation is actually the concentrated one.  
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with -0.5<d<0.5, the series  and  are fractionally cointegrated. We then proceed 
on to fit an autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average (ARFIMA) model to 
each residual series to estimate the fractional difference parameter d from: 
1ty 2ty
( ) ( ) ttd aBzBB Ψ=−Φ ˆ)1(  .            (5) 
Here, Ψ(B) and Φ(B) represent the MA and AR polynomials, respectively, B is a 
backward shift operator, and  is an i.i.d. white noise series, which will be 
interpreted as the equilibrium error in the vector error correction model as discussed later. 
Once a long-run relationship among the variables is established, Engle and Granger 
(1987) showed that a vector error correction model (VECM) is an appropriate method to 
model the long-run as well as short-run dynamics among the cointegrated variables. We 
expand the VECM to FIVECM to account for fractional integration in the  series by 
using the ARFIMA model displayed in Equation (5). Following Granger (1986), the 
bivariate FIVECM can be depicted in the following form: 
}{ ta
tẑ
   
1 1 1 11 1 12 2 1
1 1
2 2 2 21 1 22 2 2
1 1
ˆ[(1 ) (1 )] ,
ˆ[(1 ) (1 )] ,
m m
d i i




t t t i t i t
i i
y c B B z y y
y c B B z y y






∆ = + − − − + ∆ + ∆ +




        (6) 
where  is the differenced series vector or return vector of 
 or 
( ′∆∆=∆ ttt yyy 2,1
),( ′∆∆ tt SPSHH ),( ′∆∆ tt HSSHH .  is estimated by Equation (2) in which the 
estimate of is obtained by applying regression (1) to fit on the respective pair of stock 
index vectors. We employ the VAR(m) structure for the VECM model with m=1 in this 
study in which  is the error vector, the coefficients  capture 
the reactions of the series when they are deviated from the long-run equilibrium, while 
the magnitudes of the 
1ˆ −tz
β̂
( ′= ttt 21 ,εεε ) )( ′= 21,ααα
si 'α represent the speeds of the adjustment. The lagged terms in 
Equation (4) account for the autoregressive structures of the ty∆  series and, at the same 
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time, reflect the return transmissions between different stock markets. 
    
In the context of cointegration, as fractionally integrated series  has infinite 
autoregressive representation in (3), the FIVECM model in (6) shows that the dynamics 
of 
tẑ
( )′∆∆=∆ ttt yyy 2,1  are affected by all of the past values of . This structure 
implies, in principle, that the cointegration errors between two bound series have 
long-run contribution to the adjustment of series towards equilibrium, although the 
impact of distantly past errors may be negligible in terms of magnitude. Comparing with 
one time adjustment shown by the VECM model, this gradual adjustment mechanism in 
the FIVECM to long-run cointegration relations seems to be more realistic. The gradual 
adjustment could manifest the virtue of VECM model in capturing the long-run as well as 
the short-run interactions among involved series. Therefore, when the cointegration error 
series possesses long memory feature, conventional VECM is mis-specified, as it only 
allows  to exert correction function in the system. 
1,ˆ ≥− iz it
1ˆ −tz
    
As it is often observed that the conditional volatilities of financial return series 
exhibit time varying characteristics, in this study we improve the estimation further by 
employing a multivariate GARCH (MGARCH) model to capture the heteroskedasticity 
in the second moment of series. In other words, we model the conditional mean and 
conditional variance of the return series simultaneously. To do so, we let 













ε tε , 
conditioning on the past information. The most flexible MGARCH model is the BEKK 
















00 )( εε ,                        (7) 
                                                 
6 The complete form of BEKK in Engle and Kroner (1995) accommodates more generality, interested 
readers are referred to the original paper; the model (7) here is essentially BEKK(1,p,q) in their paper.  
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where  is a lower triangular matrix,  and  are unrestricted coefficient 
matrices, and  is symmetric and positive semi-definite. Allowing p=1 and q=1 
suffices for modeling volatility in most of the financial time series. With this formulation, 
the dynamics of  are fully displayed in the sense that the dynamics of the conditional 
variance as well as the conditional covariance are modeled directly, thereby allowing for 
volatility spillovers across series to be observed. The volatility spillover effect is 
indicated by the off-diagonal entries of coefficient matrices A
0A sAi ' sB j '
tH
tH
1 and B1. This can be clearly 
seen from the expansion of BEKK(1,1) into the following individual dynamic equations: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22 2 211 11 11 12 11 11 12 11 12 12 22
0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
22 2 2 222 21 22 21 22 21 11 21 22 21 22 22
0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 11 21 11 21 2




t t t t t t
t t t t t
t t
A A A B B B B
A A A A B B B B
A A A A
σ ε ε σ σ σ
σ ε ε σ σ
σ ε
− − − − −
− − − −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + + + + +⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
1tσ −⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + + + + + +⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
= + +
( )
11 22 12 21 12 22 2 11 21 11
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
12 21 11 22 12 12 22 22
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
)
.
t t t t
t t
A A A A A A B B
B B B B B B
ε ε ε σ
σ σ







The above equation system is more complicated than a univariate GARCH model 
because it allows interactions among the two conditional variances and residuals. In the 
case of student-t distribution which is assumed for the error vector of (6) as used in this 




1 2log ( , | ) * ( ) ln 1 ( 2) ,
2 2




vL v Y T G v H v H
G v v v v




+ ⎡ ⎤= − − + −⎣ ⎦
= Γ + − − − Γ
∑ ∑          (9) 
where θ  denotes the parameter vector (in both mean and variance equations),  
is the error vector obtained from (6), ( ′= ttt 21 ,εεε ) ( )tttH ε1cov −≡  is the conditional 
variance-covariance matrix of error vector,  is sample size, T (.)Γ  is Gamma function, 
and  is the degree of freedom of the bivariate student-t distribution. The parameters in 
conditional mean and variance equations enter the likelihood function through 
v
tε  and 
, respectively. Since the conditional variance matrix  can be recursively tH tH
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evaluated according to equation (7) or equation (8), the log likelihood function equation 
in (9) can be calculated without extreme complexity. The log likelihood function is then 
maximized to obtain the estimates of parameters, conditioning on the starting value of 
conditional variance, the popular optimization algorithm BHHH is employed in 
maximizing likelihood. By estimating jointly with the FIVECM-BEKK model, the 
coefficient estimates are more efficient and the relationships among the return series are 
delineated more accurately (Bauwens et al, 2006). 
    
At last, we note that the time-varying correlation coefficient between two return 
series can be obtained from the conditional variances and covariances after the model is 
estimated. The stationarity condition for the volatility series in a BEKK (1,1) model is 
that the eigenvalues of matrix 1111 BBAA ⊗+⊗  are all less than unity in modulus, 
where  stands for Kronecker product of matrices⊗ 7.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Cointegration setup  
 
Before modeling cointegration, it is necessary to examine the non-stationarity properties 
of the stock price indices. To test for non-stationarity, we apply both augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests to examine the logarithmic values of 
, , and . The results are presented in Table 2. All the indices are found to 
be integrated of order one using both unit root tests
tSHH tHS tSP
8. This finding is consistent with the 
results of previous studies on stock price indices, see, for example, Narayan and Smyth 
(2005). 
                                                 
7 Readers may refer to Proposition 2.7 of Engle and Kroner (1995) for detailed discussion on covariance 
stationarity conditions for the general BEKK model.  
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. 








ADF PP        Test 
Index t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
tSHH  -3.377 0.9198 -4.633 0.8456 
tSP  -1.744 0.4085 -1.781 0.3899 
tHS  -1.969 0.6166 -2.164 0.5081 
Notes:  , , and  are the logs of the weekly Shanghai All Shares index, Hangseng index, and 
S&P 500 index, respectively. The ADF tests applied on both and  are with constant, trend, and 
lag length of 1. The ADF test applied on  is with constant and lag length of 1. The lag length selection 
for ADF tests is chosen by data dependent procedure stated in Ng and Perron (1995). The corresponding PP 
tests have the same structure without terms, using Bartlett window with bandwidth 6.  I(1) versus 




0 : (1)H I
1 : (0)H I
 
 
Next, we test for long-run relationships between pairs of stock price indices 
 and  by fitting the DOLS model in Equation (1) with lag length 
p=2. The estimated model coefficients are presented in Table 3. The results suggest that 
all the estimated for the two regression models are highly significant.  
),( ′tt SPSHH ),( ′tt HSSHH
β̂
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tSP  tHS      Ind.var 
Coef. 
estimate p-value estimate p-value 
α  0.6846 0.2849 -2.0020 0.000 
2β̂  
0.9593 0.000 0.9937 0.000 





ω  -1.3561 0.0168 -2.1282 0.0337 
0ω̂  -1.6552 0.0036 -2.4078 0.0164 
1ω̂  -0.6862 0.2244 0.5229 0.6012 
2 ̂ω  -0.5698 0.3130 0.7335 0.4636 
 
Notes:  ,   ,  and  are the logs of the weekly Shanghai All Shares index, Hangseng index, 
and S&P 500 index, respectively. The DOLS model is defined in equation (1).     
tSHH tHS tSP
 
In order to confirm the existence of a long-run relationship between the series in each 
pair, we test the stationarity for the cointegration residuals. We construct the  series 
by applying Equation (2) on each pair of series using the estimated cointegration 
coefficient  from the corresponding DOLS model. These constructed cointegration 
residual series are denoted as  and , respectively, in which the superscript 
stands for the dependent variable and the subscript for the independent variable. To 
informally examine the auto-dependence in the cointegration residual series, we graph in 
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Figure 2: Sample autocorrelation of cointegration residual series between China and US  



























Figure 3: Sample autocorrelation of cointegration residual series between China and HK  








 Notes: The two dashed lines denote the 95% confidence interval of the SACF 
 
  The pattern of decay for the sample autocorrelation coefficients in both Figures 2 and  
3 resembles neither I(1) nor I(0) process for the series being studies in this paper. It 
decays faster than autocorrelation of I(1) process and exhibits the feature of stationary 
process, but its autocorrelation has long persistence and cyclic fluctuations. Next, to 
formally test the possible long range dependence, the R/S test for long memory is applied 
to these two residual series. The results, which are presented in Table 4, confirm that all 




































Notes:  ,  ,  and  are the logs of the weekly Shanghai All Shares index, Hangseng index, and S&P 
500 index, respectively. The residual series are constructed by using Equation (2) in the text based on the 
corresponding DOLS model in Table 3. The bandwidth used in R/S test is integral part of ,  and N is 
sample size. The null hypothesis in R/S test is “No long-term dependence.” 
tSHH tHS tSP
4/1)100/(4 N
Range Over Standard Deviation (R/S) test           Test 









   Thereafter, we proceed to fit an ARFIMA model as stated in Equation (5) to each of 
the residual series to estimate the fractional difference parameter in the cointegration 
residuals. The results are shown in Table 5. From the table, the estimates of d confirm 
that the two cointegration residual series are fractionally integrated.  




spz  Estimates 
 
Parameters 
Value P-value Value P-value 
d 0.0847 0.0170* 0.0775 0.0168* 
AR(1) 0.9665 0.0000** 0.978 0.0000** 
Notes:  ,  ,  and  are the logs of the weekly Shanghai All Shares index, Hangseng index, 
and S&P 500 index, respectively. The series  and  are constructed by using equation (2). The 
superscript stands for dependent variable, while the subscript denotes the independent variable. The choice 







  To further confirm the results, we test whether the resulting  series obtained from }{ ta
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applying the ARFIMA model in (5) are I(0) processes9. From the table, the above results 
confirm that both of two pairs of stock indices, namely ),( ′tt SPSHH  and ),( ′tt HSSHH , 
are fractionally cointegrated.   
 
4.2 Empirical results for China’s and US markets 
 
After the cointegration relations being established in previous section, we proceed to fit 
the FIVECM model augmented by the MGARCH model. Specifically, we fit the 
FIVECM-BEKK(1,1) model to the two pairs of differenced index series in logs, i.e. pair 
of Shanghai All Shares Index and S&P 500; and pair of Shanghai All Shares Index and 
Hangseng Index; the differenced series are actually the return series of the respective 
markets. The variable sequences in the fitting FICECM are ),( ′∆∆ tt SPSHH  and 
 in both conditional mean and conditional variance equations, where 
 is dependent variable in both models. An AR(1) structure is employed in 
FIVECM equations, and multivariate student-t distribution is assumed for the error series 
of the FIVECM-BEKK (1, 1) models. The fitted model estimates for 
),( ′∆∆ tt HSSHH
tSHH∆
),( ′∆∆ tt SPSHH  
are exhibited in Table 6. 
                                                 
9 The ADF and PP tests confirm the results.  
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Table 6: Estimated coefficients for FIVECM-BEKK(1,1) fitted on ),( ′∆∆ tt SPSHH  
Parameters Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
C(1) 0.0006 0.0012 0.5318 0.5950 
C(2) 0.0010 0.0009 1.1117 0.2667 
AR(1; 1, 1) 1.3566 0.5104 2.6580 0.0008*** 
AR(1; 2, 1) 0.4766 0.3518 1.3545 0.1761 
AR(1; 1, 2) -1.1648 0.5100 -2.2838 0.0227** 
AR(1; 2, 2) -0.5968 0.3456 -1.7267 0.0848* 
1α  -1.3188 0.5208 -2.5323 0.0011*** 
2α  -0.5275 0.3530 -1.4943 0.1356 
A(1, 1) 0.0068 0.0018 3.7191 0.0000*** 
A(2, 1) 0.0024 0.0014 1.7540 0.0799* 
A(2, 2) 0.0001 0.0599 0.0011 0.9991 
ARCH(1; 1, 1) 0.2496 0.0474 5.2639 0.0000*** 
ARCH(1; 2, 1) -0.0043 0.0133 -0.3263 0.3721 
ARCH(1; 1, 2) 0.0366 0.0671 0.5449 0.5860 
ARCH(1; 2, 2) 0.2734 0.0439 6.2276 0.0000*** 
GARCH(1; 1, 1) 0.9481 0.0199 47.5456 0.0000*** 
GARCH(1; 2, 1) 0.0005 0.0052 0.1034 0.4589 
GARCH(1; 1, 2) -0.0025 0.0217 -0.1163 0.9074 
GARCH(1; 2, 2) 0.9592 0.0138 69.190 0.0000*** 
Notes:  , HS  ,  and  are the logs of the weekly Shanghai All Shares index, Hangseng index, 
and S&P 500 index, respectively. The estimated model is FIVECM-BEKK(1,1) as shown in (6) and (8), the 
dependent variable is 
tSHH t tSP
tSHH∆ , the error structure is bivariate t-distribution, and the estimated degrees of 
freedom are 6.965 with standard error 1.026. The use of the ARFIMA (1,d,0) model reduces the actual 
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   In Table 6, the conditional means C(i), i=1,2 are the constant terms in the conditional 
mean equation, AR(i, j, k), i=1, j=1,2, k=1,2, stand for the AR term coefficients, and iα , 
i=1,2, represent the adjustment speed parameters in the FIVECM model displaying in 
equation (6). The estimates of AR coefficients show that both return series presents serial 
dependence which is verified by the significant AR(1;2,2) estimates. In particular, the 
 series displays the mean-reversion property as AR(1;2,2) is negative. It is 
noteworthy to point out that the AR(1; 1,2) is significant, inferring that there is return 
transmission between stock markets of China and US. In other words, US market 
Granger-causes China’s market. Conforming to cointegration theory, the sign of the first 
adjustment speed parameter estimate is correct. The negative value of 
tSP∆
1α  implies that 
the Shanghai stock index, , indeed adjusts back to the long-run equilibrium. 
However, the US stock index, , seems not to be bound by the cointegration relation 
between the two markets, or the adjustment scheme is only unilateral.  
tSHH
tSP
   
Now, we turn to analyze the conditional variance equation in which A(i, j) denotes 
the elements of the constant matrix , whereas ARCH(1;i,j) and GARCH(1;i,j) stand 
for the elements of the ARCH and GARCH coefficient matrices  and , 
respectively. From the table, we observe that all the diagonal elements of coefficient 
matrices are highly significant, while all the off-diagonal elements are not significant at a 
conventional significance level. The fitted MARCH model, BEKK(1,1), acts just as the 
diagonal multivariate volatility model. This result indicates that the GARCH (including 
ARCH) effects are substantial in the return vector series 
0A
1A 1B
),( ′∆∆ tt SPSHH , which is 
consistent with usual conclusions about return series. In addition, according to the 
non-zero values of A(1, 1), the unconditional variances of both return series are not zero, 
which is confirmed by the Figure 4 for the fitted conditional standard deviation of two 
return series that show China’s stock market to be much more volatile than the US 
market.  
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Figure 4: Conditional Standard Deviations for tSHH∆  and tSP∆  
 MGARCH Conditional Standard Deviation





















    The estimated results from the figure indicate no volatility spillover or shock 
transmission between China and US stock markets. Although there is a long-run 
conintegrating relationship between the two markets, the information on one market does 
not immediately influence the other. This could be due to the institutional distinctions, 
because one is the leading mature market, while the other is a new fledgling one born 
from the highly-centralized economy. Although the fundamental gaps render the two 
markets still acting on their own information, the links between the two markets have 
surely been strengthened by the two increasingly integrated economies. In addition, the 
elevating contemporaneous relation between China and the US stock markets can be 
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    Figure 5 shows that there is no obvious long-lasting trend in the conditional 
correlation over time, howbeit it reveals that the correlation between two market return 
series has moved upwards a little bit after 2000, interrupted at the late 2002 when there 
was a collapse on China’s market. At that time, the China’s government attempted to 
convert huge volume of non-tradable shares (most of them are state-owned shares) to 
tradable shares10, which could induce panic and crash in the market.  
 
   Finally, the eigenvalues of  (  and  are estimated ARCH and 
GARCH coefficient matrices, respectively) are 0.997, 0.984, 0.981, and 0.972; all are less 
than unity. Therefore, the conditional volatilities of two stock return series are stationary. 
The model adequacy diagnostics are listed in Table 7. Specifically, Ljung-Box test of 
white noise is applied to both standardized residuals and squared standardized residuals 
to test for possible remaining serial correlation in the first and second moments of 
1111
ˆˆˆˆ BBAA ⊗+⊗ 1Â 1B̂
                                                 
10 Non-tradable shares, which are of the form of state shares and legal entity shares alike, account for about 
two thirds of the total shares issued on China’s domestic exchanges.  
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residuals. The number of lags employed in both Ljung-Box tests is 12, indicating that the 
test statistics follow a Chi-square distribution with 12 degree of freedom. All the tests are 
applied to the two individual residual series separately. The test statistics show that the 
fitted model is adequate and successful in capturing the dynamics in the first as well as 
second moments of index return series. 
 
Table 7: Model diagnostic statistics for tSHH∆  and tSP∆  
Normality test 
(Jarque-Bera) 
White noise test 
(Ljung-Box) 
GARCH effect test 
(Ljung-Box) 
    Test 
 
Series statistic p-value statistic p-value statistic p-value 
tSHH∆  22563 0.0000* 9.8954 0.1291 29.110 0.5118 
tSP∆  1029 0.0000* 5.0439 0.5382 26.5266 0.6480 
Notes:  and  are the logs of the weekly Shanghai All Shares index and S&P 500 index, 
respectively. The Jarque-Bera statistic asymptotically follows a Chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of 
freedom . The other normality tests like Shapiro-Wilk’s test were also employed, the conclusion is 
essentially same. These results corroborate the assumption of student-t for the error terms which is based on 






 4.3: Empirical results for China and Hong Kong markets 
 
Table 8 exhibits the coefficient estimates for the FIVECM-BEKK(1,1) fitted on the other 
pair of return series, i.e. ( ′∆∆ tt HSSHH , , representing China and Hong Kong markets. 
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Table 8: Estimated coefficients for FIVECM-BEKK(1,1) fitted on ( )′∆∆ tt HSSHH ,  
Parameters Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
C(1) 0.0006 0.0001 0.5295 0.5966 
C(2) 0.0018 0.0013 1.3873 0.1659 
AR(1; 1, 1) 0.9468 0.2593 3.6506 0.000*** 
AR(1; 2, 1) -0.0352 0.2581 -0.1367 0.8913 
AR(1; 1, 2) -0.8387 0.2683 -3.1255 0.0018*** 
AR(1; 2, 2) -0.0095 0.2637 -0.0359 0.9713 
1α  -0.9248 0.2674 -3.4582 0.0000*** 
2α  -0.0331 0.2617 -0.1263 0.8995 
A(1, 1) 0.0077 0.0018 4.0790 0.0000*** 
A(2, 1) 0.0019 0.0021 0.8992 0.3689 
A(2, 2) 0.0000 0.1503 0.0003 0.9997 
ARCH(1; 1, 1) 0.2683 0.0510 5.2569 0.0000*** 
ARCH(1; 2, 1) 0.1033 0.0523 1.9729 0.0489** 
ARCH(1; 1, 2) -0.0296 0.0438 -0.6754 0.4997 
ARCH(1; 2, 2) 0.2192 0.0549 3.9899 0.0000*** 
GARCH(1; 1, 1) 0.9318 0.0257 36.1752 0.0000*** 
GARCH(1; 2, 1) 0.0138 0.0069 2.0222 0.0217** 
GARCH(1; 1, 2) 0.0137 0.0127 1.0748 0.2829 
GARCH(1; 2, 2) 0.9773 0.0148 65.709 0.0000*** 
 
Notes:  and   are the logs of the weekly Shanghai All Shares index and Hangseng index, 
respectively. The estimated model is FIVECM-BEKK(1,1) as stated in (6) and (8): the dependent variable 
is , the error structure is bivariate t-distribution, and the estimated degrees of freedom are 7.029 
with standard error 1.142. The use of an ARFIMA (1,d,0) model reduces the actual sample size to 729. *, *, 





Z. Yi, C. Heng, W.K. Wong / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 38-74 
 
 
    Overall, the results in Table 8 show a stronger relationship between China and Hong 
Kong markets than that between China and US markets, this is unsurprising because the 
two economies are closely related and interdependent on each other. For the AR terms, 
the significance of AR(1; 1, 1) indicates there is serial correlation in China’s stock market 
while the opposite is true for Hong Kong’s stock market because AR(1; 2,2) is 
insignificant. The significant AR(1;1,2) signifies that there is return transmission from 
Hong Kong to China’s market. This could be due to the exemplary role of Hong Kong to 
China’s Stock market, as Hong Kong has historically been a good reference for China in 
establishing and toning its stock market. Next, the highly significant 1α  with right sign 
dictates that China’s stock index is also restricted by the long-run equilibrium with Hong 
Kong market. Again, the adjustment to the cointegration relation is unilateral, as Hong 
Kong market appears not to respond to disequilibrium between the two markets. 
    
Finally, the estimates for the conditional variances show an interesting interaction 
between the volatility processes of the two markets. In particular, the significance of both  
GARCH(1; 2, 1) and ARCH(1; 2, 1) suggests that the volatility spillover goes from 
China’s market to Hong Kong’s market. Furthermore, the information transmission is 
unidirectional because the other two off-diagonal coefficients are not statistically 
different from zero. The information flow may reflect the fact that the economy of Hong 
Kong heavily relies on mainland China, and a substantial part of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in mainland China is from Hong Kong. Thus, information about 
macroeconomic conditions and policies as well as micro-market structures in the 
mainland would certainly exert a great deal of repercussions on the Hong Kong stock 
market. In addition, many large state-owned inland companies listed in the Hong Kong 
exchange (some of them are cross-listed in both markets) may also contribute to passing 
market shocks from mainland China to Hong Kong. In this sense, China’s stock marking 
leads in comparison to the Hong Kong market in information absorption. Also, the 
significant diagonal elements of ARCH and GARCH matrices confirm the property of 
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conditional heteroskedasticity of two return series. The fitted conditional standard 
deviations of two series are shown in Figure 6 which also affirms the higher variability of 
mainland China’s market than Hong Kong market.    
 
Figure 6: Conditional Standard Deviations for tSHH∆  and tHS∆  
 
MGARCH Conditional Standard Deviation























Notes:  and   are the logs of the weekly Shanghai All Shares index and Hangseng index, 
respectively. 
tSHH tHS
    
In addition, Figure 7 below describes the dynamics of contemporaneous correlation 
between the two index return series, tSHH∆  and tHS∆ . The fitted conditional 
correlation between the two return series was quite volatile before mid-2001, whereas 
afterwards it is less volatile and gradually stabilizes in the positive range with few 
interruptions, a typical example of this is in late 2002 when China’s stock market 
collapsed. This pattern coincides with the increasing institutional and economic links 
between the two sides after the sovereignty of Hong Kong was returned to China.  
 66
Z. Yi, C. Heng, W.K. Wong / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 38-74 
 
Figure 7: Conditional correlation between return series tSHH∆  and  tHS∆
China.HK.conditional.correlation




















   Comparing Figure 7 with Figure 5, it is obvious that the positive range of conditional 
correlation between China and Hong Kong markets is larger than that between China and 
the US markets. Indeed, the median of the former contemporaneous correlation is 0.087, 
whereas that of the latter is -0.032. The model diagnostic below shows the adequacy of 
the FIVECM-BEKK(1,1) model fitted on tSHH∆  and tHS∆ . 
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Table 9: Model diagnostic statistics for tSHH∆  and tHS∆  
Normality test 
(Jarque-Bera) 
White noise test 
(Ljung-Box) 
GARCH effect test 
(Ljung-Box) 
    Test 
 
Series statistic p-value statistic p-value statistic p-value 
tSHH∆  1098 0.0000 44.278 0.0450 30.214 0.4547 
tHS∆  49.73 0.0000 30.460 0.4422 22.4701 0.8364 
 Notes:  and   are the logs of the weekly Shanghai All Shares index and Hangseng index, 
respectively. The Jarque-Bera statistic asymptotically follows Chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of 
freedom. The other normality tests like Shapiro-Wilk’s test has also been employed, the conclusion is 
essentially same. These results corroborate the assumption of student-t for the error terms which is based on 
normality test of original series.  
tSHH tHS
    
Again, as the eigenvalues of  are 0.996, 0.977, 0.977, and 0.970; all 
are less than unity, the fitted conditional volatilities of China and Hong Kong stock return 






This paper employed the FIVECM model to investigate the cointegration relations 
between China and the US stock markets, and between China and Hong Kong stock 
markets. Applying the Engle-Granger two-step procedure to estimate and construct the 
cointegration vector, this paper set up the FIVECM in the general VAR framework which 
can be used to reveal the long-run equilibrium, short-run dynamic movement, as well as 
lead-lag relations between the index return series. Furthermore, by augmenting the 
FIVECM model by MGARCH model, the dynamic dependences in the second 
conditional moments of index return series are also brought into the picture.  
    
The empirical results confirm our conjecture that there are fractional cointegration 
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relations, or long-run equilibria between China and the US stock markets, and between 
China and Hong Kong stock markets. However, according to the estimates, only China’s 
market appears to be bound by the cointegration relations; the other two markets do not 
make adjustments in response to the deviations from the equilibrium. The US and Hong 
Kong markets are also found to lead China’s market in first conditional moments; that is, 
there are return transmissions running from both US and Hong Kong markets to China’s 
market. This finding is expected, as both the US and Hong Kong are more developed and 
mature markets, China’s stock market investors are likely to follow precedent and trail 
after what their counterparts have done previously in the US and Hong Kong. However, 
volatility spillover effect is shown by estimates to flow from China’s market into Hong 
Kong’s market; in other words, there is information transmission from mainland China 
into the Hong Kong market. This may well be due to the heavy dependence of the 
economy of Hong Kong on the mainland, and the increasing number of cross-listed 
companies on both markets.   
    
The evolution of the two fitted conditional correlation series reveal that China’s 
stock market has been experiencing stronger and more stable ties with both the US and 
Hong Kong markets in recent years. Moreover, judging from the magnitude of dynamic 
correlation coefficients, China’s market appears to be closer to Hong Kong’s market than 
the US market, specifically- China’s stock market is more positively correlated with its 
close neighboring market than with the world’s leading superpower. This finding 
provides important information to international portfolio managers investing on these 
three markets.  
 
   Overall speaking, although China’s stock market has a long-run cointegration relation 
with the world market, represented by the US and Hong Kong markets, the short-run 
interactions, namely return and volatility transmissions, between China’s market and the 
other markets are not profuse. We believe that the ongoing liberalization and deregulation 
in China’s financial market may increase the integration of its stock market further into 
world markets. In terms of future research, this paper only exploits the stock market 
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indices and their differenced series; incorporating other relevant exogenous variables into 
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The performance of analysts’ forecasts has attracted increasing attention in recent years. 
One strand of the literature examines the association between dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts and security returns (Miller, 1977; Diether et al., 2002). It is commonly 
observed that the larger the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, the lower the future return of 
a stock. There are also studies using the Fama-French multifactor model to investigate 
the impact of analyst forecast dispersion (AFD hereafter) on excess returns. For example, 
Chen et al. (2002) show that stocks with higher AFD have significantly lower future 
returns than otherwise similar stocks. Diether et al. (2002) argue that the dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts cannot be used as a proxy for risk. Sadka et al. (2007) find that 
analysts tend to agree with each other in bullish markets and diverge in opinions in 
bearish markets. Other studies in this area include Easton and Sommers (2007), Chang et 
al. (2006), Bushman et al. (2005), Johnson (2004) and Ajinkya and Gift (1985). 
 
Thus far, no study has systematically investigated the relationship between analyst 
forecast dispersion and expected returns during the crash periods of stock markets. This 
paper bridges this gap by examining the quality of analysts’ forecasts surrounding stock 
market crashes in the U.S.. A Fama-French model regression incorporating the analyst 
forecast dispersion (AFD) is estimated. In contrast to the conventional result, we find a 
significant nonlinear relationship between AFD and excess returns. In particular, we show 
that stock returns are higher during the crash period when analysts highly agree or highly 
disagree with one another. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the 
data and methodology. Section 3 investigates the connection between AFD and market 
turmoil. Section 4 studies the relationship between AFD and excess returns using the 
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2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Our data are extracted from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S), the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and Standard and Poor’s Compustat 
datasets. The I/B/E/S Detail History File contains individual analyst’s estimates from 
more than 200 brokerage houses and 2000 analysts, and the I/B/E/S Summary History 
File consists of chronological snapshots of consensus level data taken from the I/B/E/S 
Detail History File on a monthly basis. For the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, we use 
the I/B/E/S Summary History File1, which contains summary statistics such as the 
forecast mean, median, and the number of analysts making forecasts in the corresponding 
month.  
 
Figures 1 to 3 demonstrate the movements of the Dow Jones, Nasdaq 100 and 
Standard and Poor 500 in three different subsamples from 1985 to 2007.2 Table 1 
summarizes the key features of the three indices.  
 
[Insert Figures 1 to 3 here] 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
We modify the Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm (BB) and use the magnitude of the 
drop of stock prices in the initial phase to identify stock market crashes.3 The BB 
algorithm defines a peak at time t if 
 
1 The estimates contained in the Summary File are collected and filtered from the Detail History File on the 
third Thursday of each month. 
2 In Figures 1 to 3, we divide the Dow Jones Industrial Average by 3, making it comparable with the other 
two indices. 
3 Bry and Boschan (1971) use a nonparametric approach to partition a time series into two half cycles. 
Pagan and Sossounov (2003) adopt the Bry-Boschan (BB) algorithm to define the bull-bear cycles of the 
market. Chong et al. (2010) use the moving-average crossing rule to define market states. 
 77
T. T.L. Chong, X.l. Wang / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 75-93 
 
Pt = max{ Pt-6, …, Pt-1, Pt , Pt+1, …, Pt+6}, 
and there is a trough at t if 
Pt = min{ Pt-6, …, Pt-1, Pt , Pt+1, …, Pt+6}, 
 
where Pt denotes the value of the stock index at time t. After identifying the peaks and 
troughs, two criteria are used to determine the starting and ending dates of stock market 
crashes.  
 
Criterion 1 All the three indices must fall by more than 30% during the crashes. 
 
Criterion 2 a. At the beginning of a crash, at least two of the indices reach a 
two-year high, and at least two of them fall by more than 15% in the 
following two months. 
 b. At the end of a crash, at least two of the indices reach a two-year low, 
and at least two of them rise by more than 15% in the following two 
months. 
 
Criterion 1 concerns the magnitude of the crash, while Criterion 2 imposes condition 
on the acuteness of index fluctuation on the starting and ending dates of the crash. Under 
Criterion 1, two crashes are identified in our sample, namely, the 1987 stock market crash 
and the tech-bubble burst in 2000-2002. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 has a 
relatively minor impact on the U.S. stock market (all the indices drop by less than 20%). 
Thus, it is excluded from our analysis. After identifying the two stock market crashes, 
Criterion 2 is applied to determine the starting and ending dates of the crash periods. The 
results are reported in Table 2.  
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Note from Table 2 that the duration of the 1987 stock market crash is only three and 
a half months, while the tech-bubble burst lasts for two and a half years. The starting and 
ending dates of the two crashes are also identified. As expected, the Nasdaq is more 
volatile than the other two indices during the tech-bubble burst. 
 
3. ANALYST FORECAST DISPERSION (AFD) 
 
Following the conventional definition of AFD in the literature, we define the analyst 
forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute 
value of the mean earnings forecast. To ensure that the AFD is properly defined, we drop 
the companies covered by less than two analysts. We also follow Sadka and Scherbina 
(2007) to exclude observations where the mean earnings forecast is zero (which account 
for 0.07% of the total observations). Finally, following the conventional treatment, stocks 
with share price lower than five dollars are also removed from our sample. The total 
percentage of the observations deleted from the original Summary History File is about 
28%. 
 
The AFD is a leading indicator that can be used to provide warning signals for 
market risk. In a risky market, pessimistic analysts are punished less if they remain silent 
(Jackson, 2005). Thus, we expect the AFD to be considerably lower in the pre-crash 
period and higher after the crash. Figure 4 plots the monthly average AFD from January 
1976 to December 2007 using the whole sample obtained from the I/B/E/S Summary 
History Monthly File.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
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The first observation from Figure 4 is that the monthly average AFDs at yearends are 
generally lower than they are in the middle months of the year. The average dispersion is 
0.084 for November, December, January and February, while it is 0.094 for May, June 
and July and August. Furthermore, the AFD exhibits a cyclical pattern. 13 out of 32 (41%) 
peak in May to August, and 25 out of 32 (78%) AFD annual troughs occur in the months 
of November to February. Since the duration between the estimate issuance date and 
forecast end date is shorter at the yearend, it is easier for analysts to reach a consensus 
based upon information from the final report than that from the interim report, We do not, 
however, observe abnormal movements of AFD before the two crashes from Figure 4. 
The most volatile movements occur at 1982-1984, the end of 1989, 1992-1994, and 1999. 
We examine the sub-samples covering the two crashes to evaluate the performance of 
analysts. The monthly average AFDs are depicted in Figure 5 and Figure 6.  
[Insert Figure 5 and Figure 6 here]  
From Figure 5, we observe a falling AFD before the 1987 crash. In the beginning 
month of the crash, the AFD is quite stable, but it falls thereafter. In December, the AFD 
rebounds by 20%, reflecting that analysts have different opinions regarding the ending 
date of the crash. For the tech-bubble burst, Figure 3 shows that all the indices experience 
drastic drops and rebounds. This is especially the case for the Nasdaq. The AFD exhibits 
a downward trend in the first few months of the tech-bubble burst, after which it 
rebounds rapidly until the end of the burst. 
 
4. FAMA-FRENCH THREE-FACTOR MODEL 
 
To find the relationship between AFD and excess returns in the tech-bubble burst, we 
incorporate AFD into the Fama-French model.4 The model of Fama and French (1993) is 
 
4 The 1987 sub-sample contains only 29 monthly observations, which is inadequate for us to conduct a 
meaningful regression analysis. 
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able to capture the ordering of stock returns across portfolios sorted by variables such as 
size, B/M, or earning-to-price ratio. Here, we estimate the Fama-French three-factor 
model for subsamples with different AFDs. First, we sort the stocks in the 2000-2002 
sub-sample into five dispersion quintiles, and obtain their average returns. The 
corresponding excess returns on the left-hand side of the model are derived by 
subtracting the risk-free rate from the returns obtained. We use the monthly average rate 
of the one-month U.S. Treasury bill as the risk-free rate.  
 
The three factors are constructed in the same way as Fama and French (1993). The 
first factor, Rm-Rf, is the excess return on the market portfolio. The second factor, SMB, 
is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and that of large stocks. 
The third factor, HML, is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high 
book-to-market stocks and that of low book-to-market stocks. The results are reported in 
Table 3. The reported t-statistics are Newey-adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlations.5
 
The results in Table 3 indicate that the three-factor model leaves a large unexplained 
return for the portfolio of stocks in the lowest dispersion quintile. Thus, the three-factor 
model has a lower explanatory power in a rising market where analysts have consensus. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that, for high dispersion quintiles, the coefficients of HML 
turn significantly negative.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
To examine whether dispersion of analysts’ forecasts can serve as a risk proxy to explain 
the excess return, we include the average dispersion of the monthly portfolios into the 
model. If a positive relationship is found, then the AFD can be used as a risk proxy to 
 
5 We use the Goldilocks method to determine the lag length, i.e. m = 0.75T1/3, where m is the lag length, T 
is the sample size. A lag length of 3 is used as a result. The method is discussed in Newey and West (1987). 
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explain the excess return during stock market crashes. The results are reported in Table 4. 
Note that the coefficient of HML becomes insignificant. The R-square of the new model 
is close to 0.9. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
After controlling for market risk, size and book-to-market ratio, the insignificant 
coefficient of AFD suggests that it is not a good proxy for risk. To allow for nonlinearity, 
we also include the square of dispersion in the model. The estimation results are reported 
in the lower panel of Table 4. The coefficient estimate of squared dispersion is 
significantly positive, suggesting that excess returns are high when dispersion is too low 
or too high. Thus, during the crash period, excess returns exist when analysts share that 





This paper provides a first attempt to study the relationship between the dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts and excess stock returns surrounding stock market crashes. We find 
evidence from the U.S. market that analysts have a bad forecast performance three 
months before the crashes. We include the AFD and its square in the Fama-French model 
regression to explain the variation in stock returns during market crashes. It is found that 
the excess return of a stock has a U-shape relationship with the forecast dispersion of 
analysts. Thus, in a risky market environment, excess returns can be found in stocks with 
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Table 2: Identification of stock market crashes from 1985 to 2007 
 
 
 DJ Nasdaq SP500 
  Starting Ending Starting Ending Starting Ending 
1987 crash 1987.8.17 1987.11.30 1987.8.17 1987.11.30 1987.8.17 1987.11.30 
Index 2709.5 1766.74 421.15 260.87 335.9 223.92 
Peak/Trough Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
% Fall(-)/Rise in 2 months -28.00 10.84 -30.95 22.00 -26.11 15.80 
Duration 3.5 month 3.5months 3.5 months 
% Index change in total -34.79 -38.06 -33.33 
00-02 tech-bubble burst 2000.3.20 2002.9.30 2000.3.20 2002.9.30 2000.3.20 2002.9.30 
Index 11112.72 7528.4 4691.61 815.4 1527.46 800.58 
Peak/Trough No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% Fall(-)/Rise in 2 months -7.32 18.17 -33.89 36.93 -19.70 17.00 
Duration 2.5 years 2.5 years 2.5 years 
% Index change in total -32.25 -82.62 -47.59 
 
The benchmark for stock market crashes is set to be a 30% drop for all three indices. The starting and 
ending dates for the crashes are determined by Criterion 2, which states that at least two of the indices 
reach a two-year peak (or trough), and fall (or rise) more than 15% in the following 2 months. 
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Table 3: Results of Fama-French Three-Factor Models (1999.1 - 2004.1) 
 
 
 Factor Sensitivities 
Portfolio Alpha(%) Rm – Rf SMB HML Adj. R2
D1(low dispersion) 1 0.722 0.253 0.084 0.73 
Newey Adj. t (3.50) ** (12.48) ** (3.71) ** (4.32) **  
D2 0.6 0.823 0.395 0.046 0.80 
Newey Adj. t (2.60) * (13.12) ** (7.39) ** (2.50) *  
D3 0.3 1.016 0.537 -0.032 0.85 
Newey Adj. t (0.97) (12.14) ** (10.55) ** (-1.09)  
D4 -0.1 1.182 0.652 -0.144 0.87 
Newey Adj. t (-0.39) (14.20) ** (9.20) ** (-2.83) **  
D5(high dispersion) 0.07 1.455 0.833 -0.224 0.90 
Newey Adj. t (0.16) (15.92) ** (8.14) ** (-2.86) **  
Tests for ARCH effect and Serial Correlations 









conclusion DW statistic conclusion
D1 0.94 0.31 0.36 No ARCH 1.57 Uncertain 
D2 0.94 0.62 0.70 No ARCH 1.56 Uncertain 
D3 0.60 0.91 1.21 No ARCH 1.77 No SC 
D4 0.49 0.54 0.14 No ARCH 1.92 No SC 
D5 0.31 0.47 0.44 No ARCH 1.91 No SC 
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Table 4: Results of Fama-French Three-Factor Models with Dispersion and its 
Square(1999.1 - 2004.1) 
 
 
  Factor Sensitivities 
Dep. Variable: 
excess returns 
Alpha(%) Rm - Rf SMB HML Dispersion Dispersion2 Adj. R2
Loadings -0.32 1.04 0.53 -0.05 0.04  0.89 
Newey Adj. t (-0.22) (16.90) ** (10.80) ** (-1.51) (0.49)   
Loadings 10.80 1.04 0.54 -0.06 -1.45 4.77 0.90 
Newey Adj. t (2.01) * (17.43) ** (10.08) ** (-2.77) ** (-2.09) * (2.20) *  
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Figure 1: Three Major U.S. Stock Indices (1985 - 1990) 
 
Adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average is derived by dividing the original index by 3, so that it is 
comparable with the other indices along time. 
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Figure 2: Three Major U.S. Stock Indices (1990 - 2000) 
 
Adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average is derived by dividing the original index by 3, so that it is 
comparable with the other indices along time. 
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Adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average is derived by dividing the original index by 3, so that it is 




























Figure 3: Three Major U.S. Stock Indices (2000 - Present) 
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Figure 4: Monthly Average AFD (1976.1 - 2007.12) 
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To date, research which integrates corporate governance and risk management has been 
limited.  Yet, risk exposure and management are increasingly becoming the core function of 
modern business enterprises in various sectors and industries domestically and globally.  Risk 
identification and management are crucial in any business strategy design and implementation.  
From the investors’ point of view, knowledge of the risk profile, risk appetite and risk 
management are key elements in making sound portfolio investment decisions.  This paper 
examines the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and risk disclosure 
behavior using a sample of Canadian publicly-traded companies (TSX 230).  Results show that 
Canadian public companies are more likely to disclose risk management information over and 
above the mandatory risk disclosures, if they are larger in size and if their boards of directors 
have more independent members.  Minority voting control ownership structures appear to 
negatively impact risk disclosure and CEO incentive compensation shows mixed results.  The 
paper concludes that more research is needed to further assess the impact of various governance 
mechanisms on corporate risk management and disclosure behavior. 
 
KEY WORDS: Corporate governance, Enterprise risk management, Agency costs, Fraction of 
controlling votes, Risk disclosure. 
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As corporate risk management continues to evolve globally to embrace several aspects of business 
operations and activities, corporate governance and corporate risk management are increasingly 
intertwined thus highlighting the importance of interdependencies and mutual impacts of corporate 
governance choice on overall risk management strategies and disclosures.  In other words, enterprise-
wide risk management is a natural and key component of corporate governance.  While several 
regulatory changes have been implemented recently (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley act) much of the relevant 
information disclosed by corporations remains voluntary to a great extent. Risk disclosure is no 
exception and recent governance regulations and guidance seem to offer research opportunities to first 
document firms’ responses to these regulations and then examine any changes in disclosure behavior.  
This paper provides a primary step towards closing this research gap by empirically investigating the 
nature of the linkages potentially existing between corporate governance and risk management 
disclosure for a sample of Canadian publicly-listed companies.  The paper highlights the importance of 
considering several dimensions of corporate governance simultaneously to evaluate the effectiveness 
of corporate governance structures and examine in a more comprehensive way accounting disclosures 
related to governance and risk disclosure issues within a unified framework of enterprise-wide risk 
management.  Results from this empirical study reveal that firms are more likely to disclose risk 
management information over and above the mandatory requirements, if their boards of directors have 
more independent members, thus consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley board independence 
requirements.  Firm size and industry nature also significantly impact the likelihood of increased risk 
disclosure by sample firms.  Further, a negative relationship between the degree of controlling vote 
ownership structures and risk disclosure is documented, whereas the CEO incentive compensation 
components show some mixed results as to their impact on risk disclosure behavior as explained in 
more detail below. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 1 briefly reviews the regulatory framework for risk 
management and corporate governance disclosure in North America.  Section 2 discusses some prior 
related research and presents this paper’s research hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the data and 
methodology for the empirical analysis, while section 4 reports and discusses the empirical findings.  








1. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR RISK DISCLOSURE AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
  
Financial accounting standards bodies and security exchange commissions, both in Canada and the 
United States, require “business entities” to provide information to financial statement users regarding 
their exposure to risk.   Financial and market risk disclosures (such as currency, interest rate and credit 
risks) are the most regulated categories of risk (see for example Lajili and Zeghal, 2005).  In particular, 
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (or CICA) Handbook (Section 3860) requires that 
firms disclose any information that assists users of financial statements in assessing the extent of risk 
related financial instruments use such as the extent and nature of the financial instruments including 
the terms and conditions. The risks listed in paragraph 44 of this section include: price risk (currency, 
interest rate, and market risk), credit, liquidity, and cash flow risk. Furthermore, the CICA Handbook 
states that: “…entities are encouraged to provide a discussion of the extent to which financial 
instruments are used, the associated risks and the business purposes served” (CICA Handbook, section 
3860 paragraph 43).  Thus, mandatory risk disclosures concern primarily financial instruments use and 
are usually reported in the footnotes to the financial statements.  Qualitative or quantitative discussions 
of the risks associated with the use of financial instruments and management’s policies to control those 
risks are currently voluntary to a great extent.  While the Canadian regulations appear to deal more 
broadly with different types of financial instruments use and exposure disclosures, the US GAAP 
regulations contain more specific, detailed and usually more complex risk disclosure requirements.  
For instance, SFAS 107 “Disclosure about fair value of financial instruments” and SFAS 133 
“Accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities” establish accounting and reporting 
standards for financial instruments and derivative instruments respectively. In particular, SFAS 133 
requires that an entity recognizes all derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the statement of 
financial position and measure those instruments at fair value.   
 
 In addition to the financial reporting statements for risk disclosure summarized above, 
securities exchange regulators both in Canada and the US, require that registrant firms disclose certain 
information (including risk) mainly in the MD&A section of the annual reports.   Forward-looking 
information is only encouraged in Canada presently in contrast with the US exchange rules where the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires companies to provide both quantitative and 
qualitative disclosures about market risk including forward-looking information (e.g., FRR No. 48).  
 




Non-financial types of risk are currently disclosed on a voluntary basis to a large extent and mostly in 
the MD&A sections under the condition of “materiality” and “significant risk exposure,” which might 
give management a chance to exercise their discretion in choosing to publicly disclose potentially 
relevant risk information. 
 
With regard to corporate governance, The CICA 2001 report on corporate governance in 
Canada highlights the role that boards of directors should play in corporate governance and proposes 
amendments to the disclosure requirements and guidelines by the Toronto Stock Exchange (sections 
473 to 475).  In the US, the recent COSO (i.e., Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission) report (2004) proposes a global framework for enterprise risk management to 
facilitate information sharing and communication between directors, managers and other employees.  
The CICA (2001) report stresses the distinction and separation between managing or running the firm 
(management’s role) and overseeing and monitoring management’s actions and decisions and holding 
it to account (the board of director’s major role).  This view is consistent with agency theory since it 
emphasizes the separation between the agent’s and the principal’s actions and responsibilities and also 
the separation of ownership and control since the board of directors exist to protect the best interests of 
the shareholders.   
 
2.  PRIOR RELATED RESEARCH AND STUDY’S HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Most recent research in the finance and accounting literature have examined firm risk exposure and 
corporate governance structure as it relates to firm performance, value, and audit pricing decisions, 
among others  (e.g., Beasley et al. 2005, Bedard and Johnstone 2004, Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003, 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003, Cohen et al. 2002, Beasley and Salterio 2001).  Generally, the 
findings from these studies lend support to agency theory predictions with regard to the effects of the 
separation of ownership and control and related agency costs on firm value.  For example, from a 
sample of Swedish public firms, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) document a significant decrease in firm 
value (Tobin’s q) associated with controlling vote ownership or a controlling minority shareholder (or 
CMS) governance structure.  Family CMSs were also found to be associated with the highest firm 
value discount among all controlling owner categories such as corporations and financial institutions.  
An important implication of this result is that the higher the agency costs borne by a firm or 
 




organization, the lower the expected market performance of the firm and consequently its value in the 
market.   
 
Agency relationships are complex and difficult to manage because the principal cannot 
perfectly and cheaply monitor the agent’s behavior, actions and information (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 
1976).  However, the more control the principal exerts over financial and other relevant economic 
resources in the business organization, the more likely he/she will be able to control and effectively 
oversee the agent’s actions and effort.  In agency theory, the crucial question comes down to finding 
the most efficient or optimal incentive compensation contracts and information alignment schemes 
between the principal and the agent, a challenging undertaking both in theory and in practice.  The 
design of relevant and reliable managerial performance measures, the degree of risk exposure and risk 
sharing involved in different compensation schemes, as well as the parties’ utility functions and 
compensation preferences, should all be examined thoroughly before such a contracting scheme is 
adopted.  Further, and since contracts are by nature incomplete (e.g., Hart 1988) and not 
comprehensive (specifically because of risks and uncertainties in future business transactions and the 
inability to foresee all possible contingencies), they should be revised and renegotiated on an ongoing 
basis.   
 
In addition to the agency theory foundations of corporate governance usually captured through 
the incentive compensation packages and contingent contracts aimed at aligning shareholders and 
management’s, executive power and control of decision making rights within an organization have led 
to the development of the managerial or executive power approach to corporate governance and its 
interaction with organizational and firm performance variables.  For instance, Adams et al. (2005) 
provides evidence that corporate performance (e.g., stock returns) will be more variable if a 
corporation is run by a powerful CEO with centralized decision making power concentrated in his/her 
hands.  To proxy for CEO power, Adams et. al (2005) uses governance variables such as whether the 
CEO is also the founder of the company, formal position and titles, and status as the board’s only 
insider.  The paper thus questions the validity and implications of policy recommendations calling for 
example for the separation of the CEO and chairman of the board functions (i.e., Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002) because firms run by powerful CEOs could out-perform or under-perform their peers with less 
powerful CEOs. The current paper also adopts a more integrated approach to corporate governance 
 




linking both board and executive characteristics with agency-related governance mechanisms (e.g., 
incentive compensation and ownership and control variables) to risk management disclosure volume 
and behavior.   
 
 Tufano (1996) examines the impacts of corporate governance mechanisms (executive 
compensation forms and equity ownership structures) on the degree of financial risk management for a 
sample of North-American mining firms.  The study results highlight the importance of managerial 
risk aversion and executive risk diversification strategies embedded in their incentive contracts on the 
degree of corporate risk management.  Notably, the study finds that managers who own more shares of 
the stock of their firms manage more financial risk while those who hold more stock options tend to 
manage less financial risks, after controlling for other risk management variables such as leverage and 
the degree of business diversification.  A most recent study, Beasley et al. 2005 examines the extent of 
enterprise risk management (ERM) implementation as it relates to corporate governance and other 
organizational factors for a sample of 123 American and international organizations.  They find that 
ERM stage of adoption is positively related to certain key governance and organizational factors such 
as the presence of a chief risk officer, board independence, support shown for ERM from the CEO and 
CFO, and the presence of a Big Four auditor among other factors.  In the current paper, the relationship 
between risk management information disclosure and corporate governance is empirically investigated.  
Despite an extensive research on corporate governance and accounting disclosure in prior literature, 
research linking both governance and risk disclosure in particular is rare (e.g., Lajili and Zeghal 2005, 
Beasley et al., 2006).  The current paper attempts to provide a primary step towards the development of 
a more systematic approach to corporate governance and risk management and disclosure in the future. 
 
 Based on prior literature and this study’s motivations, this study’s research hypotheses are 
formulated as follows: 
H1:  An increase in the number of independent board members positively affects the extent of 
voluntary risk management disclosure, other things being equal.  
H2.  An increase in minority controlling vote ownership structures negatively affects the degree of 
voluntary risk management disclosure, other things being equal. 
H3.  CEO incentive compensation positively affects the degree of voluntary risk management 
disclosure, other things being equal. 
 





Hypothesis (1) is based on the premise that the higher the proportion of independent directors 
on the board (all else being the same), the higher the extent of internal controls implemented by the 
company to provide more transparency and guidance into strategic decision making, performance 
measurement, and internal (as well as external) audit operations.  This hypothesis is consistent with 
Sarbanes Oxley regulations and prior research (e.g., Beasley et al. 2005).  Hypotheses (2) and (3) 
examine the impact of ownership and control structures and CEO incentive compensation, 
respectively, on the extent of enterprise risk management disclosures.  While hypothesis (2) anticipates 
a negative relationship between the extent of ERM disclosure and the extent of minority controlling 
vote ownership structures, hypothesis (3) predicts a positive impact of CEO incentive compensation on 
ERM disclosure.  The underlying argument behind hypothesis (2) sign prediction is grounded in 
agency theory with regard to the potential conflicts of interests between the minority control owners 
and the rest of the common shareholder base which would increase total agency costs potentially 
leading to ineffective corporate governance.  To protect their interests, minority control shareholders 
would be more inclined to disclose less risk and risk management information and thus withhold 
potentially relevant information on which they could act at their own discretion.  Hypothesis (3) 
prediction is also based on agency theory since incentive compensation (assuming it is optimally 
designed) is expected to mitigate agency costs (between managers and owners) and help align senior 
management’s (i.e., the CEO) goals and interests with shareholders and the board of directors.  The 
higher the incentive compensation of the CEO, the lower the agency costs and the more effective are 
the corporate governance mechanisms including risk disclosure. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
To examine the nature of the linkages between corporate governance mechanisms and risk disclosure 
empirically, a sample of the largest Canadian companies represented by the TSX/S&P firms in 2002 is 
used in the current study with a focus on voluntary risk management disclosure, i.e., risk information 
disclosed over and above the mandatory requirements and controlling for industry nature.   Risk 
management as a full process is internal to the firm’s operations and is usually considered proprietary 
information.  Therefore, only part of the risk management process is observable to outsiders through 
 




public disclosure (both mandatory and voluntary-type of disclosures) which potentially hinders our 
efforts to study the systematic relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and actual risk 
management.   Given this limitation, the empirical results should be carefully interpreted with caution 
and not to confound risk management strategies with risk management disclosures. 
 
A detailed content analysis (e.g., Milne and Adler, 1999) of risk and risk management 
disclosures by this sample’s firms in their annual reports (both in the notes to the financial statements 
and in the MD&A sections) was conducted to assess the volume and frequency of risk disclosures in 
the time period under study.  Content analysis is suitable for assessing and measuring the volume, 
intensity and consistency of disclosures particularly when the information disclosed is qualitative in 
nature which is the case for most risk management disclosures (e.g., Lajili and Zeghal, 2005).  
Following previous content analysis research (e.g., Milne and Adler, 1999) a graduate student familiar 
with content analysis procedures was instructed to code the risk information in the annual reports and 
identify the categories reported by marking on the worksheet the number of words in each risk-related 
sentence and for each risk category where the word “risk” appeared in the annual report. Corporate 
governance data was collected for the same study sample and time period using the proxy circular 
disclosures.  Other sample firms’ characteristics were also collected using the Compustat database.   
 
4. Results And Discussion 
 
4.1  Descriptive and content analyses 
 
The study sample comprised 225 firms trading on the TSX in 2002 representing the largest Canadian 
public companies with average total assets of $13 billion.  The sample has a higher proportion of firms 
in the manufacturing sector (about 40% of the total sample) followed by the mining and construction 
sector (about 18% of the total sample).  Table (1) gives more details about the study sample 
characteristics in terms of the corporate governance attributes and risk management disclosures.  As 
shown in table 1, the financial services industry has the highest number of board members with an 
average of thirteen and a median of fourteen members, and the mining/construction sector has the 
 




smallest board size with an average of eight members.  The degree of board independence in strict 
terms (i.e., where board members are not identified as company insiders through direct employment by 
the company) appears to be relatively high in the sample exceeding 74% of board membership on 
average with the highest independence attributed to the financial services sector (about 81%) and the 
lowest shown for both the mining/construction and the trade sectors.  Most companies represented in 
the sample also have an average of three to four different committees as shown on table (1).  Results 
not tabulated for ease of presentation show that the most common board committees are the audit 
committee (99% of the sample), the governance committee (81% of the sample), the compensation 
committee (59% of the sample), and the “environment, health and safety” committee (27% of the 
sample).  Only 9% of the sample firms have a “risk committee” and most of those firms belong to the 
financial services, transportation and communication, and manufacturing sectors, respectively. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
In contrast with the uniform distribution of the board attributes across sectors in the TSX 
sample, table (1) shows that the corporate governance dimensions of ownership, control and executive 
compensation are widely dispersed and exhibit a significantly higher variability across the companies 
and sectors represented in the sample.  This could be partly attributed to the lack of clear guidance or 
regulations with regards to these corporate governance mechanisms in the wake of the recent 
accounting scandals in North America (e.g., Enron, World Com, Nortel Networks,…etc).  For 
example, the fraction of controlling votes varies widely across firms and sectors ranging from as low 
as 0% to almost 100% for some firms in the sample and the average control vote proportion ranges 
from about 11% in the manufacturing sector to about 38% in the transportation/communication sector.  
CEO incentive compensation also shows high dispersion ranging from about $100,000 to about $ 
2,885,000 across the firms and sectors in the sample.  Similarly, CEOs of the study sample own stocks 
and options in their companies ranging from 2,200,000 to zero options and stock. Finally, Panel (B) of 
table ) shows that Canadian publicly traded firms disclose both financial and non-financial types of 
risk information thus consistent with the enterprise risk management (ERM) conceptual framework 
(e.g., COSO, 2004).  
 
Table (2) further summarizes the content analysis results and highlighting the predominantly 
qualitative risk disclosures as reported by the sample firms.  It shows the degree of risk exposure, as 
 




captured by the likelihood of occurrence of the uncertain event and its potential consequences for the 
total sample and also by sector in panel (B) of the table.  Based on the qualitative risk disclosures 
provided by the sample firms in their annual reports which were then coded to show a rated scale from 
1 to 5 (see footnote to table 2), results reveal that most TSX firms in 2002 recognize their economic 
exposure to more than one risk factor or category and seem to follow an integrated or enterprise risk 
management framework (e.g., Beasley et al., 2005, Miller, 1998).  For example, 191 firms in the 
sample report that they are relatively highly exposed to operational risks such as technical failures and 
loss of key employees among others (e.g., Lajili and Zeghal, 2005) rating the likelihood of such risks 
occurring at 4.1 on average.  The industry analysis further highlights that the “services” sector faces 
the highest exposure to operational risks (3.95 out of 5) followed by the “financial services” sector 
(3.89) and the “mining” and “transportation” sectors respectively (3.83).   
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
Although the perceived likelihood of risky events or risk factors seems to be higher for some 
non-financial risk types (e.g., operational risk, government regulation risk, competitive risk), the 
impact of these risk factors appears to be less severe than financial risks such as interest rate and credit 
risk according to table (2).  It is not clear whether this is attributed to a well-defined risk response plan 
and strategy followed by the sample firms to control such non-financial types of risks, or if the 
potential impacts of those risks on firm performance are under-estimated or poorly understood.  More 
research is needed in the future to clarify such issues.  Furthermore, the qualitative risk assessment and 
analysis as disclosed by the sample firms and summarized in table (2) offer interesting insights as to 
the willingness of some firms to publicly communicate risk information to their stakeholders, however 
this form of risk disclosure might be limited by the lack of quantification of the risk impacts on firm 
profitability and more in-depth risk analysis such as the “value-at-risk” or other risk assessment 










4.2 Multivariate analysis 
 
To further investigate the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and risk disclosure 
and test the study’s hypotheses, both logistic and multiple regression models are developed and 
estimated for the study sample firms.  Table (3) gives the Pearson correlation coefficients for some of 
the key study’s variables.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
As shown in table (3), corporate governance attributes such as board size and board 
independence are significantly positively correlated.  The control ownership variable is positively 
correlated with both board size and board independence but the correlation is only statistically 
significant for the board size variable.  To distinguish between CEO incentive compensation and base 
compensation which is more competitively determined on the labour markets for executives, CEO total 
compensation is broken down into three different components, namely the base salary, bonus pay, and 
the number of stocks and options held by the CEO.  While CEO base salary is significantly and 
positively correlated with almost all other corporate governance variables, “CEO stocks and options” 
correlation coefficient with those same variables has the expected sign (positive except for the control 
ownership variable) but is not statistically significant.  Later in the regression analysis, bonus pay is 
added to other long-term cash incentive compensation to more fully capture all components of CEO 
incentive compensation.  Firm size as measured by total sales is positively and significantly correlated 
with almost all corporate governance variables and is thus introduced as a control variable in the 
regression.  Table (4) summarizes the logistic regression results to test the study’s hypotheses and help 
explain and predict corporate risk disclosure intensity based on corporate governance attributes and 
mechanisms, namely board size, board independence, the fraction of controlling votes, and CEO 
compensation while controlling for firm size and industry type. Given the high correlations between 
some corporate governance variables included in this study as shown in table (3), these are 
alternatively included in the logistic regression. The dependent variable in the logistic model estimated 
in table (4) is set to 1 if the company outperforms its industry peers in disclosing non-financial risk-
type information, and 0 otherwise based on the average non-financial risk disclosures per industry as 
shown in table (1).  Since most financial risk disclosures are mandated by the regulatory bodies in 
 




North-America as discussed in section (1) of this paper, non-financial type of risk information is 
generally disclosed on a voluntary and discretionary basis in Canada in particular.  By comparing each 
company’s disclosure intensity with respect to its peers in its industry group, we effectively control for 
industry differences across the sample firms and also focus our attention on non-financial more 
voluntary-type of risk disclosures which might potentially drive stakeholder decision-making.    
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
The logistic regression results presented in table (4) seem to partly support this study’s 
hypotheses.  Board independence is positively and significantly related to the intensity and consistency 
of risk disclosure thus lending support to H1 in this study and also suggesting the Sarbanes Oxley 
independence requirement is supported by the data in this case.  The higher the proportion of 
independent board members, the greater the likelihood of high risk disclosure, other things being the 
same.  This finding is important as various regulatory and advisory bodies in North America (including 
the SEC in the US and the CICA in Canada) have all recommended high board independence as a main 
feature of effective and good corporate governance.  However, other relevant corporate governance 
mechanisms have received less regulatory attention such as minority control ownership structures and 
CEO incentive compensation and research dealing with such important governance mechanisms is 
ongoing (e.g., Coombs and Gilley (2005); Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005)) .  As shown in table (4), 
and consistent with hypothesis (2), the fraction of controlling vote variable is negatively but not 
significantly related to voluntary risk disclosure intensity.   The higher the fraction of controlling vote 
exhibited by the firm in the sample, the less likely this firm will be a relatively high risk discloser.  
This result is robust to various model specifications including those not shown in table (4) for ease of 
presentation.  These results suggest that the ownership and control structure is a potentially relevant 
corporate governance variable and thus should not be overlooked or under-estimated in future research 
and also regulatory discussions particularly in countries where such structures are commonly observed 
such as in Canada and some countries in Europe (e.g., Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003, Laporta et al. 
1999).  Minority control ownership structures could potentially increase agency costs and ultimately 
lead to ineffective corporate governance.  However, it is not clear whether the source of minority vote 
control has any differential impact on corporate governance.  We conducted further regressions 
including dummy variables denoting whether the minority voting control is held by a founder family, a 
 




corporation or a financial institution respectively.  Results not shown on table (4) for ease of 
presentation show that if minority vote control is held by a corporation, it increases significantly the 
likelihood of high risk disclosure whereas if a founder family of a financial institution holds minority 
voting control, it negatively but not significantly impacts on voluntary risk disclosure intensity.  Future 
research could further investigate this result and shed more light on the nature of information 
asymmetries and associated agency costs between minority control shareholders and other common 
shareholders and impacts on governance mechanisms.  CEO incentive compensation whether captured 
by the number of options and shares granted to the CEO under long-term incentive programs or as 
additional incentive compensation in terms of bonus pay and other long-term compensation, shows a 
positive but not significant impact on voluntary risk disclosure intensity as shown on table (4).  Thus 
only a weak support for agency theory with respect to CEO incentive compensation is documented in 
this study.  Finally, firm size is positively and significantly associated with increased risk disclosure 
which is expected as bigger companies are usually exposed to more risks and are usually operating in 
various business segments and globally as well.  Further, the firm size variable controls for the total 
disclosure intensity and behavior as larger firms are more politically visible, have economies of scale 
in processing information and are thus expected to disclose more corporate information voluntarily, 
other things being the same. 
 
Table (5) further tests the study’s hypotheses using multiple regression techniques and reports 
the results for the sample firms.  In this case, the number of non-financial risk sentences disclosed both 
in the notes and the MD&A section of the company’s annual report is the dependent variable.  Industry 
type is now controlled for in the regression model by including dummy variables for each 1-digit 
sector included in the sample (TSX 230, 2002).  The results are in general consistent with table (4) 
logistic regression results.  Board independence and firm size and positively and significantly related 
to risk disclosure intensity whereas minority voting control is negatively but not significantly related to 
risk disclosure.  Mining companies significantly disclose more non-financial risk information and this 
could be attributed to the degree of regulatory control imposed upon this particular industry given the 
nature of its business operations and environmental impacts and other potential risk factors.  An 
interesting result shown on table (5) is the negative relationship between CEO compensation and risk 
disclosure intensity which is significant at 10% for the “stocks and options” incentive compensation 
variable.  This result might suggest that granting more options and stocks to the CEO might have 
 




negative impacts on corporate governance by entrenching top management in this case and leading to 
less transparency and disclosure potentially increasing agency costs rather than reducing them.  Further 
research is needed to clarify the links between CEO incentive compensation and risk management and 
disclosure in the future. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The current paper explores the potential linkages between corporate governance and corporate risk 
disclosure intensity.  Corporate governance is approached from two dimensions: the characteristics of 
the board of directors associated with effective governance mechanisms following prior research and 
recent regulations (e.g., SOX, CICA) and an agency theory-based approach to corporate governance in 
terms of the extent of the agency costs involved in governance structures.  The empirical analysis 
dealing with Canadian publicly-traded companies (TSX 230 in 2002) seems to support the existence 
and significance of such linkages.  The results lend general support to some of the recent regulations 
(e.g., SOX, CICA) and also to agency theory predictions (e.g., Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003).  In 
addition to documenting a fairly good amount of predominantly qualitative information about risk 
exposure and risk management as disclosed by TSX 230 firms, thus consistent with the Enterprise Risk 
Management general framework (COSO, 2004), this study further shows that corporate risk disclosure 
intensity is closely related to some key corporate governance variables.  More specifically, regression 
results show that Canadian public companies are more likely to disclose more risk information if their 
boards of directors have more independent members thus lending support to recent regulatory changes 
and recommendations (e.g., SOX, CICA).  Another important finding is the consistent negative 
although not significant relationship between the degree of controlling vote ownership structures and 
risk disclosure, suggesting that ownership and control structures are perhaps among the key corporate 
governance variables that would impact risk disclosure intensity and transparency in the future.  
Another governance variable that warrants more research attention with respect to its potential impacts 
on risk management and disclosure in the future is CEO incentive compensation.  Mixed results were 
found in this study.  Future research could further elaborate on executive incentive compensation and 
its impacts on overall governance and risk management and disclosure behavior.  Further, risk 
 




disclosure quality and not just intensity could be a more relevant research undertaking in the future 
where risk disclosures are used to infer the quality and effectiveness of the risk management strategies 
and overall corporate governance.  Collectively, these results suggest that enterprise risk management 
as a strategically designed process and a performance control tool is inherently intertwined with 
corporate governance mechanisms and thus should be implemented following an integrated approach 
encompassing all possible aspects of firm’s operational as well as organizational and governance-
oriented characteristics.  From a public policy perspective, regulatory bodies and agencies in North 
America and around the world could further examine the impact of different ownership and decision 
control structures as well as CEO power and incentive compensation, among others, on risk disclosure 
quality, transparency, and corporate governance effectiveness in general.  The Enterprise Risk 
Management framework seems to be well suited for providing a potentially sound, comprehensive and 
hopefully verifiable (audit-friendly) basis for integrating all the possible facets of risks to which 
companies are exposed and also ensuring that those risks are fairly communicated to all stakeholders.  
More research is needed to guide management, boards and regulatory bodies as well as information 
users in effectively measuring risk and tracking management performance records in managing all 
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Table 1: Corporate Governance and Risk Disclosure: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Corporate Governance Charateristics 
  Sector 
Number of 
Firms Mean  Median  S.D. Min Max 
Board Attributes               
Board Size 1 40 8.20 8 3.28 0 16 
  2,3 89 9.53 9 2.50 5 16 
  4 29 11.72 12 2.66 6 17 
  5 21 10.52 11 3.67 0 16 
  6 27 13.00 14 4.98 3 22 
  7,8 19 9.11 9 2.71 4 14 
Board 
Independence 1 40 6.08 6 2.71 0 15 
  2,3 89 7.27 7 2.68 1 12 
  4 29 9.31 10 2.79 4 14 
  5 21 7.81 8 3.64 0 14 
  6 27 10.52 10 4.76 2 19 
  7,8 19 7.32 8 2.43 3 11 
Number of 
Committees 1 40 3.7 4 1.57 0 6 
  2,3 89 3.29 3 1.21 1 6 
  4 29 3.83 4 1.14 2 7 
  5 21 3.38 3 1.40 0 5 
  6 27 3.63 3 1.55 1 7 
  7,8 19 2.95 3 0.97 1 5 
Ownership, control 
and Compensation             
Fraction of 
controlling votes 1 40 10.68 .00 16.37 .00 73.20 
(in %)  2,3 89 28.20 16.50 29.19 .00 99.70 
  4 29 37.68 21.71 36.54 .00 99.90 
  5 21 34.10 29.00 28.33 .00 92.44 
  6 27 29.28 28.40 31.21 .00 80.00 
  7,8 19 23.95 13.50 26.34 .00 73.83 
CEO incentive 
compensation 1 35 $471,760.51 $350,00 349027 $101,42 $1,808,60 
(in $ thousands)  2,3 89 $576,365.84 $500,00 334349 $110,00 $1,920,00 
  4 28 $693,362.39 $658,78 336225 $202,50 $1,821,25 
  5 20 $662,536.95 $612,55 369453 $191,30 $1,600,00 
  6 24 $792,235.08 $646,06 567374 $125,95 $2,884,53 
  7,8 19 $502,936.63 $508,44 318943 $200,00 $1,662,12 
CEO stocks and 
options 1 40 231,570.43 100,00 382155 0 2,000,00 
(in thousands)  2,3 89 170,284.69 100,00 217487 0 1,110,00 
  4 29 104,586.93 60,00 134359 0 486,11 
  5 21 211,254.76 15,67 508078 0 2,200,00 
  6 27 140,728.04 125,00 143042 0 450,30 
  7,8 19 152,387.11 80,00 229459 0 1,000,00 
 







Table 1.   (Cont.) 
 
Panel B: Risk Disclosure  
 
  Sector  
Number of 
Firms Mean  Median S.D. Min Max 
Total risk 
disclosures 1 40 5.40 5 17.55 0 112 
  2,3 89 3.85 3 16.65 0 157 
  4 29 5.59 4 13.08 0 72 
  5 21 3.48 3 5.74 0 20 
  6 27 6.59 8 13.17 0 71 
  7,8 19 2.05 2 4.92 0 22 
Financial risk 1 40 2.60 2 2.77 0 12 
  2,3 89 2.21 2 2.33 0 9 
  4 29 3.45 3 2.72 0 11 
  5 21 2.52 0 3.75 0 12 
  6 27 4.15 5 3.24 0 12 
  7,8 19 0.95 0 1.31 0 4 
Total non-financial 
risk 1 40 2.80 2 2.90 0 10 
  2,3 89 1.64 1 2.13 0 10 
  4 29 2.14 1 2.50 0 9 
  5 21 0.95 0 2.09 0 9 
  6 27 2.44 2 1.95 0 9 
  7,8 19 1.11 1 1.20 0 4 
 
Notes : 
1 : Mining /Construction, 2&3 : Manufacturing, 4 :  Transportation/Communications, 5 :  Trade, 6 : Finance/Insurance, 7&8 :  Services 
 
Variable  definitions  
The variables are defined as the following: 
• Board size: Total number of the members of the board of directors. 
• Board independence:  The number of independent, non-executive board members. 
• Number of committees: The number of board committees. 
• Fraction of controlling votes: Proportion of voting rights attached to common and multiple voting shares owned by a 
controlling owner category (i.e., the shareholder with the highest proportion of the firm’s votes).   
• CEO incentive compensation:  CEO compensation other than annual base salary (i.e., bonus, incentive plan and other cash 
compensation) and excluding stock and options ownership.   
• CEO stocks and options:  The number of shares and options granted under a long-term compensation plan and awards. 
• Total risk disclosures: The total number of sentences related to risk and risk management as reported (disclosed) by the sample 
companies both in the notes to the financial statements and the MD&A section of the company’s annual report. 
• Financial risk:  The total number of sentences related to financial risk (i.e., currency, interest rate, credit, financial instrument 
value, and liquidity risks) reported by the sample companies both in the notes to the financial statements and the MD&A 
sections of their annual reports. 
• Total non-financial risk: The total number of sentences related to risk categories other than financial risk as defined above and 













                 
Table 2: Risk Assessment and Analysis 
 
Panel A: Total sample 
  CUR INT CRE FIN LIQ COM MAR ENV OPE GOV ECO SUP NAT POL TEC WEA CYC DIS SEA
LIK:    3.8a 3.5                  3.2 3.0 3.5 4.3 4.4 3.8 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.2 3.9 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.1 4.1
# Firms 192                   173 178 19 65 112 186 102 191 146 140 41 12 73 59 43 39 15 33
CON:                    3.8 4.1 4.0 4.3 3.2 3.0 2.7 3.7 2.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.2 3.9 3.3 4.1 4.2 3.5 4.3
# Firms                    192 173 178 19 65 112 186 102 191 146 140 41 12 73 59 43 39 15 33
 
Panel B: Analysis by sector 
   CUR INT CRE                FIN LIQ COM MAR ENV OPE GOV EO SUP NAT POL TEC WEA CYC DIS SEA
Sector:  Mining & Construction (40 firms) 
LIK:    3.55 2.73 2.40 0.23                0.93 4.05 3.23 3.35 3.83 3.25 2.28 0.30 0.58 2.03 0.23 1.10 0.25 0.15 0.20
CON:                    3.35 3.53 2.93 0.33 0.90 2.60 2.20 3.25 1.75 2.63 2.28 0.45 0.45 2.05 0.33 1.30 0.48 0.20 0.23
Sector:  Manufacturing (89 firms) 
LIK:   3.26 2.44 2.48                 0.26 0.62 2.22 3.73 1.97 3.36 2.35 2.43 0.84 0.13 1.11 1.20 0.52 0.98 0.11 0.49
CON:                    3.21 3.22 3.08 0.33 0.63 1.57 2.27 1.84 2.31 1.99 2.15 0.83 0.10 1.26 1.12 0.56 1.10 0.1 0.56
Sector:  Transportation & communication (29 firms) 
LIK:     3.28 3.34 2.76 0.31 0.48               2.52 3.38 1.17 3.83 3.38 2.38 0.72 0.34 0.66 1.79 1.10 0.24 0.14 1.31
CON:                    3.41 3.48 4.00 0.41 0.62 1.76 1.83 1.07 2.14 2.34 2.41 0.76 0.21 0.93 1.24 1.28 0.24 0.14 1.31
Sector:  Trade (21 firms) 
LIK:  2.00 2.24                  1.95 0.19 0.38 1.38 3.14 0.76 2.10 1.29 1.95 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.52 0.33 0.29 0.86
CON:                    1.95 2.57 2.48 0.43 0.57 1.05 1.95 1.10 1.76 1.43 1.48 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.57 0.48 0.29 0.81
Sector:  Finance/Insurance (27 firms) 
LIK:    3.30 3.59 3.22 0.33                3.19 0.56 4.22 0.74 3.89 2.33 2.15 0.00 0.07 0.78 0.33 0.41 0/30 0.11 0.30
CON:                    3.70 3.15 2.85 0.55 2.19 0.78 2.33 0.89 2.37 2.00 1.52 0.00 0.19 1.19 0.48 0.44 0.41 0.07 0.37
Sector:  Services (19 firms) 
LIK:  3.37 2.11                  2.00 0.16 1.42 0.00 3.68 0.37 3.95 2.95 2.63 0.53 0.00 1.37 2.00 0.68 0.95 0.89 1.00
CON:                    3.21 2.42 3.68 0.21 1.26 0.00 2.37 0.37 2.11 2.79 2.00 0.58 0.00 1.58 1.42 0.58 0.95 1.26 0.95
Notes: 
LIK: Likelihood of risky event COM: Commodity risk  POL: Political risk 
CON: Consequence of risky event MAR: Market risk  TEC: Technology risk 
CUR: Currency risk ENV: Environmental risk  WEA: Weather risk 
INT: Interest rate risk OPE: Operational risk  CYC: Cyclicality risk
CRE: Credit risk ECO: Economic risk  DIS: Distribution risk 
FIN: Financial instrument use risk SUP: Supplier risk  SEA: Seasonality risk 
LIQ: Liquidity risk NAT: Natural resource risk GOV: Government regulation risk 
    
a The scores from 1to 5 are based on the qualitative risk assessment information as disclosed by the sample firms in their annual reports.  The scores have been assigned 
in the following manner: Likelihood; “almost certain”: 5, “likely”: 4, “possible”: 3, “unlikely”: 2, and “rare”: 1.   Consequence; “insignificant”: 5, “minor”: 4, 
“moderate”: 3, “major”: 2, and “catastrophic”: 1.
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Notes: 
a The variables are as defined in table 2 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test) 






Table 4:  Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance Logistic Regression Results 
 





















-5.304 3.033  -0.007 0.000  0.229 










-7.402 2.697  -0.006  0.04 0.377 
Significance 
 









-3.382  -0.037 -0.009 0.000  0.290 











 -0.046 -0.008  0.043 0.451 









 *, **, ***: denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 a Board independence is measured as the proportion of independent directors relative to total directors on the board.  
b CEO incentive compensation is measured as the proportion of total CEO incentive compensation (bonus, incentive plan and other cash 
compensation and excluding stock and options ownership) relative    to total CEO compensation. 
c All other variables are as defined in table 2 
 
 
Table 5: Multiple Regression Results: Risk disclosure and governance   
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 a Board independence is measured as the proportion of independent directors relative to total directors on the board.  
b CEO incentive compensation is measured as the proportion of total CEO incentive compensation (bonus, incentive plan and other cash compensation and excluding stock and options ownership) relative    
to total CEO compensation. 
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ABSTRACT 
         A challenge in enterprise risk measurement for diversified financial institutions is 
developing a coherent approach to aggregating different risk types.  This has been motivated 
by rapid financial innovation, developments in supervisory standards (Basel 2) and recent 
financial turmoil.  The main risks faced - market, credit and operational – have distinct 
distributional properties, and historically have been modeled in differing frameworks.   We 
contribute to the modeling effort by providing tools and insights to practitioners and 
regulators.  First, we extend the scope of the analysis to liquidity and interest rate risk, 
having Basel Pillar II of Basel implications.  Second, we utilize data from major banking 
institutions’ loss experience from supervisory call reports, which allows us to explore the 
impact of business mix and inter-risk correlations on total risk.  Third, we estimate and 
compare alternative established frameworks for risk aggregation (including copula models) 
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VaR and proportional diversification benefits-PDB), goodness-of-fit (GOF) of the model as 
data as well as the variability of the VaR estimate with respect to sampling error in 
parameter.  This benchmarking and sensitivity analysis suggests that practitioners consider 
implementing a simple non-parametric methodology (empirical copula simulation- ECS) in 
order to quantify integrated risk, in that it is found to be more conservatism and stable than 
the other models.  We observe that ECS produces 20% to 30% higher VaR relative to the 
standard Gaussian copula simulation (GCS), while the variance-covariance approximation 
(VCA) is much lower.  ECS yields the highest PDBs than other methodologies (127% to 
243%), while Archimadean Gumbel copula simulation (AGCS) is the lowest (10-21%).  
Across the five largest banks we fail to find the effect of business mix to exert a directionally 
consistent impact on total integrated diversification benefits.  In the GOF tests, we find 
mixed results, that in many cases most of the copula methods exhibit poor fit to the data 
relative to the ECS, with the Archimadean copulas fitting worse than the Gaussian or 
Student-T copulas.  In a bootstrapping experiment, we find the variability of the VaR to be 
significantly lowest (highest) for the ECS (VCA), and that the contribution of the sampling 
error in the parameters of the marginal distributions to be an order or magnitude greater than 
that of the correlation matrices.   
 
KEYWORDS: Risk Aggregation, Enterprise Risk Management, Economic Capital, Credit 
Risk, Operational Risk, Market Risk, Copula.   
 
JEL Classification: G10, G20, C10  
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 
A modern diversified financial institution, engaging in a broad set of activities (e.g., banking, 
brokerage, insurance or wealth management) is faced with the task of measuring and 
managing risk across all of these.  It is the case that just about any large, internationally 
active financial institution is involved in at least two of these activities, and many of these 
are a conglomeration of entities under common control.  Therefore, we have the necessity of 
a framework in which disparate risk types can be aggregated.  However, this is challenging, 
due to the varied distributional properties of the risks1.  It is accepted that regardless of 
which sectors a financial institution focuses upon, they at least manage credit, market and 
operational risk.  The corresponding supervisory developments - the Market Risk 
Amendment to Basel 1, Advanced IRB to credit risk under Basel 2 and the AMA approach 
for operational risk (BCBS 1988, 1996, 2004) – have given added impetus for almost all 
major financial institutions to quantify these risks in a coherent way.   
 
Furthermore, regulation is evolving toward even more comprehensive standards, such 
as the Basel Pillar II Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) (BCBS, 2009).  
In light of this, institutions may have to quantify and integrate other risk types into their 
capital processes, such as liquidity, funding or interest income risk.  A quantitative 
component of such an ICAAP may be a risk aggregation framework to estimate economic 
capital (EC)2.  A key contribution of our paper is providing analytical techniques around 
several activities that are supervisory expectations in the context of ICAAP for institutions 
having EC models.  First, we employ sensitivity analysis3, and accuracy testing of the EC 
model, in both cases assessing the likely ranges of the EC model quantile estimates.  These 
two are accomplished through quantifying the variability in EC risk measures resulting from 
sampling error in the estimation of key parameters (estimation of marginal distributions and 
                                                          
1  This is not unique to enterprise risk measurement for financial conglomerates, as it appears in several areas of 
finance, including corporate finance (e.g., financial management), investments (e.g., portfolio choice) as well as 
option pricing (i.e., hedging). 
2 However, in the U.S. supervisors are not requiring all institutions to model EC, only the largest and most 
systemically important (BCBS, 2009).   
3 This is one form of a form of stress testing, the other is scenario analysis (BCBS, 2009). 
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correlations).  We also conduct benchmarking of models4, a type of validation exercise for 
an EC framework, by comparing EC risk measures across different frameworks for 
aggregating risks (or copula model) for a given bank, as well as across banks for a given 
modeling framework. 
          
The central technical and conceptual challenge to risk aggregation lies in the 
diversity of distributional properties across risk types.  In the case of market risk, a long 
literature in financial risk management has demonstrated that portfolio value distributions 
may be adequately approximated in a Gaussian, due to the symmetry and thin tails that tend 
to hold at an aggregate level in spite of non-normalities at the asset return level (Jorion, 
2006).5  In contrast, credit loss distributions are characterized by pronounced asymmetric 
and long-tailed distributions, a consequence of phenomena such as lending concentrations or 
credit contagion, giving rise to infrequent and very large losses.  This feature is magnified 
for operational losses, where the challenge is to model rare and severe losses due to 
exogenous events, such failures of systems or processes, litigation or fraud (e.g., the Enron 
or Worldcom debacles, or more recently Societe Generale).6  While the literature abounds 
with examples of these three (Crouhy et al., 2001), little attention has been paid to the even 
broader range of risks faced by a large financial institution (Kuritzkes et al., 2003), including 
liquidity and asset / liability mismatch risk.    
 
Certain risk types are more amenable to estimation, such as market risk, while others 
present a greater challenge, such as operational risk.  In the case of the former, there is richer 
data available and well established methodologies, in order to estimate distributions.  
Unfortunately, for the latter we deal with a paucity of data, and the techniques available for 
fitting such distributions are just recently being developed.  Furthermore, little is known 
about how these risk types relate to one another.  In order to address this, we build upon the 
method of copulas, an approach that has become popular within the operational risk realm 
itself, stemming from the necessity of having to combine a large number of risk types.  This 
                                                          
4 Another name for this is hypothetical portfolio analysis (BCBS, 2009). 
5 Even in this context, there are anomalies such as the stock market crash of 1987, which is an event which 
should never have occurred under the normality of equity returns. 
6 However, this does not cover catastrophic losses, e.g., the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
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methodology combines separate marginal distributions in a coherent and plausible manner, 
preserving key distributional features such as skewness and excess kurtosis.  Furthermore, 
this technique has the advantage of handling situations in which little is known about 
relationships amongst random variables, requiring only some measure of codependence 
(such as correlation).  We compare various copula models, as well as other methods for the 
construction of a joint distribution of losses, such as simple addition or the correlation matrix 
approach.7 
 
The empirical exercise uses regulatory call report data to proxy for the losses from 
the various risk types.  The empirical analysis focuses upon five of the largest financial 
conglomerates (JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Wachovia and Bank of America), 
available on a quarterly frequency, commencing in the 1st quarter of 1984.  The rationale for 
concentrating on large banks is motivated in large part by the intense policy debate 
surrounding the New Basel Capital Accord (BCBS, 2004).  The most recent incarnation of 
Basel incorporates operational risk, a new risk type to the regulatory calculation, which 
differs substantially in distributional characteristics from market and credit risk.   The 
importance of this is highlighted by the conclusions of the BCBS Joint Forum (2001, 2003), 
which highlights quite clearly how banks and insurers are actively wrestling with this.  While 
the focus herein is upon the banking sector, our methodology could just as easily extend any 
other kind of financial conglomerate such as an insurer. 
 
This study is part of a burgeoning literature that performs a comprehensive analysis 
around how to combine a set of underlying risk factors influencing the total risk of large 
financial institutions.  Furthermore, our work is among first to utilize publicly available, 
industry-wide data to perform to this end8.  In particular, we are able to study enterprise-wide 
risk across alternative risk aggregation measures (or dependence structures) and across 
institutions.  We analyze actual data from a set of large financial institutions, in contrast with 
                                                          
7 We may extend this framework to a more recently developed more general setting, where different subsets of 
risk types can have different dependency structures, through nested and pair copula constructions (Aas et al 
2004 a,b, 2007). 
8 For a study in this area very much in this spirit of our research program, see Rosenberg and Schuermann 
(2006). 
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many of the previous studies that have used simulated data to model risk distributions.  
Furthermore, as these institutions have varying business mixes, we are able to examine the 
sensitivity of risk estimates to this.  Such analysis is relatively rare in the literature, and even 
among the studies conducting such, this has generally involved either a rather limited set of 
risk factors, or has been limited to the loss experience of a single institution, which creates 
challenges for generalizing the results.  A notable exception to this trend in the literature is 
Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006), who analyze a panel of quarterly data for a set of large 
banks, developing empirical proxies for different risk types (credit, market and operational), 
and employ the method of copulas to aggregate these.  We follow a similar empirical 
strategy, utilizing the same type of data extracted from regulatory filings, giving us 
confidence that results obtained are representative of a typical institution.  We propose to 
extend this framework in several ways.  First, we consider a wider range of risk types.  
Second, we investigate both the magnitudes of risk measures and the goodness-of-fit to the 
data of alternative risk aggregation methodologies.  Finally, we perform sensitivity analysis 
by studying the variability of different risk measures that is a consequence of sampling error, 
through a bootstrap experiment. 
 
Our main results are as follows.  Through differences observed across the five largest 
banks by book value of assets as of 4Q089, we find in regard to different risk aggregation 
methodologies significant variation amongst absolute measures of risk.  Dollar 99.97th 
percentile Value-at-Risk (VaR) is increasing in size of institution, but expressed as a 
proportion of book value it appears to be decreasing in size of the entity.  Across different 
risk aggregation methodologies and banks we observe that the empirical copula simulation 
(ECS) and Archimadean-Gumbel copula simulations (AGCS) to produce the highest 
absolute magnitudes of VaR as compared to the Gaussian copula simulation (GCS), Student-
T copula simulation (STCS) or any of the other Archimadean copulas.  The variance-
covariance approximation (VCA) produces the lowest VaR.  The proportional diversification 
benefits, as measured by the relative VaR reduction vis a vis the assumption of perfect 
correlation, exhibit radical variation across banks and aggregation techniques.  The ECS 
                                                          
9 These are, in order of decreasing size: JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo and PNC. 
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generally yields the highest values than the other methodologies (127% to 243%), the GCS 
“benchmark” (41-58%) and VCA (31-40%) toward the middle to lower end of the range, 
while the AGCS is the lowest (10-21%).  We conclude that while ECS (VCA) may over-
state (under-state) absolute (relative) risk, on the order of about 20% to 30% across all banks, 
proportional diversification benefits are generally understated (overstated) by the VCA 
(ECS) relative to standard copula formulations on the order of about 15% to 30% (3 to 6) 
across all banks and frameworks, respectively.  Through differences observed across the five 
largest banks, we fail to find business mix10 to exert a directionally consistent an impact on 
total integrated risk or proportional diversification benefits above and beyond exposure to, 
and correlation amongst, underlying risk factors.  In an application of the goodness-of-fit 
tests for copula models, developed by Genest et al (2009), we find mixed results and in many 
cases that commonly utilized parametric copula models fail to fit the data.  In a 
bootstrapping experiment, we are able to measure the variability in the VaR integrated risk 
and proportional diversification benefit measures, which can be interpreted as a sensitivity 
analysis (Gourieroux et al, 2000.)  In this experiment we find the variability of the VaR to be 
significantly lower for the EC, and significantly greater for the VCA, as compared to other 
standard copula formulations.  However, amongst copula models we find that the 
contribution of the sampling error in the parameters of the marginal distributions to be an 
order or magnitude greater than that of the correlations.  Taken as a whole, our results 
constitute a sensitivity analysis that argues for practitioners to err on the side of conservatism 
in considering a non-parametric copula alternative in order to quantify integrated risk.           
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a brief 
overview of the related literature.  Section 3 follows with a discussion of various risk 
aggregation frameworks.  Section 4 presents the data analysis: descriptive statistics and the 
marginal risk distributions by risk type.  In Section 5, we present our analytical results by 
examining the impact of alternative aggregation methodologies on the integrated risk 
measure across banks, both in absolute terms and also its variability.  Section 6 provides 
final comments and directions for future research.     
                                                          
10 As measured by the relative proportion of trading to lending assets. 
 




1. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Risk management as a discipline in its own right, distinct from either general finance or 
financial institutions, is a relatively recent phenomenon.  It follows that the risk aggregation 
question has only recently come into focus.  To this end, the method of copulas, which 
follows from a general result of mathematical statistics due to Sklar (1956), readily found an 
application.  This technique allows the combination of arbitrary marginal risk distributions 
into a joint distribution, while preserving a non-normal correlation structure.  Among the 
early academics to introduce this methodology is Embrechts et al. (1999, 2002).  This was 
applied to credit risk management and credit derivatives by Li (2000).  The notion of copulas 
as a generalization of dependence according to linear correlations is used as a motivation for 
applying the technique to understanding tail events in Frey and McNeil (2001).  This 
treatment of tail dependence contrasts to Poon et al (2004), who instead use a data intensive 
multivariate extension of extreme value theory, which requires observations of joint tail 
events.  
 
Most of the applications of copula theory seen in finance have been in the domain of 
portfolio risk measurement, examples including Bouye (2001), Longin and Solnik (2001) 
and Glasserman et al (2002)11.  In a notable paper, Embrechts et al. (2003) reviews and 
extends some of the more recent results for finding distributional bounds for functions of 
dependent risks, with the main emphasis on Value-at-Risk as a risk measure.  On the other 
hand, it is rare to find papers in the financial institutions area, where the application would 
be for risk aggregation.  The joint distribution of market and credit risk in a banking context 
is analyzed by Alexander and Pezier (2003), who instead of a copula use a common risk 
factor model.  In the setting of an insurance company, Wang (1998) lays a theoretical 
framework and surveys various modeling approaches to enterprise-wide risk, in the setting of 
                                                          
11 Patton (2002) uses copulas to model exchange rate dependence.  Rosenberg (2003) accomplishes multivariate 
contingent claims pricing through application of copulas.    Fermanian and Scaillet (2003) analyze copula 
estimation and testing methods. 
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heterogeneous risk types.  In the case of a diversified insurer with both property & casualty 
and life insurance business segments, Ward and Lee (2002) model the joint loss distribution 
using pair-wise roll-ups with a Gaussian copula 12 .  Notable here is that marginal 
distributions are computed both analytically as well as numerically, for example in the cases 
of credit (a beta distribution) and life insurance / mortality (Monte Carlo simulation), 
respectively. Furthermore, a rather broad set of risks are analyzed relative to the previous 
literature, in this case non-catastrophe liability, catastrophe, mortality, asset-liability 
mismatch (ALM), credit, market and operational risk.  In another study, similar to Ward and 
Lee (2002) in that risks are modeled in a pairwise fashion, Aas and Dimakos (2004) estimate 
the joint loss distribution in the setting of a bank having a life insurance subsidiary.  In this 
model, total risk is sum of the conditional marginal risk and unconditional credit risk, which 
is achieved by imposing conditional independence through a set of sufficient conditions, 
such that only pair-wise dependence remains. Simulation experiments indicate that while 
total risk measured using “near tails” (i.e., 95–99%) is only about 10% less than addition of 
individual risks, using “far” tail (i.e., 99.97%) is about 20% less, suggestive of the 
importance of diversification effects for accurate risk aggregation in the tails. 
 
Kuritzkes et al. (2003), in the setting of a financial conglomerate and in a Gaussian 
copula framework having analytic solutions, arrive at a large set of diversification results by 
through varying a range of input parameters.  Similarly to Dimakos and Aas (2004), addition 
of individual risks is found to overstate total diversified risk, although the differences are less 
than the former study (about 15% across market, credit, and operational risk for a bank; 20–
25% for insurers; and 5–15% for a “bank-assurance” style financial conglomerate.)  
 
In are recent study, Schuermann and Rosenberg (2006) study integrated risk 
management for typical large, internationally active financial institution.  They develop an 
approach for aggregating three main risk types (market, credit, and operational) where the 
distributional properties amongst them varies widely.  The authors build the distribution of 
total risk using the method of copulas, which allows them to incorporate realistic features of 
                                                          
12 Ward and Lee (2002) also apply a risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) framework to analyze financial 
performance of the institution. 
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the marginal distributions (e.g., well documented empirical skewness and leptokurtosis of 
financial returns and credit losses), while at the same time preserving a flexible dependence 
structure.  Exploring the impact of business mix and inter-risk correlation on total risk, the 
former are found to be more important than the latter, which is interpreted as “good news” 
for financial supervisors.  They also compare the copula methodology with various 
approaches simplified applied by practitioners, such as the variance-covariance and the 
simple addition approaches, thereby documenting how the latter may overstate total risk. 
 
Aas et al (2007) present a new approach to determining the risk of a financial 
institution, including components for the standard risk types (credit, market, operational and 
business), and additional ownership risk faced in the context of owning a life insurance 
subsidiary.  Due to lack of appropriate data for certain risk types, this model combines a 
base-level with top-level aggregation mechanisms.  Economic risk factors used in the 
bottom-up component are described by a multivariate GARCH model with Student-t 
distributed errors, and the loss distributions for different risk types determined by non-linear 
functions of these factors.  This implies that these marginal loss distributions are correlated 
indirectly through the relationship between risk factors.  The model, originally developed 
DnB Nor (the largest financial institution in Norway), is adapted to the requirements of Basel 
II.  
 
Aas and Berg (2007) review models for construction of higher-dimensional 
dependence that have arisen recent years.  The authors argue that in a multivariate data-set, 
which exhibits complex patterns of dependence (particularly in the tails), risk can be 
modeled using a cascade of lower-dimensional copulae.  They examine two such models that 
differ in their construction of the dependency structure, the nested Archimedean and the pair-
copula constructions (also referred to as “vines”).  The constructions are compared, and 
estimation and simulation techniques are examined.  The fit of the two constructions is tested 
on two different four-dimensional data sets, precipitation values and equity returns, using a 
state of the art copula goodness-of-fit procedure.  The nested Archimedean construction is 
strongly rejected for both data-sets, while the pair-copula construction provides an 
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appropriate fit.  Through VaR calculations, they show that the latter does not over-fit data, 
but works very well even out-of-sample. 
 
Several proposals have been made recently of goodness-of-fit tests for copula 
models.  Genest et al (2009) briefly and critically review this literature and propose a 
“blanket test”, which requires neither arbitrary categorization of the data, nor “strategic” 
choices of non-parametric settings such as smoothing parameters, weight functions, kernels, 
windows, etc.  The null distribution is the empirical copula and does not depend upon the 
choice of marginal distributions.  They describe the results of a large-scale Monte Carlo 
experiment designed to assess the effect of sample size and strength of dependence on the 
level and power of the blanket tests for various combinations of copula models under the null 
hypothesis and the alternative.  In order to circumvent problems in the determination of the 
limiting distribution of the test statistics under composite null hypotheses, they recommend 
the use of a double parametric bootstrap procedure, whose implementation is detailed and 
practical recommendations rendered.    
         
2. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY: ALTERNATIVE RISK AGGREGATION 
FRAMEWORKS 
 
The concept of risk is conventionally framed in terms of a divergence between an expected 
outcome and an adverse result with respect to some phenomenon of interest.  Depending 
upon the application or risk type, these quantities may include valuations, cash flows, levels 
of loss or the severities associated with an event of default.  Conventionally, this profile has 
been characterized by a mathematical object known as a probability distribution, which 
quantifies potential outcomes and their associated relative likelihoods of occurrence13.  Risk 
can, and has commonly been, described by the some measure of the entropy or dispersion of 
a probability distribution such as a standard deviation (or variance).14  However, unless one 
                                                          
13 It follows that this description of risk is not of the Knightian variety, wherein we do not have knowledge nor 
means of inferring this mathematical description, also known as “uncertainty”.  
14 If a random variable X has a distribution function F, this is defined as ( ) [ ]PrF x X x≡ ≤ .  
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is dealing with a normal or Gaussian distribution 15 , this measure is not sufficient to 
characterize risk as we conceptualize it both in economics as well as herein.  Once we depart 
from normality, then simple measures of dispersion such as the standard deviation fail to 
provide a complete description of risk as we understand it.  There may exist arbitrarily many 
distributions having the same such measure but also having very different shapes, such that 
risk could vary dramatically.  When particularly concerned with adverse outcomes and the 
tails of the distribution, directly connected to the concept of downside risk, we may find 
these to be divergent for distributions having the same standard deviation.  In that case, one 
must attempt to quantify higher moments of the probability distribution, such as skewness or 
kurtosis.  A popular way to cope with non-normality, which has been long documented as a 
feature of asset prices (Mandelbrot, 1963) and more recently for varied risk types, is to 
analyze a quantile of a distribution as in a “Value-at-Risk” measure (VaR).  This is usually 
framed in a statement that we can, with a certain probability (or percent of the time), expect 
some risk factor of interest to not exceed an extreme value.  Such an approach, while subject 
to severe criticism from a theoretical perspective regarding it as not being a “coherent” 
measure of risk (Artzner et al, 1997, 1999), has nevertheless become standard in the 
industry16.  Setting aside this debate for now, we will briefly describe the VaR, or what we 
prefer to term the “risk quantile approach” (RQA) to quantifying adverse financial or 
economic outcomes.     
                           
2.1 Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
 
VaR is one of the industry standard approaches for measuring risk due to adverse outcomes.  
A basic description of this risk measure is as a high quantile of a loss distribution, whereby 
convention levels of risk are defined as higher realizations of a vector of risk factors; if the 
context involves profit and loss (“P&L”), then it is understood that we are taking the 
negative of the dollar amounts, so that higher values indicate losses.  Let us denote a vector 
of K risk factors at time t by ( )1 ,..,t t KtX X=X , having joint distribution function 
                                                          
15 In fact, this extends more broadly to the class of elliptical distributions, of which the normal is a member. 
 
16 A classic example is J.P. Morgan’s RiskMetrics™ (Phelan, 1995). 
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( ) ( )1 1Pr ,.., K KF X x X x≡ ≤ ≤X X .  Let us consider a single-valued function of the risk 
factors : KR RΠ → , which could be the aggregate losses on a set of dollar positions from 








Π =∑X  that we consider herein.  The VaR at the thα  confidence level between 
times t and t + ∆, denoted as ( ) ( ),ttVaR α+∆
∆ X , is related to the thα quantile of ( ) ( )( )FΠ ΠX X  by18: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,Pr 1 1t t t tt VaR F VaRα α α+∆ +∆Π Π+∆ ΠΠ ≥ = − = −X XXX                (1) 
This implies that the VaR is given by19: 








X                                                 (2) 
VaR is meant to provide a compact summary measure of the risk with respect to a set 
of factors, analogously to the concept of a sufficient statistic that characterizes the 
distribution of a random variable.  While there are many compelling arguments that this 
analogy is strained, and that in managing and measuring risk one should focus on the entire 
distribution rather than a summary measure (Diebold et al, 1998; Christoffersen and Diebold, 
2000; Berkowitz, 2001), nevertheless interest in a simpler summary measure continues.  
Artzner et al. (1997, 1999) lay out a set of criteria necessary for what they term a 
‘‘coherent’’ measure of risk.  The first such criterion is homogeneity, which is the 
requirement that risk be increasing in the size of positions.  Second, monotonicity, is the 
notion that we consider a portfolio having systematically lower returns than another, for all 
states of the world, to have greater risk.  Subadditivity is the condition that the risk of a 
collection of positions (such as a weighted average or a simple sum) cannot be greater than 
the collection of such risks.  Finally, the risk-free condition stipulates that as the proportion 
of a portfolio invested in the risk-free asset increases, the risk of the portfolio risk should not 
                                                          
17 In the case of market risk, we consider daily changes in P&L on the positions,, whereas for credit or 
operational risk the horizon is conventionally 1 year.  The latter is also the supervisory horizon under Basel II 
for credit and the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) for operational risk. 
18 Note the conventions: we have oriented X such that losses are in the positive direction and 1 α− is the tail 
probability. 
19 It may be the case that the distribution function is not everywhere differentiable, in which case we have to 
deal with the theory of generalized inverses. 
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be increasing.  It is well-known that unless the underlying risk factors come from the family 
of elliptical distributions, which subsumes the Gaussian, then VaR does not satisfy 
subadditivity.  The implication of this is that in such a situation it is possible to take 
concentrated positions in one exposure in such a way that the risk of that exposure is just shy 
the overall portfolio VaR threshold (Embrechts et al. 1999, 2002).  A risk metric closely 
related to VaR, which is coherent, is the expected shortfall (ES).  This measures the 
expectation of the risk exposure conditional upon exceeding a VaR threshold: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
E





⎡ ⎤= Π Π >⎣ ⎦
X XX X                            (3) 
  The issue that arises with the ES risk measure is the choice of the VaR cutoff.  We 
will report ES results corresponding to a conventional confidence level of 0.99, which yields 
magnitudes close to the conventional level of 0.9997 for economic or regulatory capital.   
 
An interesting and ubiquitous special case that we consider here, motivated by the 
mean-variance investment theory of Markowitz (1959) and seen in many economic capital 
frameworks amongst banking practitioners, is where risk factors have a valid variance-
covariance matrix and either risk factors are multivariate Gaussian, or risk managers and 
investors do not care about moments higher than the 2nd 20:   
[ ] [ ]( ) [ ]( )V Tt t t t t t t t t t+∆ +∆ +∆ +∆ +∆ +∆⎡ ⎤= = − −⎣ ⎦Σ X E X E X X E X                     (4) 
Where [ ]Vt t+∆X  is the time t variance of vector t+∆X .  Note that we are assuming the risk 
factors to be dollar exposures, so that we do not have the portfolio weights of the familiar 
expression for portfolio variance.  That is, our total time t risk exposure at ,t t+∆Π is simply 









Π = =∑i X                                                    (5)  
It follows from (3.1.4) and (3.1.5) that the standard deviation of the position is given 
by the square-root of quadratic form:  
                                                          
20  The later case would hold under rather restrictive assumptions, such as a quadratic utility function 
(Markowitz, 1959).  Still, it has been considered a useful approximation in many situations. 
 









t t t k t t k t i t ij t i t j
i i j
S σ ρ σ σ+∆ +∆
= ≠
⎡ ⎤Π = = +⎣ ⎦ ∑ ∑i Σ i                          (6) 




( , )t t i t j
t ij
t t i t t j
Cov X X
Var X Var X
ρ = are the univariate variance and 
linear (Pearson) correlation coefficients, respectively.  Note that we retain the time subscript 
in the 2nd moments to remind ourselves of the dynamic nature of this problem in  a general 
context. To illustrate, suppose that we have 3 risk factors ( )1 2 3, ,t t t tX X X=X 21.  In this case 




, ,1 ,2 ,3 ,12 ,1 ,2 ,13 ,1 ,3 ,23 ,2 ,3
1
2t i t t t t t t t t t t t t t
i
S X σ σ σ ρ σ σ ρ σ σ ρ σ σ+∆
=
⎡ ⎤ = + + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑        (7) 
Under these assumptions, that minimizing the variance of the total loss is the object of the 
exercise, the VaR of we simply proportional to the standard deviation of the position 
,t t tS +∆⎡ ⎤Π⎣ ⎦  according to the 
thα quantile of the standard normal distribution22:   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1, ,tt t t tNVaR Sα α+∆
Π −
+∆Π ⎡ ⎤= Φ Π⎣ ⎦
X
X                                     (8) 











Φ = ∫ is the standard normal 
distribution function.   Let us consider a special case of this, in which the standardized (i.e., 
mean zero and unitary variance) distribution of the positions is the same as that of the total 
loss: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,iXF Z F Z i ZΠ= ∀ ∈ ∀X                                     (9) 






=  is the normalized risk factor.  In such a case, which holds under a 
Gaussian assumption, we can write the “Hybrid Value-at-Risk” (HVaR) as follows:  
                                                          
21 These are perhaps credit, market and operational losses; but we would abstracting from the fact that credit 
and operational losses – which are non-negative and highly skewed – would not be modelled as Gaussian (but 
perhaps log-normal.) 
22 In the case of 1 0.9997α− = , the  Basel Pillar II capital calculation, we get ( )1 1 3.06α−Θ − = .   
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )






t t t i t i t j
K K
t ijX X X
i i j
HVaR F F Fα α α α ρ
+∆
Π − − −
= ≠
⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦∑ ∑
X                   (10) 
The content of equation (3.1.10) is that we may compute VaR for the total exposure 
using the same formula as that common in Markowitz portfolio theory, but with the 
volatilities replaced by the VaRs of each risk factor.  Note that in calculation of HVaR when 
the marginals are not distributed according to a single density family, it is likely that we are 
not placing the proper weights on the various risk factors.  Furthermore, the net effect of this 
approximation – i.e., whether or not we are over- or underestimating the true VaR – is 
indeterminate, as it will depend on the relations among the marginal quantiles, the 
corresponding volatilities and the quantile of the total loss.   However, a nice advantage of 
this formulation is that HVaR does allow the tail shape of the margins to affect the total loss 
VaR estimate.  Finally, in concluding our discussion of VaR, there are 2 more special cases 
worth noting.  First, the case in which we assume risk factors or losses to be uncorrelated, 
i.e., , 0 ,t ij i jρ = ∀ , which we call “Uncorrelated Value-at-Risk” (UVaR): 














⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦∑
X                                           (11) 
The case in which we assume risk factors or losses to be perfectly 
correlated, , 1 ,t ij i jρ = ∀ , we call “Perfectly-correlated Value-at-Risk” (PVaR): 












= ∑X                                              (12) 
It should be obvious that in the framework of assumption (3.1.9) and in a mean-
variance world, PVaR (UVaR) forms an upper (lower) bound on the HVaR measure of risk 
(3.1.10), i.e.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , ,
, 0,1
t t t t t t
KUVaR HVaR PVaRα α α α
+∆ +∆ +∆
Π Π Π≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈X X X X       (3.1.13) 
 




3.2 The Method of Copulas 
 
 The essential idea of the copula approach is that any joint distribution can be 
factored into a set of marginal distributions and a dependence function called a copula.  
While the dependence structure is entirely determined by the copula, distributional features 
of the risk components (location, scaling and shape) are entirely determined by the specified 
marginal distributions.  In this way, marginal risks that are initially estimated separately (or 
“predetermined”) can then be combined in a joint risk distribution that preserves the original 
characteristics of the underlying risks. 
 
An important application in which the method of copulas is a powerful tool is the 
case where distributions of risk variables are estimated using heterogeneous dynamic models 
(e.g., a GARCH type model for security return) that are not amenable to combination into a 
single dynamic model.  This may be due to explanatory variables, measurement frequencies 
or classes of models that differ across risk types.  In such a case, we may view the marginal 
distributions as pre-determined and therefore we may estimate them in a first step.  In a 
second stage, a dependence function is then fit to in order to combine these time-varying 
marginal risk distributions, resulting in a time-varying joint risk distribution. 
 
However, there are cases in which marginal risks are not estimated using time series 
data, examples being implied density estimation, survey data, or the combination of 
frequency and severity data.  In these situations there is way to directly estimate a 
multivariate dynamic model that incorporates all of the risk types.  In these contexts the 
copula method can incorporate these marginal risks into a joint risk distribution.  This 
method is also useful when multivariate densities inadequately characterize the joint 
distribution of risks, as is often the case when employing vendor models.  It is well known in 
risk management applications that the multivariate Gaussian framework provides a poor fit 
the skewed, fat-tailed properties of market, credit, and operational risk.  Through use a 
copula, combined with either parametric or nonparametric margins with quite different tail 
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shapes, we can combine these into a joint risk distribution that adequately fits the data.  
Furthermore, such joint risk distributions derived by the method of copulas can also span a 
range of dependence types beyond linear correlation, such as tail dependence.  
 
As we have seen in the previous section, in order to compute the correct VaR of total 
losses (or of our total position), it is required that we first obtain the joint return distribution 
of total risk exposure.  Even in the simplest of cases, where we are additively aggregating 
losses denominated in the same unit of measure, it is highly unlikely that we could come up 
with this object.  Only in special cases, such as the Gaussian, do we have that sums (or more 
generally linear combinations) or normal random variables results in a normal variate as 
well.  The method of copulas allows us to in a sense solve this problem through a 2-step 
procedure.  First, we specify the distributions of the underlying risk factors, or the 
“margins”.  Second, we combine these through the specification of a “dependence function”, 
in order to produce the joint distribution.  Then from the latter we are able to compute 
quantiles of the loss distribution, since the aggregate losses are nothing more than weighted 
averages of the individual losses.  This exercise not only provides a practical prescription to 
quantifying risk in a multivariate context, but also provides theoretical perspective into 
modelling risk in such a context (Nelsen, 1999).  
 
A fundamental result underpinning copula methodology is Sklar’s theorem (Sklar, 
1956).   Simply stated, this is the proof that (under the appropriate, and sufficiently general, 
mathematical regularity conditions) any joint distribution can be expressed in terms of a 
composite function, a copula and a set of marginal distributions.  This representation 
suggests the possibility of a 2-step procedure, first the specification of each variable’s 
marginal distribution, and then a dependence relationship that joins these into a joint 
distribution.  A copula is a joint distribution function in which the arguments are each 
normalized to lie in the unit interval, and without loss of generality these can be taken to be 
univariate cumulative distribution functions.  If we have a k-vector of risk factors 
( ) ( ),.., ~Ti KX X F= XX x , then a copula is a multivariate joint distribution defined on the K-
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dimensional unit cube, such that each marginal distribution is uniformly distributed on the 
unit interval, :[0,1] [0,1]KC → .  Thus we may write:    
( ) ( )1 1( ),.., ( )KX X KF C F x F x=X x                                           (13) 
where ( ) 1,..,
iX i
F x i K=  are the marginal cumulative distribution functions and 
( ) [ ]. . 0,1 KC s t ∈u u is the copula function.  This also admits a density function 
representation (in the case that all the underlying risks come from continuously differentiable 
distributions): 
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( ) ( ),.., ( )
i K i K
K
X i X K X i X K
K



















 is the density function of the ith risk factor.  We see that 
the copula is a relation between the quantiles of a set of random variables, rather than the 
original variables, and as such is invariant under monotonically increasing transformations of 
the raw data.  As summarized by Nelson (1999), there are four technical conditions that are 
sufficient for a copula to exist.  First, ( )0 0iu C∃ = ⇒ =u .  Second, we require 
that ( ) ( )1 1 1 1,.., , ,.., , 1i i K K i iu u u u u C u− + −= < ⇒ =i u .  Third, ( )C u  must be k-increasing on 
the sub-space [ ] [ ]1 , 0,1
KK
i i iB x y== × ⊆ .  Finally, the so-called C-volume of B should be non-














z , where ( ) { }card K KN K z x= =z .   It has also 
been proven (Nelson, 1999) that there exist theoretical bounds to any given copula, which 
are important in that they represent generalizations to the conventional concepts of perfect 
inverse and perfect positive correlation. These are called the Frechet-Hoeffding boundaries 
for copulas.  The minimum copula, the case of perfect inverse dependence amongst random 
variables, is given by: 






W k u C
=
⎧ ⎫− + ≤⎨ ⎬
⎩ ⎭
∑u u                                       (15) 
The maximum copula, the case of perfect positive dependence (or comonotonicity) 
amongst random variables, is given by:    







min jj kC u M∈≤u u                                                (16) 
Note that, as established by Sklar (1956), while for a random vector having a valid 
joint distribution function the copula will always exist, there is no guarantee that it will be 
unique.   We may always construct a copula for any multivariate distribution according to 
the method of inversion.  Intuitively, this is a means of removing the effects of the marginal 
distributions upon the dependence relation by substituting in the marginal quantile functions 
in lieu of the arguments to the original distribution function.  If we denote a random vector in 
the kth hyper-unit interval by ( ) [ ]1,.., 0,1
K
Ku u= ∈u , then we may write the copula as a 
function as this as follows:   
( ) ( )1 1( ),.., ( )X Xi Ki KC F F u F u− −= Xu                                         (17) 
Consider a rather common choice of copula function, the Gaussian copula.  This is 
simply a multivariate standard normal distribution:    














⎡ ⎤Φ = Φ = ⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅⎣ ⎦∫ ∫X Xx Ρ x Ρ x
Ρ
     (18) 
where Ρ  is the correlation matrix and we assume that the variates are zero-mean.  Given 
arbitrary marginal distribution functions 1 1( ),.., ( )
X Xi Ki K
F u F u− − , we can write the Gaussian 
copula as: 
( ) ( )1 1( ),.., ( );X Xi KG i KC F u F u− −= ΦXu Ρ                                          (19) 
It is important to note that Ρ  is not necessarily the correlation matrix of the risk 
factors ( ),..,i KX X=X .  In this context, Ρ is the rank-order correlation of the transformed 
variables ( ) ( )( ),..,X Xi Ki KF x F x .  In cases of other copula functions, it may be some different 
measures of dependence that characterizes the copula.  An example is another commonly 
employed and closely related choice of copula in the elliptical family, the t-copula (Demarta 
and McNeil, 2005):   
( ) ( )1 1( ),.., ( ); ,X Xi KT i KC T F u F u ν− −=u Q                                    (20) 
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where in addition to the measure of dependence Q we have the degrees-of-freedom 
parameter ν , which controls the thickness of the tails.  We use separate notation for Q for 
the reason that it may not coincide with P23.     
An often neglected but very fundamental and quite interesting type of copula is the 
empirical copula.  This is a useful tool in cases where analyzing data with an unknown 
underlying distribution.  The procedure involves transform the empirical data distribution 
into an "empirical copula" by warping such that the marginal distributions become uniform 
(Fermanian and Scaillet, 2003.)  Mathematically the empirical copula frequency function has 
the following representation : 








E K j i
j
i iC x x s t x x
K K K =
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞ = ≤⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∩                        (21) 
where ( )jix represents the i
th order statistic of jx .  An interesting computational property of 
(3.2.9) is that this corresponds to the historical simulation method of computing VaR, which 
involves simply resampling the observed history of joint losses with replacement (or 
bootstrapping).  Historically, this was one of the standard methods for computing VaR for 
trading positions amongst market risk department practitioners.  
 
Finally, we will consider an important class of copulas, the Archimadean family.  
Many of these have a simple form, with properties such as associativity, and have a variety 
of dependence structures.  Unlike elliptical copulas (e.g., Gaussian or T), most of the 
Archimedean copulas have closed-form solutions and are not derived from the multivariate 
distribution functions using Sklar’s Theorem.  One particularly simple form of k-
dimensional Archimadean copula is given by:  









⎛ ⎞= Ψ Ψ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑x                                          (22) 
                                                          
23 We may estimate its components jointly by maximum likelihood. 
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where :[0,1] +Ψ →  is known as the generator function, which satisfies the following 
















> .  There are several special cases of note here.  In the product copula, also 
called the independent copula, there is no dependence between variates (i.e., its density 










=∏x                                                  (23) 
It is easily seen that this is equivalent to ( ) ( )lnx xΨ = −  in (3.2.10).  Where the 
generator function is indexed by a parameter θ , a whole family of copulas may be 













⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑x                                            (24) 
Note that the Clayton copula exhibits negative tail dependence, which is to say that 
realizations of extreme low quantiles of random vectors are more likely, relative the case of 
elliptical copulas such as Gaussian or Student-T.  In this case the generator is given by 
( ) 1x xθΨ = − .  Note that where parameter 0θ =  we have the case of statistical 
independence.  Another commonly employed copula in this family, considered by Gumbel 
(1960) in the context of extreme value theory, includes the Gumbel copula:  
( ) ( )
1
1









⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑x                                     (25) 
in which case the generator is given by ( ) ( )( )lnx x θΨ = − 25.  Note that the Gumbel copula 
exhibits positive tail dependence, which is to say that realizations of extreme high quantiles 
                                                          
24 This is related to the gamma frailty models of survival analysis (Clayton, 1978). 
25 Note that some authors change notation on the Archimadean parameter to α , as in that context has the 
interpretation as the tail parameter. 
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of random vectors are more likely, relative the case of elliptical copulas such as Gaussian or 
Student-T.  Finally, we consider the Frank copula (Nelsen, 1986):  
( ) ( )
( )
1










⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑x                    (26) 







Ψ = ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
.  Note that the Frank copula 
exhibits neither negative nor positive tail dependence. 
 
  We find a loss distribution by fitting these models to the data (e.g., MLE) and then by 
simulating realizations from a multivariate distribution by generating independent random 
vectors.  We can make our independent random vectors correlated (by means of a Cholesky 
decomposition, for instance).  In particular, we first estimate the marginal distributions of 
each risk (e.g., central tendency, scale and degrees-of-freedom of a t- distribution) and then 
through inversion have uniform variates.  Next, we fit the dependence structure of the copula 
model by maximum likelihood, e.g. the dependence matrix in t-distribution case, or the 
dependence parameter in the Archimedean case.  Finally, we simulate long history of losses 
using independent random variables (e.g., 4 quarters of losses in each run for 100,000 
iterations) 26 .  For example, in the Gaussian copula case, it is standard normal and 
independent random variables that we generate.  With knowledge of the marginal 
distributions of the risk factors (which can be estimated either parametrically or non-
parametrically), we can derive a rank-order correlation matrix of the transformed marginal 
data, from which we can make our independent random vectors correlated (by means of a 
Cholesky decomposition, for instance). 
 
 We implement conservative marginals.  First, in the case of operational and credit 
risks, we estimate a truncated generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution27.  In the general 
case, this has distribution function given by (Bradley and Taqqu, 2003): 
                                                          
26 In this study we use mainly the library “Copula” in R and the Statistics Toolbox in Matlab.  
27 In probability theory and statistics the GEV is a family of continuous probability distributions developed 
within extreme value theory to combine the Gumbel, Fréchet and Weibull families.  By the extreme value 
theorem the GEV distribution is the limit distribution of properly normalized maxima of a sequence of 





, , exp 1GEV
xF x
ξµµ σ ξ ξ
σ
−⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥= − + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
                                 (27) 
 where , Rµ ξ ∈ are the location and tail parameters and σ +∈  is the scale parameter.  Since 





, in order to model non-negative operational28 or 
credit losses, we impose the restriction σµ
ξ







σ ξ ξ σ
ξ+
−⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥= − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
                                 (28) 
  In the case of the symmetric risks – market, liquidity and interest income – we 























⎛ ⎞+ ++⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟Γ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠= + =⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠Γ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
∫                 (29) 
where Rυ +∈ is the degrees of freedom, : R R+ +Γ → is the standard gamma-function, and 
[ ] [ ]: 0,1 0,1B → is the standard beta function, so that the left-hand-side of (3.2.17) is the 
regularized incomplete beta function. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND MARGINAL 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
In Tables 1.1 and 1.2, and in Figures 1.1.1-1.2.3, we summarize basic characteristics of our 
data-set.  The bank sample is from the top 200 banks by book value assets (BVA), as of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
independent and identically distributed random variables.  Therefore, the GEV distribution is used as an 
approximation to model the maxima of long (finite) sequences of random variables. 
28 See De Fountnouvelle et al (2003) for an alternative way to model operational risk. 
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year-end 2008, from quarterly Call Reports.  More precisely, we have quarterly data from 
1Q84 to 4Q08, obtained from the “Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a 
Bank with Domestic and Foreign Offices - FFIEC 031” regulatory reports, expressed on a 
pro-forma basis that go back in time to account for mergers29.  
 
Table 1.1 and Figures 1.1.1-1.1.6 summarize characteristics of the data-set as of the 
4th quarter of 2008 for the 200 largest banks (the “Top 200") in aggregate that represents a 
hypothetical “super-bank” (“AT200”) and individually for the top 5 banks in BVA  or the 
“Top 5".  The five largest banks by BVA as of 4Q08, in descending order, are as follows: JP 
Morgan Chase – “JPMC” (BVA = $1.85T), Bank of America – “BofA” (BVA = $1.70T), 
Citigroup – “CITI” (BVA = $1.32T), Wells Fargo –WELLS (BVA = $1.24T) and Pittsburg 
National Corporation – “PNC” (BVA = $290B).  As of 4Q08 the AT200 represented $10.8T 
in BVA, and of this the Top 5 banks represents $6.4T, or 59.4% of the total.  The skew in 
this data is extreme, as the average (median) banks amongst the Top 200 has $53.8B 
($7.04B) in BVA, reflected in a skewness coefficient of 6.8 that indicates an very elongated 
right tail relative to a normal distribution.  Indeed, our Top 5 banks reside well into the upper 
5th percentile of the distribution of book value of assets (BVA = $162.9B).  This distribution 
is shown graphically in Figure 1.1.1. 
 
The distribution of the book value of equity (BVE) is similarly skewed toward the 
largest banks, as the Top 200 (5) have aggregate BVE = $1.01T (= $563.8B, or 56.0% of the 
Top 200), as compared to the average (median) bank having MVE = $5.04B (= $70M).  We 
see that the distribution of the book value of total debt (BVTD) is even more extremely 
skewed toward the Top 5 banks, the Top 200 (5) having BVTD = $9.75T (= $5.83T, or 60% 
of the Top 200), as compared to the average (median) bank having BVTD = $48.1B ($6.4B). 
 
Various fields in the Call Reports allow us to construct accounting ratios that are 
informative regarding various dimensions of financial state, such as leverage, profitability 
                                                          
29 In order to illustrate, if a bank in 2008 is the result of a merger in 2008, pre-2008 data is merged on a pro-
forma basis (i.e., the other non-surviving bank’s data will be represented as part of the surviving bank going 
back in time.) 
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and loss rates.  Book leverage ratios (BLR, the distribution of which is shown in Figure 
1.1.2) – defined as the ratio of the BVTD to BVA - in the Top 5 ranges rather narrowly in 
the range of 89.5% for BofA to 92.3% for CITI, which is reflective of the broader sample 
having mean (median) of 89.4% (90.1%), and overall it varies modestly from 83.7% (5th 
percentile) to 93.8% (95th percentile).  
 
We have available from the Call Reports the book or mark-to-market values of assets 
classified as residing in either the lending (“LA”) or trading (“TA”) books,  respectively.  
Taking the ratios of these to BVA, we are able to compute the corresponding proportions of 
lending (“PLA”) or trading (“PTA”) assets, which are quantities of interest in that they 
convey a sense of the business mix.  The distributions of these are shown graphically in 
Figures 1.1.3 and 1.1.4, respectively.  Amongst the broader sample, the median bank has 
PLA = 69.5%, not far above the average of PLA = 66.6%.  The Top 5, as well the AT200, 
fall into the lower half of this distribution.  JPMC and CITI are notably on the low side, 
having respective PLA’s of 39.9% and 47.0%, while WELLS and PNC come closer to the 
center of the distribution (PLA = 64.1% and 62.4%, respectively).  In contrast, the 
distribution of PTA is both quite skewed as well as more highly variable amongst the Top 5 
banks: the mean (median) in the Top 200 is 1.4% (0.0%), while within the Top 5 and AT200 
PTA ranges in 2.1-19.8%.  JPMC and CITI are far ahead at respective PTAs of 19.8% and 
15.2%, while WELLS and PNC are at the lower end (PTA = 4.2% and 2.1%, respectively), 
and BofA (AT200) are middling at PTA = 9.2% (9.0%). 
 
A measure of credit losses, the ratio of gross charge-offs to the amount of lending 
assets (“GCOR”, shown graphically in Figure 1.1.5), is clearly elevated for the largest 3 
banks amongst the Top 5 relative to a typical bank in the Top 200 as of year-end 2008.  The 
median (mean) GCOR = 0.76% (1.27%) in the broader sample; in contrast, in the case of 
JPMC, BofA and CITI it is 1.46%, 1.95% and 2.51%, respectively.  In contrast, WELLS and 
PNC are to the middle or lower half of this distribution, having respective GCORs of 0.95% 
and 0.34%.  On the other hand, for the ratio of non-performing loans to total lending assets 
(“NPAR”), with the exception of PNC (NPAR = 16.2%) the remaining banks in the Top 5 
are not far from the experience of a representative bank amongst the Top 200.  While 
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NPARs of the average and median banks are 3.4% and 2.4%, respectively, we observe 
NPARs of 3.3%, 4.0%, 3.1%, 4.6 and 3.2 for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI and WELLS, have 
respectively.  Finally, we consider the widely cited net-interest margin measure of bank core 
profitability, defined as the ratio of the difference between interest income and expense to 
book value of total lending assets (“NIM”, shown graphically in Figure 1.1.6).  This ratio 
exhibits a very high degree of skew toward the largest banks by book value in the sample: 
while the median (mean) bank in the Top 200 has NIM = 1.1% (1.2%), this ranges in 4.0% 
(PNC) to 5.9% (JPMC) amongst the Top 5, which is far into the tail of the distribution in for 
the broader sample (95th percentile of NIM = 1.85% for the Top 200).               
 
We gather equity price information from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database as of 4Q08, extracting firms defined as financial institutions.  In Table 1.2 
and Figures 1.2.1-1.2.3, we summarize some equity market information for the banks in our 
sample, 123 of the Top 200 (which includes all the Top 5) for which we could make a 
definitive match to CRSP.  This sample of banks for which we have equity price data (the 
“Top 123 CRSP”) allows us to compute various economically meaningful quantities, such as 
the “market leverage ratio” (defined as the ratio of the book value of total debt to itself plus 
the market value of equity – “MLR”), or the market-to-book ratio (defined as the ratio of the 
sum of the book value of total debt plus the market value of equity to the book value of 
assets - “MTBR”).  We observe that the distributions of BLR and MLR are quite similar in 
the broader sample: respective medians of 90.3% and 90.7%.  However, most of the Top 5 
are somewhat more leveraged according to the MLR measure, ranging in 91.1% (WELLS) to 
97.1% (CITI) by this metric, as compared to 91.31% (PNC) to 92.3% (CITI) for the BLR.  
This is reflective of the beating that the stocks of the largest banks had been subject to by 
year-end 2008.  It is also worth noting that the Top 5 generally sell at a discount to book 
value according tom the MTBR, and lag the broader Top 123 CRSP sample where median 
(average) MTB is 98.8% (103.0%), and the Top 5 ranges from 95.1% (CITI) to100.4% 
(WELLS).   
 
Table 1.3 and Figures 2 through 5 summarize distributional properties of and 
correlations amongst our 5 accounting based proxies for corresponding risk types.  These 
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calculated from quarterly Call Reports in the period 1Q84-4Q08, for the AT200 and Top 5 
banks.  We measure credit risk (“CR”) as gross charge-offs (“GCO”).  We measure 
operational risk (“OR”) as other non-interest expense (“ONIE”).  Market risk (“MR”) is 
proxied for by the deviation to the trailing 4-quarter average in net-trading revenues (“NTR-
4QD”); such a measure is discussed in Jorion (2006).  Whereas our proxy to CR of GCO is 
the same as in Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006), we deviate from that in estimating OR 
and MR, for which the authors used external operational risk data and a GARCH factor 
model fit to macro data, respectively.  In our extension of capturing Liquidity Risk (“LR”) 
and Interest Rate (or Income) Risk (“IR”), we also follow the Jorion (2006) prescriptions.  
LR is approximated by the liquidity gap, defined as total loans minus total deposits, as a 
deviation from a moving 4-quarter trailing average ("LG-4QD").  Similarly, IR is 
approximated by the interest rate gap, defined as total interest expense minus total interest 
income, as a deviation from a moving 4-quarter trailing average ("IRG-4QD"). 
 
First considering quarterly GCO, we observe in Table 1.3 that median quarterly GCO 
ranges from $1.00B-$1.91B amongst the 4 largest of the Top 5, with PNC much lower at 
$270M.  The range over time across the Top 5 is wide from $10M to $5.81B.  In all cases 
GCO exhibits high positive skew.  Median (mean) GCO for the AT200 is $6.66B ($7.89B), 
with a wide range of $1.92B to $31.16B, and significantly positive excess skewness.  
Median NIE ranges in $2.90B-$4.08B amongst the 4 largest of the Top 5, with PNC much 
lower at $84M.  The range over time across the Top 5 is wide from $42M-$33.1B.  In the 
case of 4 out of 5 of the 5 largest banks, GCO exhibits high positive skew, the exception 
being PNC.  Median (mean) NIE for the AT200 is $6.66B ($7.89B), with a wide range of 
$1.92B to $31.16B, and significantly positive excess skewness.  Median NTR-4QD ranges in 
$-88M to $4.08B amongst the Top 5.  The range over time across the Top 5 is wide in -
$0.88M to $9.09B.  In the case of 4 out of 5 of the 5 largest banks, NIE exhibits high 
positive skew, with the exception of PNC.  Median (mean) NTR-4QD for the AT200 is -
$130M (-$10M), with a wide range of -$7.20B to $16.13B, and significantly positive excess 
skewness.  Median LG-4QD ranges in -$6.85B to -$760M amongst the Top 5.  The range 
over time across the Top 5 is wide in -$82.9B to $90.05B.  LG-4QD exhibits less excess 
positive skewness than the other variables.  Median (mean) LG-4QD for the AT200 is -
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$20.5B (-$20.1B), with a wide range of -$159.7B to $375.8B, and significantly positive 
excess skewness.  Median IRG-4QD ranges in  -$910M to $920M amongst the Top 5.  The 
range over time across the Top 5 is wide in -$35.0B to $31.7B.  Unlike the other variables, 
IRG-4QD exhibits mild negative skewness.  Median (mean) IRG-4QD for the AT200 is -
$2.62B (-$7.34B), with a wide range of -$171.72B to $153.01B, yet not having significantly 
negative excess skewness. 
 
In Figures 2.1.1 through 2.1.6 are displayed the smoothed kernel distributions of 
historical losses for each risk type, our accounting based proxies.  We observe from these 
figures that indeed there is wide variation in the distributional properties of the different risk 
types.  In the case of GCO, for AT200 and for all of the Top 5, we see the familiar right 
skewed and long tailed distribution of historical credit losses, as well as of theoretical loss 
distributions such as the Basel asymptotic single risk factor model.  In some case however, 
we observe bi-modality, such as for JPMC and CITI.  The distribution of ONIE, the OR 
proxy, is similarly non-negative and right-skewed with an elongated tail.  Additionally, the 
mode appears shifted rightward relative to that of GCO (and not as peaked), the tails appear 
somewhat heavier and do not exhibit the multi-modality as in the distribution of GCO.  On 
the other hand, the proxies for MR, LR and IR are all symmetric.  However, there are subtle 
differences amongst these that are worthy of note.  NTR-4QD exhibits the greatest degree of 
peakedness amongst these, while IRG-4QD the least.  In the lower-left panel for each of 
these we show the distribution of the proxy for “Total Risk”, which is simply the sum of the 
5 proxies.  These are generally closer to symmetric than GCO and ONIE, but are heavier 
tailed and more skewed to the right than the remaining 3 proxies.     
 
Given these distributional features, when we implement the copula models, we 
choose to model the marginal distributions of GCO and ONIE as 2-paramter GEV (equations 
3.2.15 and 3.2.16), having non-negative support; and that of the remaining risk proxies 
(NTR-4QD, LG-4QD and IRG-4QD) as Student’s T distributions (equations 3.2.17), 
symmetric and with degrees of freedom determined  by the data.  We could fit alternative 
marginal distributions, potentially giving a better fit to the empirical distributions or better 
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modeling the tails30, but we wish to make the simplest parametric choices possible that are 
still conservative, in that these exhibit heavy tails relative to normal or log-normal.  This is 
for the purpose of making this exercise easily replicable by practitioners. 
 
In Figures 2.2.1 through 2.2.6 are displayed the quarterly time series of historical 
losses for accounting loss proxies of each risk type.  We observe from these figures that 
indeed there is wide variation in the time series properties of the different risk types.  In the 
case of GCO, for AT200 and for all of the Top 5, we see the familiar long cycling 
characteristic of annual loss rates in rating agency publications.  In particular, note the peaks 
during the downturns of the early 1990’s and 2000’s, as well as most recently at the end of 
2008 during the height of the financial crisis.  It is more difficult to detect the cyclical effect 
in the time series of the OR proxy ONIE, and there appear to be greater differences across 
banks.  In the case of AT200 and 3 of the Top 5, something like a smooth upward trend is 
evident, but not so for WELLS and PNC.  In aggregate and across the most of the Top 5, the 
MR proxy NTR-4QD appears to fluctuate mildly around zero, with the exception of JPMC 
where the degree fluctuation is greater and appears to be increasing over time. And in all 
cases, there is an upward blip in the MR measure sometime in 2008, which is (with the 
exception of JPMC) a change of historically unprecedented magnitude.  LG-4QD seems to 
lie somewhere between GCO and NTR-4QD in its time series behavior, having more 
variation over time than the latter, and faintly some of the long cycling of the former.  One 
can see slight elevation in the liquidity risk measure in the last downturn and recently for 
JPMC, BofA and WELLS.  On the other hand, IRG-4QD behaves quite differently than the 
other risk proxies, in all cases exhibiting very clear autocorrelation, having a saw-tooth 
pattern with much greater variability than but with no detect sensitivity to the cycle nor any 
discernable “blip” as compared with NTR-4QD.  However, in most cases we can detect that 
the variability in this measure has mildly decreased over time (especially from early on in the 
sample period), possibly reflecting then use of derivatives on the part of banks to better 
manage this risk.             
                                                          
30 A relatively straightforward choice would be to use these fitted kernel density estimates, at a modest but 
material increase in computational burden.  A more computationally expensive approach would be to model the 
body and the tails separately, say through a “conventional” distribution (e.g., lognormal or students-t) and 
something like a Generalized Pareto Distribution, respectively. 




In Table 1.4, and in Figures 3.1 through 3.6 (4.1 through 4.6), we show the linear 
Pearson (rank-order Spearman31) correlations amongst the 5 proxies of the risk types.  First, 
we observe some wide disparities across banks in the signs and magnitudes of the 
correlations.  The second general observations is that magnitudes are generally on the low 
side, and in some cases negative, which would support the presence of substantial 
diversification benefits.  Finally, the Spearman rank order correlations also exhibit wide 
disparity in signs and magnitudes across risk pairs, and moreover are not in generally in-line 
with the results of the linear correlation analysis.         
 
In the case of CR and OR, Pearson correlations range from large and positive (0.65 
and 0.77 for AT200 and CITI, respectively), to modest and positive (0.10 and 0.29 for 
WELLS and PNC, respectively), and then to small and negative (-0.06 and -0.04 for JPMC 
and BofA, respectively).  The Spearman correlations are the same in sign and generally close 
to the Pearson correlations in magnitude for this pair, albeit significantly larger for PNC 
(41%).  This runs counter to some empirical evidence that operational and credit risk losses 
may be positively correlated (Chernobai et al, 2008).  Possibly this reflects the heterogeneity 
in control processes across banks that are better captured in this analysis.   
 
In the case of CR and MR, in almost all cases Pearson correlations are positive and of 
modest magnitude, ranging from 0.16 (CITI) to 0.22 (AT200) in the 4 out of 5 cases, but is 
only 0.05 (0.09) for BofA (PNC).   The Spearman correlations are close in most cases, 
except that it is negative (much smaller) for AT200 (CITI), -0.05 vs. 0.22 (0.08 vs. 0.16).  
These observations may be considered in line with empirical evidence and theoretical 
arguments that support a positive correlation between credit and market risks (Jarrow and 
Turnbull, 2000).   
 
While CR and LR are all positively correlated by the Pearson measure, we observe 
that the magnitudes vary widely across banks: from large (0.53 and 0.48 for AT200 and 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
31 Note that these are the ordinary Pearson correlation amongst the rank transformed variables. 
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BofA, respectively), to modest (0.19, 0.31 and 0.21 for JPMC, CITI and PNC, respectively), 
and to small (0.02 for WELLS).  However, Spearman correlations agree neither in sign nor 
magnitude, being negative and small to modest in most cases: -0.12, -0.17, -0.03, -0.15 and -
0.15 for JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively; only in the case of AT200 do 
we get a positive sign on the Spearman correlation, but of diminished magnitude (0.10) 
relative to the Pearson (0.53).  Again, this is partly consistent with various empirical studies 
and models which have found or purport a positive relationship between credit and liquidity 
risk (Ericsson and, 2005), as well as certain theoretical models (Cherubini and Lunga, 2001.)   
 
In the case of CR and IR, Pearson correlations are all negative, ranging in magnitude 
rather narrowly from small (-0.08 and -0.09 for JPMC and CITI, respectively) to modest (-
0.13, -0.18, -0.14 and -0.13 for AT200, BofA, WELLS and PNC, respectively).   But again 
we are in a situation in which the Spearman correlations are radically different, all positive 
and of relatively large, ranging from 0.17 to 0.33.  While certain credit risk models in the 
structural class suggest a negative correlation (Merton, 1974), empirically we do not have a 
firm sense a priori of what the sign on this correlation ought to be. 
 
In 4 out of 6 cases, OR and MR have modest positive Pearson correlations, ranging 
from 0.11 for JPMC to 0.20 for AT200, but are negative and have small (modest) values of -
0.04 (-0.09) for WELLS (PNC).  The Spearman correlations are also positive in most cases, 
but of diminished magnitude, ranging from 0.01 for WELLS to 0.10 for both JPMC and 
BofA; but as in the Pearson measure it is still negative for PNC (-0.07).  There is really no 
empirical evidence of theory that can guide us in forming a prior on what the sign of this 
correlation should be.  One may speculate that during market dislocations, strains on systems 
and personnel may increase the likelihood of an operational risk event, such as a trading 
error or the revelation of a fraud (e.g., see Jorion 2006 for the Barrings and Daiwa case 
studies). 
 
Considering the Pearson correlation between our proxies for OR and LR, we see 
much diversity in sign and magnitude, while the Spearman correlations are all negative and 
of modest size.  In the cases of JPMC, CITI and AT200 we observe Pearson correlations of 
H. Inanoglu, M. J. Jr / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 118-189 
 
 150
small to modest magnitude (0.07, 0.12 and 0.15, respectively).  On the other hand, the 
respective negative Pearson correlations of -0.05, -0.09 and -0.10 for WELLS, BofA and 
PNC tend to lie on the low range.  The Spearman correlations are all negative and range 
from small (-0.02 for AT200) to modest (-0.24 and -0.26 for BofA and WELLS, 
respectively).  Here we not only don’t have any research precedent to go on, but cannot offer 
much in the way of speculation about what the sign should be.  It may very well be that 
during periods of a liquidity crunch internal controls are tightened in order to maximize 
available sources of funds, thereby mitigating the likelihood of an operational risk event, 
implying a negative relationship.  Similarly, to the extent that liquidity may be more 
favorable during times of favorable credit quality or rising markets, when internal controls 
may be lax, this also supports a direct relation.  And further supporting a positive 
dependence, we can imagine that the onset of an adverse operational loss may precipitate a 
loss of liquidity for a bank, which supports a direct relationship.            
 
All of the Pearson correlations between OR and IR are negative and generally modest 
in magnitude: -0.09, -0.12, -0.14,-0.16, -0.16 and -0.23 for CITI, AT200, JPMC, WELLS, 
PNC and BofA, respectively.  But the Spearman correlations are split in sign between 
positive (0.07, 0.10 and 0.12 for AT200, JPMC and CITI, respectively) and negative (-0.30, -
0.05 and -0.04 for BofA, WELLS and PNC, respectively).  Again here it is challenging to 
explain what these result should be.  One may speculate that to the extent operational losses 
may occur in periods where bank margins are healthier (and not necessarily in economic 
upturns or good parts of the credit cycle) and controls are lax, the positive correlations 
observed in some cases may make sense.  
 
We observe a wide range of in the signs and magnitudes of the Pearson correlations 
between MR and LR, while in 4 out of 6 cases Spearman correlations are moderately sized 
and negative.  AT200 (BofA) has a modestly sized positive (negative) Pearson correlation of 
0.11 (-0.18), and CITI (PNC) has a small positive (negative) correlation of 0.06 (-0.03), 
while JPMC (WELLS) has an insignificant positive (negative) correlation of 0.02 (-0.01).  
On the other hand, JPMC, BofA, CITI and WELLS have substantial negative Spearman 
correlations of -0.36, -0.23, -0.23 and -0.25, respectively; while AT200 and PNC stand out 
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by this measure with insignificant positive correlations of  0.02 and 0.002.  We find the 
Pearson results a little surprising, since it may be natural to think that liquidity measures 
would tend to be higher during downward market moves, as is more consistent with the 
Spearman measure results. 
 
In the case of the MR-IR pair, the Pearson correlations are generally negative, while 
the Spearman correlations are for the most part positive.  While for AT200 the Pearson 
correlation between MR and IR is positive and reasonably large (0.25), in the case of 4 out of 
the Top 5 it is moderately negative: -0.28, -0.19, -0.18 and -0.17 for JPMC, CITI, WELLS 
and BofA, respectively.  And for the smallest of the Top 5, PNC, it is insignificantly positive 
at 0.03.  But the Spearman measures tell a slightly different story: ranging from modestly 
(0.19 for AT200) to small (0.07 and 0.09 for WELLS and BofA, respectively) and positive 
on the one hand, to negative in one case (-0.09 for JPMC) and insignificant and positive in 
another (0.04 for PNC).  Therefore, by the Pearson measure we observe that for the very 
largest of banks, adverse moves in our market risk proxy tend to coincide with favorable 
shocks to our interest rate risk measure.  A possible explanation is that in periods of down 
markets, banks benefit from rising credit spreads on its loan book, while the rate on deposits 
is lagging.  But we are not seeing this in the Spearman measure of dependence.  
 
Finally, the correlation between IR and LR is consistently positive for both measures 
of correlation.  In the Pearson case, these range from small (0.09 for both BofA and WELLS) 
to moderate (0.12, 0.13, 0.19 and 0.20 for CITI, PNC, AT200 and JPMC, respectively).  The 
Spearman correlations are similar, albeit slightly larger: 0.08, 0.13, 0.15, 0.18, 0.21 and 0.26 
for WELLS, AT200, BofA, PNC, JPMC and CITI, respectively.  As with many of these 
results, we have little to go on in the way of prior expectations other than reasoned 
speculation.  It is possible that in periods in which deposits are growing faster than 
expansion in loans happen to coincide with periods in which banks are competing for 
deposits, and hence the interest rate gap is widening.   
 
In Table 1.5 and in Figures 5.1-5.6 we present results group-wise tests of multivariate 
stochastic independence amongst our risk proxies developed by Genest et al (2004, 2009).  
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The p-values of Table 1.5, derived under the null-hypothesis of independence with respect to 
each group, are based upon a comparison to the empirical copula process.  Figures 5.1-5.6 
are the dependograms of the test statistics and the corresponding critical values32.  We find 
that across all the possible 26 sub-sets and 6 entities under consideration, in the majority of 
cases we fail to reject independence.  For example, in only 14, 10, 5, 9, 9 and 6 groups do we 
reject the null hypothesis of independence at better than the 10% level for Top 200, JPMC, 
BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  At better than the 1% level, this drops off 
dramatically:  8, 3, 1, 3, 3 and 1 groups for the Top 200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and 
PNC, respectively.  It seems that we are able to reject independence in the most cases for 
Top 200, and the least for either BofA or PNC.  However, in the case of the broad tests of the 
5 risk types together in the second to last row, as well as the global test of at least one subset 
being independent in the final row, in all cases we are able to reject at the 10% level or better 
for all banks.      
 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS: INTEGRATED RISK THROUGH ALTERNATIVE 
AGGREGATION METHODOLOGIES 
 
The main results of this paper are tabulated in Tables 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2; and shown 
graphically in Figures 6.1-7.  In Table 2.1 we report the 99.97th percentile VaR (Equation 
3.1.2) for alternative risk aggregation methodologies for each AT200 and the Top 5 in row-
wise panels, and in Table 2.2 we replicate this for the Expected Shortfall (ES) at the 99th 
percentile  (Equation 3.1.3).  The different techniques are arrayed by column as “Gaussian 
Copula Simulation” (Equations 3.2.6-3.2.8; henceforth "GCS") 33 , “Gaussian (Variance-
Covariance) Approximation” (Equations 3.2.6-3.2.8; henceforth "VCA"), “Historical 
Bootstrap (Empirical Copula) Simulation” (Equation 3.2.9; henceforth "ECS"), “T - Copula 
Simulation” (Equation 3.2.8 henceforth "TCS"), “Archimadean Copula (Gumbel) 
                                                          
32 As outlined by Genest and Remillard (2004), this test is composed of two steps.  First, for all sub-sets of the 
variables, the distributions of the test statistics arte simulated, under the null hypothesis of mutual independence 
and for the given sample size.  In the second step, the approximate p-values are computed, based upon the 
distribution in step one.      
 
33 Results for H-VaR were nearly identical to the N-VaR, which is the output of the VCA methodology. 
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Simulation” (Equation 3.2.13; henceforth "AGCS"), “Archimadean Copula (Clayton) 
Simulation” (Equation 3.2.12; henceforth "ACCS") and “Archimadean Copula (Frank) 
Simulation” (Equation 3.2.14; henceforth "AFCS").  The 1st row in each panel labeled 
“Magnitude of Risk – Fully Diversified” represents the 99.97th percentile (ES at the 99th 
percentile) of the loss distribution, either simulated in the case of the copula methods or 
analytic in normal approximation, in Table 2.1 (2.2).  The second rows of each panel labeled 
“Magnitude of Risk – Perfect Correlation” represents the simple sum of the 99.97th 
percentiles (ES at the 99th percentile) of the simulated loss distributions for each risk type in 
the case of the copula methods, or the sum of the standard deviations of the loss in the 
analytic normal approximation (in either case, “simple summation” of risks), in Table 2.1 
(2.2).  In the corresponding 3rd rows we show the “Proportional Diversification Benefit” 
(henceforth PDB), which is defined as the difference in the risk measure between the perfect 
correlation and fully diversified cases, expressed as a proportion of fully diversified VaR or 













=               (30) 













=                  (31) 
In the second-to-bottom rows we tabulate the p-values of the Genest and Remillard 
(2009) goodness-of-fit tests for the copula models.  Approximate p-values for this test are 
based upon the a comparison of the empirical copula (EC) to a parametric estimate of the 
copula in question, that is generated through a parametric bootstrap, under the null 
hypothesis the data is generated through the EC process34.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
34 Genest and Remillard (2008) note that if the parametric bootstrap is used, then the vector of dependence 
parameters for the copula family in question can be estimated by maximizing the pseudo-maximum likelihood 
(PML), inverting Spearman’s rho or by inverting Kendal’s tau.  On the other hand, if the multiplier method is 
used, any of these may be used in the bivariate case, but in higher dimensional problems only PML may be 
used.         
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In the bottom row of each panel in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 we show the diversified VaR 
and ES as a proportion of the book value of total assets (BVTA), for AT200 and each Top 5 
institution as of the year-end 2008.  We observe wide variation in all risk and diversification 
measures across aggregation methodologies for a given institution, as well as across banks 
for a given technique.   
 
First we shall discuss the VaR results in Table 2.1.  The dollar VaR (shown 
graphically in Figure 6.1) is increasing in size of institution, ranging cross diversification 
methodologies: $688B-$930B for AT 200, $187B-$392B for JPMC, $182B-$207B for 
BofA, $132B-$277B for CITI, $104B-$199B for WELLS, and finally a big drop-off $46.6B-
$57.8B for PNC.  We show these graphically in Figure 5.1.   
 
VaR expressed as a proportion of BVA (shown graphically in Figure 2.2) also shows 
much variation across both aggregation techniques and institutions, ranging from the mid 
single-digits to just below 20%.  These percentages generally decrease with the size of the 
institution, although the relationship is not strictly monotonic.  We observe percentages 
lowest for the hypothetical aggregate AT200 (6%-9%), highest for PNC (16%-18%), and 
generally hovering just north of 10% for the middle 4 banks: 10%-20%, 11%-12%, 10%-
15%, 8%-16% for JPMC, BofA, CITI and WELLS, respectively.  Note that the ranges of 
VaR/BVA across methodologies appear to be increasing from JPMC down to WELLS.  We 
are cautious to conclude much from this, such as a “business line diversification story”, due 
to the small sample size.  Comparing different risk aggregation methodologies across banks, 
we observe that VCA produces consistently the lowest VaR, and that either the ECS or the 
AGCS produce the highest VaR, across all institutions.  ECS and ACGS is followed by TCS 
in terms of conservativeness, while the GCS “benchmark” is usually somewhere in the 
middle, and ACCS is toward the low side.  AFGS tends to be closest to GCS, albeit usually 
just a little lower.  While TCS is always higher than GCS, in some cases it is not by a very 
wide margin.  
 
  In the case of AT200, VaR under ECS (VCA) is $859B ($688B), $392B ($187B), 
$205B ($182B), $277B ($132B) , $187B ($104B) and $57.8B ($46.6B) for AT200, JPMC, 
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BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively; and this brackets the respective GCS VaRs of 
$764B, $230B, $194B, $162B, $163B and $47.9B.  AGCS is in some cases close to ECS, 
and in others still higher than GCS (understandably, with the property of upper tail 
dependence), with VaRs of $930B, $247B, $207B, $200B, $199B and $52.3B for AT200, 
JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  On the other hand, TCS is always 
higher than GCS, but in some cases by only a modest amount (and generally less than AGCS 
or ECS): VaRs of $812B, $238B, $200B, $172B, $171B and $50.1B for AT200, JPMC, 
BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  The ACCS is generally second-place to VCA 
in lack of conservativeness, understandably so given its property of lower tail dependence: 
VaRs of $728B, $219B, $182B, $149B, $152B and $46.6B for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, 
WELLS and PNC, respectively.  Finally, we see that the AFCS (the Archimadean copula 
characterized by neither upper nor lower tail dependence) is middling and often close to 
GCS in VaR magnitude as compared to its brethren methodologies: VaRs of $752B, $232B, 
$203B, $160B, $158B and $47.1B for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, 
respectively.     
 
The proportional diversification benefits, or PDBs (shown graphically in Figure 6.3), 
exhibit a great deal variation across banks and aggregation techniques, range from 10% to 
50%, with the ECS (AGCS) yielding clearly higher (lower) values than the other 
methodologies. PDBs ECS ranges in 40% to 50%, while they range in 10% to 25% for 
AGCS.  Across banks, the GCS “benchmark” tends to lie in the middle (41-58%), and the 
VCA to the lower end of the range (31-41%), while AGCS is the lowest (10-21%). 
 
Looking at the range of the PDBs across aggregation methodologies for a given bank, 
we attempt to measure the impact of business mix.  However, we cannot observe a 
directionally consistent pattern. The 2 banks with the highest proportion of trading have 
diversification benefits lying in a low and wide (11.2% to 46.1% for CITI) to a high and 
narrow range (20.3% to 36.6% for JPMC).  On the other hand, considering banks with 
proportionately more lending assets, BofA has a range similar to JPMC (25.2% to 38.3%), 
while Wells and PNC more closely resemble CITI (10.4% to 49.1% and 21.1% to 37.0%, 
respectively).  We shall not discuss the 99th percentile expected shortfall (ES) results in 
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Table 2.2, as generally the results are quite in both absolute quantities and in comparisons 
across institutions or aggregation methodologies.   
 
The results of the Genest et al (2009) GOF tests (shown graphically in Figure 6.4) are 
highly mixed (we reject the null in just under one-half of cases, 14 out of 30) and do not lend 
themselves to the extraction of a clear pattern.  Generally, the rejections of fit to the 
empirical processes are not at very high levels of significance, so that perhaps we can say 
that the models are doing a decent job.  There are only 3 rejections at better than the 1% 
level (AGCS for AT200 and JPMC, AGCS for JPMC), only one at the 5% level (AFCS for 
AT200), and the remaining 9 at only the 10% level (and in one case, the p-value is just above 
0.10).  AT200 has the most rejections (in all cases, models are rejected at the 10% level), 
followed by JPMC (2 rejections for TCS and AGCS), CITI and WELLS (2 rejections each at 
the 10% level), with BofA and PNC having the least (only 1 each at the 10% level).  Across 
banks, the GCS and AGCS models fail to reject a fit to the data most often (1 and 2 
rejections, respectively; however, AGCS has the 2 lowest p-value), while the TCS (4 at the 
10% level) and AFCS (3 at the 10% level and 1 at the 5% level) have the most rejections.    
 
The object of the second analysis that we perform, a bootstrap (or resampling) 
exercise, is to measure the uncertainty in the VaR and PDB estimates.  This is now a widely 
used technique in finance and economics, originating mainly in the statistics literature, which 
has the potential to develop estimates of standard errors or confidence intervals for complex 
functions of random variables for which distribution theory is undeveloped (Efron and 
Tibshirani, 1986).  The type of bootstrap that we implement is the so-called non-parametric 
version, in which the data is resampled with replacement.  In each iteration, the function of 
interest is recalculated, yielding a distribution of the latter which can be analyzed.  As the 
VaR estimate in any of the aggregation frameworks depends upon a random sample of 
observations, and in the case of the VCA or the copulas parametric estimates of the marginal 
distributions or of the correlation matrices, the uncertainty in the latter flows through to the 
former.  This manner of analysis is of keen importance to regulators, as they must seek to 
understand how we may decompose the volatility of capital from year-to-year into that 
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driven by the variability in model inputs, from that stemming from changes to a bank’s risk 
profile.    
 
The results of this experiment are tabulated in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for the VaR and 
PDB estimates, respectively.  We resample with replacement 10,000 times, and in each 
bootstrap we run a simulation of 100,000 years as in the main results.  The numerical 
coefficients of variation (NCV) of VaR and PDB across banks and techniques are shown in 
the final rows of each panel in Tables 3.1-3.2, as well as graphically in Figures 7.1-7.4.  We 
define the NCV as the ratio of the 95% confidence interval in the bootstrapped sample to the 
























=                                   (33) 
We do this bootstrap in two ways:  holding the estimates of the marginal distributions 
constant, and re-estimating the correlations, and vice-versa (i.e., assuming that we know the 
true correlation matrix, but that the parameters the marginal distribution is measured with 
error), shown in the left and right panels of the tables, respectively.  However, in the case of 
ESC, we cannot do either of these and simply draw a new sample from which we estimate an 
empirical copula from the resampled data.  And in the case of the VCA, we can only do the 
correlation resampling, as that methodology does not depend upon fitting marginal 
distributions. 
 
There are several clear conclusions that we can draw based upon these results.  First, 
we fail to observe a consistent pattern in the variability of VaR or PDB across size or types 
of banks (i.e., business mix).  Second, regarding which model is most or least stable, we 
observe that for either the bootstrap of VaR or PDB, the ECS and GSC techniques yields 
generally the lowest NCVs as compared to other methodology.  Third, we see that in contrast 
to this, the VCA is consistently the most variable in the bootstrap, having for the most part 
the highest NCVs.  In the comparison between VCA and the copula methods (excluding 
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ECS) this is somewhat surprising, since VCA does not require estimation of marginal 
distribution parameters, yet nonetheless has much higher NCVs in the resampling of 
correlations for any of the copula methodologies.  In the bootstrap of VaR, NCV ranges in 
6.4%-13.6% for ECS and 27.9%-45.3% for VCA, while in the resampling of correlations 
(margins) for GCS they range in 7.1%-9.0% (35.4%-48.2%).  Fourth, for either the bootstrap 
of VaR or PDB, NCVs are an order of magnitude higher for the resampling of margins as 
compared to the resampling or correlations, and this difference is accentuated for the 
bootstrapping of VaR as compared to PDB.  Five, NCVs are higher for the PDB as compared 
to the VaR statistics.  In the case of VaR, NCVs in the bootstrap of correlations (margins) 
range in 5.9%-45.3% (25.2%-69.6%), while in the case of PDB the corresponding numbers 
are 9.9%-158.2% (22.7%-118.2%).  Finally, according to the NCV criterion, the PDB is 
much more imperfectly estimated than the VaR, across methodologies or banks.  
 
In the case of the VaR bootstrapping in Table 3.1, the NCV for ECS is 8.1%, 6.4%, 
13.6%, 9.1%, 9.1% and 8.9% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, 
respectively.  The corresponding NCV of VaR numbers for VCA in the bootstrap of 
correlations are much higher: 28.2%, 30.3%, 27.9%, 45.3%, 27.0% and 32.9%, respectively.  
However, in the case of GCS, the corresponding NCVs for the correlation bootstrap of VaR 
are slightly lower than ECS at 7.1%, 7.8%, 8.9%, 8.0%, 8.1% and 9.0% for AT200, JPMC, 
BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  In this exercise of varying the correlations, the 
NCVs of both the Student-T (8.5%, 7.5%, 11.1%, 12.0%, 16.4% and 10.9%) and AGCS 
(10.6%, 7.5%, 10.8%, 9.6%, 9.3% and 10.0%) slightly higher for AT200, JPMC, BofA, 
CITI,WELLS and PNC, respectively.  Finally, ACCS is slightly lower in NCV across banks: 
6.6%, 7.0%, 6.5%, 6.5%, 6.0% and 5.9% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, 
respectively. 
 
In the bootstrapping of margins for VaR in the right panel of Table 3.1, we observe 
that the NCVs of all the copula models are higher than VCA and far exceed ECS, but it is 
hard to tell which of these is consistently greater or less.  In the case of GCS the NCVs for 
the margin bootstrap of VaR are 35.4%, 41.4%, 48.2%, 38.4%, 40.0% and 44.8% for AT200, 
JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  The NCVs of Student-T are all higher 
H. Inanoglu, M. J. Jr / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 118-189 
 
 159
than those for GCS:  43.6%, 46.6%, 56.1%, 62.2%, 46.0% and 47.4% for AT200, JPMC, 
BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  But the comparison to of GCS or TCS to either 
AGCS (39.3%, 33.5%, 37.8%, 52.7%, 45.7% and 44.9% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, 
WELLS and PNC, respectively) and ACCS (44.36%, 50.0%, 25.2%, 54.4%, 62.1% and 
69.6% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI,WELLS and PNC, respectively) is mixed across 
banks. 
 
As with the VaR bootstrapping, in the resampling of PDB in Table 3.2, we observe 
that overall NCVs are higher than in the estimation of VaR, across methodologies and 
institutions.  The estimation of PDB is least precise for VCA, and generally most accurate 
for ECS, followed closely by GCS in having low NCVs.  In the resampling of correlations, 
the GCS and CCS are notably more variable, in that order, as compared with the VaR 
estimation.  As with the case of VaR, the resampling of margins has higher NCVs, although 
the difference as compared to the correlation bootstrapping is not as stark as in VaR 
estimation. 
 
In Table 3.2 for PDB  in the resampling of correlations we observe that the NCV for 
ECS is 14.2%, 12.4%, 18.1%, 12.5%, 9.9% and 18.1% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, 
WELLS and PNC, respectively.  The corresponding NCVs for GCS are significantly higher 
in most cases at 23.5%, 34.3%, 24.4%, 29.0%, 17.3% and 24.5%.  The NCV of PDB 
numbers for VCA are much higher: 112.2%, 111.2%, 100.3%, 98.4%, 83.4% and 118.2% for 
AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  In the exercise of varying the 
correlations, the NCVs of PDB is slightly higher for TCS than GCS (31.3%, 36.0%, 39.5%, 
42.4%, 28.4% and 22.5% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively).  
On the other hand, AGCS is much higher than GCS or TCS in some cases:  75.5%, 44.1%, 
46.8%, 88.5%, 87.9% and 53.9% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, 
respectively.  And ACCS is somewhere between GCS and TCS:  23.9%, 30.0%, 24.9%, 
24.2%, 22.7% and 28.3% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  
 
In Table 3.2 for PDB in the resampling of margins we observe that the NCVs for 
GCS are quite a bit higher than in the resampling of correlations, now 46.4%, 55.6%, 38.6%, 
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45.1%, 43.9% and 56.7% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  
While always higher, in contrast with the exercise of varying the correlations, the NCVs of 
PDB are in some cases much higher for TCS than for GCS: 61.4%, 69.4%, 39.5%, 83.9%, 
58.2% and 60.9% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  On the 
other hand, AGCS is now generally lower than TCS but not for from GCS:  36.8%, 38.8%, 
44.5%, 48.6%, 53.1% and 43.0% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, 
respectively.  And ACCS is still somewhere between GCS and TCS:  35.0%, 32.8%, 26.5%, 
43.7%, 49.5% and 19.9% for AT200, JPMC, BofA, CITI, WELLS and PNC, respectively.  
            
6. SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
In this study, we have compared alternative risk aggregation methodologies.  We have 
described various models used in practice, including the variance-covariance approximation 
(VCA), as well as various copula simulations formulations that include the well-known 
parametric Gaussian copula simulation (GCS) and the less-well known (in this context) 
empirical copula simulation (ECS).  Through differences observed across the five largest 
banks by book value of assets as of the end of 2008, proxying for five risk types using 
accounting data from Call Reports submitted to national supervisors, we have identified a 
range of results across different models for aggregating risk.  The first major exercise 
involved fitting the models, describing and comparing value-at-risk (VaR) and proportional 
diversification benefits (PDBs) across banks and models, as well as goodness-of-fit statistics 
(GOF) for the latter.  The second part involved measuring the statistical variation in the VaR 
and PDB measures through a non-parametric bootstrap. 
    
First, while we documented that dollar 99.97th percentile VaR is increasing in size of 
institution, VaR as a fraction of book value does not appear to be a monotonically increasing 
in size (however, it appears to decrease overall).  Second, we saw that across different risk 
aggregation methodologies and banks that consistently the ECS and AGCS produce the 
highest absolute magnitudes of VaR as compared to either GCS “benchmark”, STCS or any 
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of the other Archimadean copulas.  Furthermore, ECS – a variant of the well-established 
“historical simulation” methodology in market risk practice – was in many cases found to be 
most conservative, a surprise in that according to asymptotic theory it should be the lower 
bound across copula models.  On the other hand, the VCA consistently produced the lowest 
VaR number, which is disturbing in that several bank practitioners are (for the lack of 
theoretical or supervisory guidance) adopting this computational shortcut.  Third, we also 
noted that the PDB tended to be largest for the ECS than the other methodologies, including 
the GCS “benchmark” or the VCA, while the AGCS produced the lowest.  Therefore, if we 
regard ECS as a reasonable benchmark with much to recommend it, we caution that banks 
choosing either the VCA or other copula models may possibly understate diversifications 
benefits.  Fourth, through differences observed across the two (three) of five largest banks 
having proportionately more trading (lending) assets, we failed to find business mix to exert 
a directionally consistent an impact on total integrated risk.  Fifth, in an application of a 
blanket goodness-of-fit tests for copula models (Genest et al, 2009), we found mixed results: 
while in about half the cases commonly utilized parametric copula models fail to fit the data, 
confidence levels tended to be modest, so clearly this is an area that warrants further 
investigation and experimentation.  Finally, the bootstrapping experiment revealed the 
variability of the VaR itself to be significantly lowest (highest) for the ECS and GCS (VCA) 
relative to other risk aggregation models.  Furthermore, we found that the contribution of the 
sampling error in the parameters of the marginal distributions to be an order of magnitude 
greater than that of the dependency measures.  Overall, our results constituted a sensitivity 
analysis that argues for practitioners to err on the side of conservatism in considering a non-
parametric copula alternative in order to quantify integrated risk.  This is because standard 
copula formulations produced a wide divergence in measured VaR, diversification benefits 
as well as the sampling variation in both of these across different measurement frameworks 
and types of institutions.  
          
There are various fruitful avenues along which this research may be extended.  First, 
motivated by some of our descriptive analysis (i.e., pairwise correlations and group-
independence tests), we may want to model sub-sets of risk factors according to different 
dependency structures (e.g., different copula models).  An ideal framework for 
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accomplishing this is the pair-copula formulation (Aas and Berg, 2007).  While this is 
computationally challenging, we believe the returns to be substantial, and at this point we are 
pursuing such an empirical strategy.  Indeed, it may well turn out that this more realistic 
framework performs not only better than standard copulas, but beats the ECS model that this 
paper has found so robust.  Second, we may consider alternatives to the copula paradigm, 
such as a dynamic time series model; an example that comes to mind is the dynamic 
conditional correlation (DCC) model of Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002).  
Third, we may investigate alternative proxies for risk factors, or different risk factors 
themselves, in this or in a competing framework.   Lastly, we could expand the universe of 
banks that we study (e.g., the Top 10 or 20 by assets size).  
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Aggregate Top 200 Banks 10,758.51 1,007.19 9,751.33 90.64% 5,737.07 53.33% 964.24 8.96% 88.01 1.53% 289.33 5.04% 188.15 3.28% -0.99 189.28 298.53 116.37
JP Morgan Chase 1,849.65 152.69 1,696.96 91.74% 738.44 39.92% 365.71 19.77% 10.75 1.46% 43.38 5.88% 29.23 3.96% 5.02 41.78 46.35 14.40
Bank of America 1,699.71 178.72 1,520.99 89.49% 900.99 53.01% 155.64 9.16% 17.60 1.95% 46.35 5.14% 27.82 3.09% -0.35 29.94 36.13 13.67
Citigroup 1,319.45 101.46 1,217.99 92.31% 620.12 47.00% 200.52 15.20% 15.55 2.51% 35.40 5.71% 28.67 4.62% -4.49 12.28 38.97 17.05
Wells Fargo 1,236.36 105.62 1,130.74 91.46% 792.49 64.10% 52.08 4.21% 7.52 0.95% 35.40 4.47% 25.50 3.22% 0.35 22.16 32.89 12.21
PNC 289.88 25.25 264.62 91.29% 180.79 62.37% 6.09 2.10% 0.62 0.34% 7.22 4.00% 29.23 16.17% -0.13 3.35 9.38 2.85
5th Percentile 2.87 0.24 2.40 83.65% 1.94 39.64% 0.00 0.00% 0.0016 0.04% 0.07 0.67% 0.01 0.36% -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
25th Percentile 3.90 0.38 3.44 88.20% 2.66 62.06% 0.00 0.00% 0.01 0.36% 0.12 0.94% 0.05 1.18% 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Average Bank 53.79 5.04 48.06 89.35% 28.69 66.63% 4.82 1.38% 0.44 1.27% 1.45 1.24% 0.94 3.40% 0.00 0.17 0.65 0.16
Median Bank 7.04 0.70 6.35 90.09% 4.38 69.53% 0.00 0.00% 0.04 0.76% 0.20 1.11% 0.11 2.37% 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
75th Percentile 15.47 1.65 14.21 91.81% 10.34 75.47% 0.05 0.40% 0.14 1.38% 0.48 1.31% 0.35 3.94% 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.04
95th Percentile 162.91 15.36 152.86 93.83% 92.30 86.12% 6.65 5.25% 1.38 3.93% 3.98 1.85% 2.06 9.75% 0.06 0.70 1.11 0.69
Standard Deviation 218.78 19.64 10.88 4.97% 109.41 15.40% 31.88 5.46% 1.92 1.95% 5.86 0.82% 3.94 4.60% 0.54 0.81 7.99 0.64
Skewness 6.76 6.97 -0.53 2.46 6.52 -1.45 9.13 7.28 7.20 6.44 6.59 7.16 6.52 5.61 0.81 8.09 22.03 6.99
Kurtosis 47.29 51.79 60.16 2.99 43.83 3.18 92.04 61.85 55.54 60.24 44.00 64.32 42.57 45.17 64.67 79.00 513.64 53.64
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics on Characteristics of Top 200 and 5 Largest Banks by Asset Size (Call Report Data As of 20081 )
3 - Defined as the ratio of gross-charegeoffs to total lending assets.
4 - Defined as the ratio of non-performing assets to total lending assets.
1 - Dollar amounts expressed in billions.
2 - Defined as the ratio of the book value of  total debt to the book value of total assets.





























Aggregate Banks2 9,179.99 644.10 838.58 8,341.40 8,985.50 90.87% 92.83% 97.88%
JP Morgan Chase 1,849.65 117.68 152.69 1,696.96 1,814.64 91.74% 93.51% 98.11%
Bank of America 1,699.71 70.65 178.72 1,520.99 1,591.63 89.49% 95.56% 93.64%
Citigroup 1,319.45 36.57 101.46 1,217.99 1,254.55 92.31% 97.09% 95.08%
Wells Fargo 1,236.36 109.92 105.62 1,130.74 1,240.66 91.46% 91.14% 100.35%
PNC 289.88 17.05 25.25 264.62 281.67 91.29% 93.95% 97.17%
5th Percentile 2.88 0.03 0.26 2.56 2.83 86.03% 81.07% 91.14%
25th Percentile 3.96 0.31 0.38 3.61 4.15 88.43% 86.33% 94.26%
Average Bank 74.63 5.24 6.82 67.82 73.05 90.10% 89.86% 103.04%
Median Bank 8.36 0.73 0.72 7.14 8.07 90.28% 90.74% 98.81%
75th Percentile 16.32 1.86 1.64 14.74 16.76 91.72% 95.52% 104.24%
95th Percentile 205.15 30.09 21.63 189.39 219.72 93.75% 99.33% 112.07%
Standard Deviation 275.91 16.87 24.74 251.42 266.72 2.46% 9.75% 28.99%
Skewness 5.3050 5.1706 5.4962 5.3000 5.2794 -0.4452 -3.8215 7.6426
Kurtosis 28.3161 29.1232 31.4196 28.2416 28.1107 1.0313 21.7520 63.3658
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics on Market Value Characteristics of Banks by Asset Size 
(Call Report and CRSP Data As of 20081 )
5 - Defined as the ratio of the book value of total debt to the quasi-market value of assets (defined in 3).
6 - Defined as the ratio of the quasi-market value of assets (defined in 3) to book value of total total assets.
1 - Dollar amounts expressed in billions.
2- 123 out of the 200 top banks by book value of assets for which we could match to CRSP as of 4Q08.
3 - Defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt.
4 - Defined as the ratio of the book value of  total debt to the book value of total assets.











Prcntl. Max Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt.
Gross Chargeoffs2 1.92 3.29 5.24 7.89 6.66 9.88 13.60 31.16 4.51 2.4931 9.0434
Non-Interest Expense3 6.20 8.55 12.85 18.47 17.55 24.20 28.64 33.10 6.60 0.1041 -0.9597
Net Trading Revenue4 -7.20 -1.79 -0.62 0.01 -0.13 0.25 1.30 16.13 2.14 4.5929 35.3144
Liquidity Gap5 -159.68 -112.11 -66.48 -20.10 -20.50 26.51 75.92 375.83 72.07 1.5928 7.8773
Interest Rate Gap6 -171.72 -89.86 -57.76 -2.62 7.34 59.23 85.11 153.01 64.80 -0.0682 -0.6063
Gross Chargeoffs 0.79 1.07 1.38 1.96 1.74 2.32 3.59 4.53 0.82 1.2623 1.3433
Non-Interest Expense 2.15 2.80 3.47 4.29 4.08 5.01 5.96 7.00 1.06 0.3278 -0.3711
Net Trading Revenue -1.59 -0.96 -0.32 -0.03 -0.09 0.21 0.87 3.65 0.63 1.9651 11.1842
Liquidity Gap -82.87 -26.97 -12.15 2.28 -0.76 13.25 38.46 88.94 24.92 0.4594 2.2183
Interest Rate Gap -30.86 -16.66 -8.67 -0.13 0.92 8.46 14.76 25.60 10.92 -0.1630 -0.3518
Gross Chargeoffs 0.85 1.21 1.52 2.10 1.91 2.43 3.91 5.81 0.87 1.6790 3.8429
Non-Interest Expense 2.81 3.19 3.71 4.14 4.05 4.53 5.20 5.98 0.62 0.3662 0.1090
Net Trading Revenue -2.43 -0.36 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.25 4.38 0.61 2.8475 31.4616
Liquidity Gap -65.05 -43.17 -20.41 -6.63 -6.85 5.92 35.65 84.95 24.59 0.5063 1.3789
Interest Rate Gap -34.99 -17.06 -9.37 -0.42 0.54 9.03 15.35 31.71 12.12 -0.1040 -0.0776
Gross Chargeoffs 0.17 0.48 0.91 1.58 1.11 2.19 3.55 4.96 1.01 1.0753 0.2524
Non-Interest Expense 0.69 1.67 2.21 3.04 2.58 3.72 5.21 6.43 1.20 0.7202 -0.1864
Net Trading Revenue -3.87 -0.39 -0.16 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.43 9.09 1.04 6.2887 60.3677
Liquidity Gap -34.38 -20.14 -10.08 -0.12 -1.93 7.55 20.76 90.05 17.96 2.2629 9.0858
Interest Rate Gap -15.34 -11.93 -6.42 -0.58 -0.91 5.83 11.39 14.60 7.32 -0.0244 -0.9156
Gross Chargeoffs 0.45 0.60 0.83 1.15 1.00 1.33 2.21 3.50 0.52 1.7393 4.0686
Non-Interest Expense 1.94 2.30 2.69 2.99 2.90 3.23 4.03 6.63 0.59 2.6639 14.1990
Net Trading Revenue -0.56 -0.12 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.12 0.75 0.13 2.0058 16.6127
Liquidity Gap -41.58 -29.25 -12.26 -5.28 -4.91 0.29 19.90 30.69 13.30 0.0705 0.5398
Interest Rate Gap -24.80 -12.17 -6.31 -0.24 0.86 6.97 11.49 22.39 8.48 -0.1075 0.0474
Gross Chargeoffs 0.10 0.17 0.21 0.33 0.27 0.38 0.68 1.33 0.20 2.4750 7.7287
Non-Interest Expense 0.42 0.57 0.75 0.84 0.84 0.93 1.07 1.23 0.15 0.0660 0.4106
Net Trading Revenue -0.21 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.2049 22.0198
Liquidity Gap -17.36 -10.17 -5.46 -1.59 -1.85 1.78 8.07 23.62 6.35 0.7620 2.3140
Interest Rate Gap -7.58 -3.76 -1.98 -0.02 0.58 2.43 3.52 7.26 2.80 -0.1077 -0.3254
2 - Gross charge-offs (GCO) is our proxy measure credit risk (CR).
3 - Other non-interest expense (ONIE) is our proxy measure of operational risk (OR).
4 -The deviation to the trailing 4-quarter average in net-trading revenues (NTR-4QD) is our proxy measure of market risk (MR).
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics on Risk Measures for Top 200 and 5 Largest Banks by Asset Size                            
(Call Report Data 1984-2008)1
6 -The deviation to the trailing 4-quarter average of the interest rate gap, defined as total interest expense minus total interest income, our 
proxy measure of interest rate risk (IRG-4QD).
5 -The deviation to the trailing 4-quarter average of the liquidity gap, defined as total loans minus total deposits, our proxy measure of liquidity 
risk (LG-4QD).

















































Pearson 65.17% -5.77% -4.34% 76.65% 10.07% 28.87%
Spearman 60.00% -3.60% -10.00% 78.00% 15.00% 41.00%
Pearson 22.41% 19.73% 5.29% 16.40% 18.42% 9.00%
Spearman -4.90% 15.00% 6.90% 8.10% 19.00% 9.00%
Pearson 53.43% 19.07% 47.87% 31.47% 2.30% 20.85%
Spearman 10.00% -12.00% -17.00% -3.30% -15.00% -15.00%
Pearson -13.28% -7.82% -18.09% -8.78% -14.31% -13.13%
Spearman 33.00% 20.00% 24.00% 33.00% 17.00% 28.00%
Pearson 19.89% 10.92% 12.01% 13.46% -4.28% -9.31%
Spearman 3.00% 10.00% 10.00% 2.70% 1.40% -6.50%
Pearson 15.33% 7.37% -8.55% 11.76% -4.85% -10.22%
Spearman -2.00% -16.00% -24.00% -9.20% -26.00% -18.00%
Pearson -11.74% -14.25% -23.49% -8.79% -15.88% -15.68%
Spearman 7.20% 10.00% -30.00% 12.00% -4.60% -4.20%
Pearson 11.27% 1.56% -18.23% 6.29% -0.94% -3.21%
Spearman 2.30% -36.00% -23.00% -23.00% -25.00% 0.26%
Pearson 24.78% -27.92% -16.70% -19.17% -17.79% 3.38%
Spearman 19.00% -9.10% 8.80% -0.60% 6.80% 3.90%
Pearson 18.97% 19.96% 9.17% 12.38% 9.14% 12.86%





Credit and Interest 
Rate Risk
Credit and Liquidity 
Risk
Table 1.4: Pairwise Correlations for Top 200 and 5 Largest Banks Risk 
Proxies (Call Report Data 1984-2008)
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Top 200 BanksPNC JPMCBank of AmericaCitigroupWells Fargo





















































































































































































































































































































































































































Top 200 BanksJPMCBank of AmericaCitigroupWells FargoPNC


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































JPMCBank of AmericaWells Fargo































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Top 200 BanksCitigroup JPMCBank of America




Figures 1.1.1-1.1.6: Distributions of Key Call Report Variables as of 4Q08 for Top 200 Banks by Book Value of Assets 
 







x 10-8 Fig. 1.1.1: Book Value of Assets (BVA)





Fig. 1.1.2: Book Leverage Ratio (BLR)






Fig. 1.1.3: Percent Lending Assets (PLA)






Fig. 1.1.4: Percent Trading Assets (PTA)






Fig. 1.1.5: Gross Charge-off Ratio (GCOR)





Fig. 1.1.6: Net Interest Margin (NIM)
Figure 1.1; Call Report Variables: 200 Largest Banks by Book Value (As of 4Q08)
H. Inanoglu, M. J. Jr / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 118-189 
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Figures 1.2.1-1.2.3: Distributions of Key Call Report Variables as of 4Q08 for Top 200 Banks by Market Value of Assets 
 
 







x 10-8 Fig. 1.2.1: Quasi Market Value of Assets (QMVA)





Fig. 1.2.2: Market Leverage Ratio (MLR)





Fig. 1.2.3: Market-to-Book Ratio (MTBR)
Figure 1.2: Call Report & CRSP Variables - 123 of 200 Largest Banks by Book Value (As of 4Q08)
H. Inanoglu, M. J. Jr / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 118-189 
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Figures 2.1.1-2.1.6:  Kernel Density Estimated Distributions of Historical Losses  





x 10-6 Credit Risk: GCO
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x 10-8 Liquidity Risk: LG-4QD













Total Risk: Sum of 
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Historical Loss Distributions (Citibank 1984-2008)





x 10-6 Credit Risk: GCO
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x 10-8Liquidity Risk: LG-4QD
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x 10-6 Credit Risk: GCO





x 10-6 Op Risk: ONIE




x 10-5 Market Risk:NTR-4QD





x 10-7 Liquidity Risk: LG-4QD
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x 10-6 Credit Risk: GCO











x 10-6 Market Risk:NTR-4QD





x 10-8 Liquidity Risk: LG-4QD
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Historical Loss Distributions (Bank of America 1984-2008)





x 10-7 Credit Risk: GCO




x 10-8 Op Risk: ONIE











x 10-8 Liquidity Risk: LG-4QD





Interest Rate Risk: 
IRG-4QD






Total Risk: Sum of 
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Historical Loss Distributions (200 Largest Banks 1984-2008)
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Historical Loss Distributions (JP Morgan Chase 1984-2008)
H. Inanoglu, M. J. Jr / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 118-189 
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Total Risk: Sum of 
Cr.,Ops.,Mkt.,Liqu.&Int.
Time Series of Quarterly Losses (200 Largest Banks 1984-2008)
H. Inanoglu, M. J. Jr / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 118-189 
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Pairwise Scatterplot & Pearson Correlations of 5 Risk Types




























































Pairwise Scatterplot & Pearson Correlations of 5 Risk Types


















































Pairwise Scatterplot & Pearson Correlations of 5 Risk Types
































































Pairwise Scattergraph & Pearson Correlations of 5 Risk Types


















































Pairwise Scattergraph & Pearson Correlations of 5 Risk Types


















































































Pairwise Scatterplot & Pearson Correlations of 5 Risk Types
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Spearman Correlations:JP Morgan Chase(Transformed Data)
H. Inanoglu, M. J. Jr / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 118-189 
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Figures 5.1-5.6: Genest et al (2009) Dependograms of Independence Tests 
H. Inanoglu, M. J. Jr / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 118-189 
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Figure 6.1: 99.97th Percentile Value-at-Risk for 5 Risk 
Types: Credit, Operational, Market, Liquidity and Interest 
Rate (200 Largest Banks: Call Report Data 1984-2008)
 

































Figure 6.2: 99.97th Percentile VaR as a 
Proportion of BVA for 5 Risk Types: Credit, 
Operational, Market, Liquidity and Interest 
Rate (200 Largest Banks: Call Report Data 
1984-2008)





















Figure 6.3: 99.97th Percentile VaR Diversification Benefit 
for 5 Risk Types: Credit, Operational, Market, Liquidity 
and Interest Rate (200 Largest Banks: Call Report Data 
1984-2008)























Figure 6.4: Genest et al (2009) Copula GOF Tests  for 5 Risk 
Types: Credit, Operational, Market, Liquidity and Interest 
Rate (200 Largest Banks: Call Report Data 1984-2008)




Figures 7.1-7.4: Coefficients of Variation of Bootstrapped Value-at-Risk and Percent Diversification Benefit 































































Figure 7.2: Numerical Coefficients of Variation in Bootstrap 
of Margins for 99.97th Percentile Value-at-Risk for 5 Risk 
Types: Credit, Operational, Market, Liquidity and Interest 
Rate (200 Largest Banks: Call Report Data 1984-2008)







































































Figure 7.3: Numerical Coefficients of Variation in Bootstrap 
of Correlations for 99.97th Percentile VaR % Diversification 
Benefit for 5 Risk Types: Credit, Operational, Market, 
Liquidity and Interest Rate (200 Largest Banks: Call Report 
Data 1984-2008)


















































Figure 7.4: Numerical Coefficients of Variation in Bootstrap 
of Margins for 99.97th Percentile VaR % Diversification 
Benefit for 5 Risk Types: Credit, Operational, Market, 
Liquidity and Interest Rate (200 Largest Banks: Call Report 
Data 1984-2008)
